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Abstract
Computer crime increases in frequency and cost each year. Of all computer crimes, data
breaches are the costliest to organizations. In addition to the harm data breaches cause to
organizations, these breaches often involve the exposure of individuals’ personal data,
placing the affected individuals at greater risk of computer crimes such as credit card
fraud, tax fraud, and identity theft. Despite the breadth and severity of consequences for
individuals, existing IS literature lacks coverage of how users respond to data breaches.
Routine Activity Theory provides the study’s theoretical frame. Routine Activity Theory
states that crime occurs when the routine activities of a potential target place them in
proximity to a motivated offender in the absence of a capable guardian. This work
examines in detail the target-guardian dyad. Using semi-structured interviews, we inquire
into potential antecedents to users’ beliefs about external guardians, how users’ beliefs
about external guardians affect users’ online routines, and how this process alters in the
aftermath of a data breach.
This study employs a qualitative case study design to explore, at an individual level, the
process by which users outside organizations determine their online routines, in light of
their reliance for data protection on external guardians over which they have little to no
control, and how the process is affected by awareness of a data breach. The cases selected
are 1) the 2017 data breach at the consumer credit agency Equifax and 2) the Facebook
Cambridge Analytica data compromise that became public in 2018.
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Our findings show that users’ individual, situational, and data characteristics affect users'
external guardianship beliefs and online routines. Additionally, under certain
circumstances, users can fail to identify data guardians or develop adversarial feelings
towards organizations that act as data guardians through control of user data. With some
well-defined limitations, after data breaches users report changes in individual
characteristics, perceptions of situational and data characteristics, and online routines.
Based on these findings, we draw conclusions for future research and practice.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Research Problem
Computer crime, defined as illegal activity involving computers (Mumford 1998),
increases in frequency and cost each year (Ponemon Institute 2017a). Of all computer
crimes, data breaches, any “unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or confidential
data resulting in the compromise or potential compromise of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of the affected data” (Sen and Borle 2015, p. 315), are the costliest to
organizations (Ponemon Institute 2017a). In addition to the harm they cause to
organizations, when these breaches involve the exposure of the personal data of
individuals, they place affected individuals at greater risk of computer crimes such as
credit card fraud, tax fraud, and identity theft (Ponemon Institute 2017b).
In recent years, millions of Americans have had their data compromised when
organizations in possession of their data failed to prevent illicit access to that data. A
2017 breach at the consumer credit agency Equifax saw 143 million consumer financial
records stolen (Ponemon Institute 2017a), placing approximately half of the citizens of
the United States at risk. Between 2014 and 2015, the data company Cambridge
Analytica used Facebook to gain illicit access to personal data from 87 million people
(Solon 2018). In this study, we examine the effect of organizational data breaches on
individuals whose data was held by an organization and exposed during a data breach
experienced by that organization.
Individuals affected by an organizational data breach may be consumers of an
organization’s goods or services (as is the case with Facebook users), or they may be
individuals about whom a company has gathered data as part of providing goods or
1

services to third-parties (as is the case with Equifax users, whose individual data is part of
Equifax’s vast repository of consumer financial information). Regardless of the auspices
under which an organization collects an individual user’s data, these users face
consequences from an organization’s data breach. The consequences of a data breach to a
user may include monetary losses, decreased value of the exposed personal data,
increased probability of receiving spam, exposure of private information resulting in
discrimination or social stigma, increased risk of fraud, increased risk of identity theft,
and other psychological or intangible harms (Romanosky & Acquisti 2009, Baldwin et al.
2017, and Ponemon Institute 2017b).
Despite the breadth and severity of consequences for users, existing Information Systems
(IS) literature lacks coverage of how users respond to data breaches. When faced with a
wide range of possible negative consequences, we argue that users seek to reduce their
likelihood of suffering such consequences in the future. The notification that their data
has been compromised may trigger changes in user characteristics and perspectives that
in turn affect their beliefs about external guardianship of their data, resulting in changes
to their online routines. Users may change their online routines by altering their online
activity; for example, choosing to abandon a social media platform. Users may change
their routines by enacting personal guardianship behaviors, such as choosing more
complex passwords. Note, we do not argue that such alterations in a user’s online routine
would necessarily achieve the goal of reducing their risk of being victim of a data breach.
Rather, we assert that the process is itself of interest, whether effective or not, because it
may change users’ online behaviors.
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Changes to user behaviors online have possible ramifications at many levels.
Understanding how users adapt their behavior should enable scholars to better predict
user choices in this period of frequent data breaches. Organizations could incorporate
relevant findings into their marketing and service recovery strategies. Governments and
security-oriented non-profits could use this information to develop relevant content for
cybersecurity training materials. However, at present, IS security research has not
captured the process by which users develop beliefs about external guardianship, how
those beliefs affect their online routines, nor how breaches affect such beliefs.
This study examines, at an individual level, processes that lead to a user’s online routines
and changes that occur after a user becomes aware of a data breach. This topic offers
value to the literature since the consequences of breaches on the beliefs, behaviors, and
activities of affected users have received little attention, thus far, in IS research, but have
applications for scholars, organizations, and governments (Bansal & Zahedi 2015).

Research Questions
Our research questions are:
1. How do individuals determine their personal online routines given that they are
reliant for data protection on external guardians over whom they have little or no
control?
2. How does awareness of a data breach impact this process?

Summary
This dissertation is laid out in six chapters. Chapter one introduced our problem space
and our research questions. Chapter two will review the current state of IS security
3

literature as it relates to our research; present Routine Activity Theory (RAT), which we
use to frame our work, and describe the constructs we have chosen to employ in a
tentative process model that we employed in our exploration of our research questions.
Chapter three explains our choice of methodology, including case selection, sample
recruitment, and our data collection processes. Chapter four covers our analysis of
collected data with detailed descriptions of coding and categorization. Chapter five ties
the results our data analysis to specific findings, answering our research questions and
presenting propositions in the context of existing research. Lastly, chapter six offers our
contributions to theory and practice, suggests possible future research, and describes the
limitations of the study as executed.

4

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Background
This chapter will cover IS research on security, the theoretical lens we will employ to
frame our research, and our tentative process model combining the two. In the first
section, we describe existing IS security research, providing an overview of the major
research streams present at this time. In the second section, we introduce our theoretical
lens, Routine Activity Theory, providing a detailed examination of its concepts and
explaining their application to our research questions. Finally, in section three, we
describe a model, derived from elements in IS security research and Routine Activity
Theory, that we developed to assist in our exploration of our research questions.

IS Security Research
There exist three major, active streams of IS security research: 1) technological, 2)
economic, and 3) socio-behavioral (Hua & Bapna 2013).
Technological
In IS security research, one of the major research streams, technological, formed when
information security systems first appeared. Researchers began to develop technological
solutions to guard against information security vulnerabilities. Using reference disciplines
such as engineering and computer science, researchers in this stream created models of
access control (Lockman and Minsky 1984), proposed algorithmic methods to improve
the confidentiality of data in computer databases without compromising data integrity
(Adam and Jones 1989), and identified key areas of computer-based vulnerability
(Boockholdt 1989). Work on these technological solutions has continued to expand and
evolve; this research is employed today by security professionals and used to create
5

industry standards and federal regulations (Kwon & Johnson 2014). Unfortunately, no
technological solution, no matter how well-designed, can provide perfect security for a
system that contains human actors (Lee et al. 2016); humans inevitably introduce
vulnerabilities. A technological stream of research is necessary, but researchers
discovered that technology alone could not solve the problem of IS security. The efficacy
of this research relied on the assumption that technology, once created, would be used by
managers to prevent information security risks to organizations; this assumption turned
out to be inaccurate (Marston et al. 1989). Managers often failed to implement these
technological solutions either because they underestimated the necessity of these
measures or lacked sufficient expertise in their use (Marston et al. 1989 and Straub &
Nance 1990).
Economic
Another early stream of IS security research began with attempts to answer questions that
would guide managers in their efforts to ensure computer-based information systems did
not increase an organization’s overall economic risks (Lockman and Minsky 1984). This
stream was motivated by a desire to enable managers to rationally assess risks arising
from organizations’ increasing reliance on costly and sophisticated information systems
(Rainer et al. 1991). Managers tended to underestimate the investment required to
adequately secure their IS assets (Loch et al. 1992). Some IS security researchers argued
that a firm’s security investments should be selected based on economic risk modeling;
these models combined qualitative and quantitative risk management methods previously
used to assess other types of risk. (Rainer et al. 1991).
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Unfortunately, at first, the efficacy of these risk management models was not empirically
supported in an information security context (Baskerville 1991). Despite this lack of
empirical validity, risk management models provided an important benefit: a lexicon.
In many organizations, management’s adoption of sound information security policy was
hampered by the lack of a common vocabulary between managers and security personnel.
When describing information security, security personnel relied on highly technical
terminology which managers rarely possessed the background to understand (Baskerville
1991). Risk management provided a shared language for discussions regarding the value
of IS security investments, enabling technologically-skilled security staff members to
convey the severity of risks and the benefits of investments to managers in a language
that managers understood from their experience assessing other types of business risk.
(Baskerville 1991). This demonstrated that a shared language regarding risks, costs, and
efficacy can enable those without technical proficiency to make sound decisions about
guardianship of their information systems.
Over time, the development and application of increasingly complex mathematic
techniques overcame many obstacles to the predictive accuracy of risk management
models in the information security context. Researchers extended and deepened existing
models to allow the possibility of ambiguous outcomes characteristic of computer
security (Sun et al. 2006). Improved simulations of attacker behavior were made possible
through the use of game theory (Cavusoglu et al. 2008) and event studies (Png et al.
2008). Econometric modeling allowed researchers to assess the efficacy of different
information security investments, including layered defenses (Cavusoglu et al. 2009),
overt versus covert defensive postures (Cremonini & Nizovtsev 2009), and security
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outsourcing (Zhao et al. 2013). Despite this progress, the frequent introduction of
unknown threats into the information security ecosystem limits the accuracy of economic
models of information security risk (Straub & Welke 1998 and Dhillon & Torkzadeh
2006). Nevertheless, economic risk modeling informs managerial approaches to
information security investment and has led to the creation of a host of options for
organizations seeking to protect themselves from the financial risks of computer crime
including cyber-insurance, third-party organizational security providers, and risk pooling
(Zhao et al. 2013). While this stream of research has provided amply for organizations,
the focus on firm-level dynamics has left the needs of private users largely unaddressed.
Organizations have many options to offset information security risks, but users do not
possess a corresponding toolset for the transfer, mitigation, or avoidance of information
security risks.
Socio-behavioral
The final major stream of IS security research is socio-behavioral. Socio-behavioral IS
researchers pull from the reference disciplines of psychology, sociology, and
criminology. They examine IS security employing a schema in which organizations are
viewed as a collection of responsible agents acting based on social norms and individual
affordances (Backhouse & Dhillon 1996). This positions security within the realm of
human decisions, thus allowing IS security research to encompass technical solutions, the
efficacy of deterrents or preventative measures, and employee behaviors, all within the
larger frame of choices made by individuals at work (Backhouse & Dhillon 1996, Phillips
1998, Straub & Welke 1998, and Willison & Backhouse 2006). This stream of research is
of particular interest, in the context of our study, because it considers human decisions.
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Socio-behavioral security research has shown that user’s perceptions of security and
interactions with security technology are affected by a variety of conscious and
unconscious factors.
Conscious Factors
Conscious factors are those over which humans have active control. They encompass the
choices we make day to day. While tied intimately with unconscious factors, conscious
factors drive our behavior when we are attentively processing our environment
(Kahneman, 2003). The conscious factors prior socio-behavioral research has identified
as relevant to IS security are threat appraisal, fear, trust, and suspicion.
Threat Appraisal and Fear
IS security researchers have found that user’s conscious decision-making when choosing
whether to adopt protective technologies differs from the decision-making process
individuals use for other technologies (Dinev et al. 2009). Evidence indicates that
constructs found in the Technology Acceptance Model of “perceived usefulness” and
“perceived ease of use,” which generally influence adoption, are not significant in the
context of IS security (Dinev et al. 2009). In the security context, individuals make an
appraisal of threat based on their perceptions of their own susceptibility and the threat’s
severity (Liang & Xue 2009). Users do not adopt security tools if they underestimate
their risks (Liang & Xue 2010) or overestimate the extent to which their self-efficacy in
information security enables them to avoid harm without outside assistance (Herath et al.
2014).
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Trust and Suspicion
Researchers have found that, when making decisions regarding online activity, users
share information with sites they trust, and they are inclined to trust sites with visible
security technology (Belanger et al. 2002). However, trust, when misplaced, can make
users vulnerable (Algarni et al. 2017). Misplaced trust is a significant factor in phishing
(Wright & Marett 2010 and Goel et al. 2017) and other types of social engineering
(Algarni et al. 2017). The trust construct that has been empirically supported refers to
situational trust between two parties, such as a customer and a firm, which is situated in a
particular time and context, such as an online transaction to purchase goods.
In counterpoint to the trust, rather than referring to a specific decision, suspicion is
understood as an ongoing assessment of others: a person with high suspicion does not
anticipate beneficial conduct from others (Bobko et al. 2014). In their work, Wright and
Marett employ dispositional factors of trust, perceived risk, and suspicion as relevant
constructs affecting deception success in phishing attempts (2010). Individuals who have
a high level of suspicion are less likely to fall for phishing attempts even when they trust
the source of an email message (Wright & Marett 2010). Suspicion is distinct from both
trust and distrust and is a process of three stages 1) uncertainty/ suspended judgement, 2)
perception of malintent, and 3) cognitive activation (Bobko 2014). Evidence indicates
that suspicion should be considered in addition to trust when modeling online behaviors,
as it can be significant in situations for which trust is not significant (Wright & Marett
2010).
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Unconscious factors
In addition to conscious factors, unconscious factors also affect users’ perceptions of
security and decisions about security behaviors. Unconscious factors are cognitive
processes that we execute without any deliberate intention (Kahneman, 2003).
Researchers have identified habituation and adherence to one’s technological frame as
unconscious factors that affect security behaviors (Anderson et al. 2016a, Anderson et al.
2016b, and Vuorinen & Tetri 2012).
Habituation
There are ways in which the brain works to undermine the user’s ability to guard against
harm. “Although users are frequently cited by security researchers as careless and
inattentive [41], our results show that at least part of this behavior is obligatory and
unconscious as a natural consequence of how the brain works.” (Anderson et al. 2016b,
P. 737). Faced with frequent warnings about possible threats, habituation inures users to
the fear such messages are supposed to create; this particular cognitive process can be
overcome with varying and increasingly garish messages, but it represents just one
unconscious obstacle to sound security decision making (Anderson et al. 2016a and
Anderson et al. 2016b). Similar to living next to train tracks, the consistent rumble of the
engine and cars fades into the background with enough time. The same can be said for
the appearance of warnings in the apparent absence of harm.
Technological Frame
Another unconscious factor that affects individual’s interactions with security technology
is the user’s technological frame; a user’s technological frame can be understood as the
largely unconscious set of norms and ideas that develop around the use of an IT artifact
11

(Phillips 1998). The demands of guardianship can conflict with an individual’s
technological frame; for example, an individual whose technological frame includes an
assumption of openness might expect to the access information within their organization
freely– a behavior that would conflict with the implementation of sound IS security
access controls (Smith et al. 2010). Individuals whose technological frame does not align
with a particular security artifact may undermine or ignore that security artifact
(Vuorinen & Tetri 2012).
In sum, the socio-behavioral stream of research demonstrates that users have conscious
and unconscious individual characteristics (i.e., aspects of an individual’s personality,
character, or experience) that affect their security beliefs and behaviors. However, much
of socio-behavioral IS security research focuses on specific aspects of a user’s behavior:
their adoption of technology, their decision to share information, their willingness to
conform to security guidelines. Each piece described has value and provides insight, but
none captures the entire process by which users determine their online routines.
Summary
Having reviewed the relevant aspects of technological, economic, and socio-behavioral
IS security research, we find that existing IS security research offers wide-ranging
findings on the use and adoption of security technologies, risk management techniques
for managers in organizations, and evidence that user’s perceptions of risk change their
behaviors. However, it presently lacks coverage of the process by which users outside of
organizations determine their online routines, and how the process is affected by a data
breach.
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Routine Activity Theory
IS security literature does not provide a solid theoretical foundation for understanding the
processes by which users determine their online routines before and after learning of a
data breach. However, data breaches are a form of crime, and a useful theory exists in the
field of criminology. Routine Activity Theory (RAT) states that crime occurs when the
routine activities of a potential target place them in proximity to a motivated offender in
the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson 1979). These three actors form the
ecosystems of crime; definitions of each can be found in Table 1.

Table 1: Routine Activity Theory
Motivated Offender

A rational actor willing to commit a crime

Potential Target

A person, place, or object of value
A person or thing the presence of which deters an

Capable Guardian
offender from committing a crime

Targets: a Caveat
The routine activities of targets place them in proximity to offenders increasing the
likelihood that they will be victims of crime. In stating that a target’s choices place them
in harm’s way, we do not place fault for the crime with the victim, nor intend to assert
that there exists some perfect set of choices which would prevent a user from ever being
victimized. In reality, much of a user’s data security is out of their hands. Once an
organization possesses a user’s data, the user is affected by the choices about security
made within that organization. Our research focuses on the Equifax and Facebook data
13

breaches, both of which occurred in the United States where the current legal and
technological climate allows organizations to collect information about individual users
without their explicit consent (Hodges 2013). In such a climate, the user, no matter how
skilled, must rely on organizations to guard them against data breaches. Such
guardianship is external to the user and not susceptible to their personal control.
Nevertheless, the users, as potential targets of crime, do possess some degree of
autonomy and agency through their choice of online routine. Understanding how users
determine their online routines, in light of their reliance on external guardians, could
empower researchers, security application developers, and governments in any efforts
they might undertake to support and facilitate users’ personal guardianship behaviors and
to reduce the risks to users that arise from their online activity.
Applicability to the IS Security Context
Prior IS security work demonstrates that RAT can be used within the IS field to
understand aspects of computer crime (Willison & Backhouse 2006, Ransbotham &
Mitra 2009, and Wang et al. 2015). For example, Willison and Backhouse found that
local knowledge of an organization improves guardianship, because situational
opportunities are important motivational factors for offenders who are inside an
organization (2006). Wang et al. found a significant relationship between guardianship
and targets and the likelihood of insider threats (2015). Ransbotham and Mitra identified
two types of target selection which differ based on which target characteristics upon
which the offender focuses (2009). This existing IS security research using RAT supports
the use of the theory to answer questions relevant to our field but chiefly has been used to
consider types of guardians, offender motivations, and characteristics that make targets
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attractive. By contrast, the perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors of targets (i.e., users)
themselves have yet to be explored comprehensively and remain a fertile ground for
research. In sum, there is a void in the IS security literature regarding users’ perceptions,
beliefs, and behaviors both pre- and post-breach. RAT can assist in our efforts to bridge
this gap. We posit that RAT can apply to the context of user behavior online and how
notification of data breaches affects this process. To our knowledge, this is first study to
apply RAT to the process by which users outside organizations determine their online
routines, in light of users’ reliance on external guardians, and how the process is affected
by awareness of a data breach.
The Target-guardian Dyad
In some ways, the relationship between an external guardian and potential target is
paradoxical in the context of computer crime, since in this setting the user generally does
not hire nor control their guardian. Users exist outside the organization. From their
position outside, they are largely unable to affect organizational-level guardianship
behaviors before or after data breaches. Indeed, since users may lack the ability to
terminate the relationship with these guardians, as is the case with users and Equifax, one
might assume external guardianship to be irrelevant to individuals’ decision making.
However, when studying the possible viability of a national identity ecosystem, IS
researchers uncovered indications that individuals consider their beliefs about external
guardianship when making decisions about their online routines (Crossler and Posey
2017). While users cannot control their data, they may make conscious decisions about
their online routine based on their external guardianship beliefs.
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In this study, we are concerned with the process by which users develop their online
routines and how data breaches affect those routines; we seek to understand those
routines in light of users’ reliance on external guardians. Prior research indicates that
users make decisions about their online routine based on their external guardianship
beliefs (Crossler and Posey 2017). However, prior work has not addressed how those
beliefs about external guardianship form. In this study, we examine in detail the targetguardian dyad; specifically, we explore specific individual characteristics that may be
antecedents to users’ beliefs about external guardians, how users’ beliefs about external
guardians affect users’ online routines, and how this process alters in the aftermath of a
data breach notification.
Relevant Antecedents to External Guardianship Beliefs
Existing research does not present a clear picture of how users develop external
guardianship beliefs. In the absence of prior work on this specific relationship, we sought
to determine possible antecedents to users’ beliefs about external guardians. It was our
hope to find constructs likely to apply, which we could use as a starting place when
asking participants about their external guardianship beliefs. In an effort to identify these,
we reviewed prior research in the security context to identify constructs previously shown
to affect security beliefs and behaviors (Rountree & Land 1996, Rhee et al. 2009, Wright
& Marett 2010, and Vance et al. 2014).
As part of our review of social-behavioral IS research earlier in this chapter, we discussed
constructs that researchers have found to affect perceptions of or interactions with
security. We discussed several constructs as part of that review: threat appraisal, fear,
self-efficacy in information security, trust, suspicion, habituation to warnings, and
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technological frame. When we began to consider what the antecedents to external
guardianship beliefs might be, these constructs were our initial candidates, because of
their effect on security perceptions and behaviors found in other works. Reviewing these
constructs for inclusion in our study, some constructs proved inappropriate to the
research at hand, while others required restatement or refinement prior to data collection.
In the following sections, we discuss all identified constructs in greater detail and explain
our reasoning for their inclusion or exclusion.
Risk Perception
Introduced as a construct in Technology Threat Avoidance Theory, threat appraisal
consists of two lower-order constructs: perceived susceptibility and perceived severity
(Liang & Xue, 2009). Threat appraisal occurs when “users evaluate the potential negative
consequences of being attacked by malicious IT” (Liang & Xue, 2009, p. 77). The threat
appraisal construct is similar to an awareness construct introduced by Dinev and Hu:
awareness of “potential threats and consequences of poor or no protection” (2007).
Threat awareness has been shown to lead to fear (Dinev & Hu 2007). In the context of IS
security, fear has been found to be more relevant than other constructs, such as perceived
usefulness and perceived ease of use, which generally drive decision making with regards
to technology (Dinev & Hu 2007). This finding is mirrored by fear appeals research using
Protection Motivation Theory which considers fear to be a motivator of behavior (Boss et
al. 2015). However, based on new findings from NeuroIS research that call into question
whether the presence of fear can be accurately assessed by reflective measures and selfreport, we are reluctant to employ either threat awareness or fear as standalone constructs
(Warkentin et al. 2016). Thus, we have chosen to combine these associated concepts into
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a single construct of risk perception which should capture user awareness and appraisal
of threat along with any emotional response thereto.
Self-efficacy in Information Security
Self-efficacy is a construct of long standing, arising originally from cognitive psychology
(Bandura 1977). Self-efficacy is context specific, and the concept was adapted for the IS
context in the form of computer self-efficacy, which refers to an individual’s belief in
their ability to perform computer-related tasks (Compeau & Higgins 1995). Self-efficacy
in information security (SEIS) is a similar, but more recent, adaptation and is defined as
“a belief in one’s capability to protect information and information systems from
unauthorized disclosure, modification, loss, destruction, and lack of availability” (Rhee et
al. 2009, p 818). Researchers have found that SEIS significantly affects security
perceptions (Wright & Marett 2010) and behaviors (Rhee et al. 2009). Individual’s with
higher SEIS perceive information security with inflated optimism; this optimism affects
not only their self-assessment, but their assessments of others concerned with information
security (Rhee at al. 2005). Based on the relationship between SEIS and individual’s
assessment of others, we have chosen to include this construct in our questions intended
to identify antecedents to external guardianship beliefs.
Trust
Like self-efficacy, trust is a construct with a long history of use in IS research. The trust
construct considers the relationship between two actors in which one actor believes that
the other will act according to their expectations (Luhmann 1979). When adapted to the
IS context, online trust was found to have important differences from offline trust. In
specific, online trust involves both trust in the trustee (e.g., organization) and trust in the
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technology the trustee employs (e.g., their website) (Shankar et al. 2002). Through these
two aspects, individuals assess whether the trustee is both willing and able to act as
expected (McKnight & Chervany 2001a and McKnight & Chervany 2001b).
The IS security literature tends to look at trust mostly from the vantage of persuasion and
deception (Wright & Marett 2010 and Wright et al. 2014). At times, in an IS security
context, trust is presented as a single, unfaceted construct (Belanger 2002 and Wright &
Marett 2010). This perspective informed our initial operationalization of trust in this
work.
When conceptualized in this manner, trust had been found to have positive and negative
effects on perception and behavior. Phishing messages are more successful at conversion
when their recipient perceives the sender as trustworthy (Goel et al. 2017). Users who
perceive a social media platform to be trustworthy are inclined to share more freely,
which can have positive or negative implications (Tow et al. 2010). Trust also enables ecommerce (Belanger et al. 2002), improves organizational security compliance (Johnston
et al. 2016), and decreases computer abuse (Lowry et al. 2015). Based on this evidence,
at the outset of our research, we argued that a user’s inclination to trust is likely to affect
their beliefs about external guardians and felt confident that trust could be examined as a
single higher-order construct. We developed interview questions about relationships
between trust as an antecedent to external guardianship beliefs based on this perspective.
During data collection limitations to this approach became evident. We will discuss these
issues in the upcoming subsection: Revisions during data analysis.
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Suspicion
Suspicion as a construct originated in the field of communication with Interpersonal
Deception Theory, which examines how individuals assess deception on a conscious or
unconscious level (Burgoon et al. 1994). Variations of the suspicion construct have been
employed in many fields. Across these fields, the construct tends to have three
components: 1) suspended judgment, 2) concern about another entity’s motives, and 3)
cognitive activation (Bobko et al. 2014). Evidence indicates that suspicion should be
considered separately from trust when modeling online behaviors (Wright & Marett
2010). When distinguishing between the two constructs, trust is characterized as a
decision, while suspicion is an ongoing cognitive state (Bobko et al. 2014). It is possible
for suspicion to be a significant construct even in cases where trust is not predictive
(Wright & Marett 2010). A suspicious person does not anticipate beneficial conduct from
others – a view we argue is likely to affect their perceptions of external guardians
(Wright & Marett 2010). Therefore, we developed interview questions designed to reveal
the relationship between suspicion and external guardianship beliefs. As with the trust
construct, data collection revealed complexities around the construct of suspicion as
described above. We will discuss these issues in detail in chapter four: Analysis.
Excluded Constructs
Habituation to Warnings
Habituation to warnings is another construct that appears in IS security research studying
the user’s perceptions of guardians (Zahedi et al. 2015, Anderson et al. 2016a, Anderson
et al. 2016b, and Jenkins et al. 2016). However, habituation to warnings refers
specifically to the narrow context in which protective software interrupts users with
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messages indicating possible security vulnerabilities; it does not refer to users’
perceptions of external guardians in the sense of organizational guardians who possess
user data. Thus, no questions intended to elicit user’s habituation to warnings were
developed for this study.
Technological Frame
The final construct covered in our review of potential antecedents based on prior research
is the technological frame. This construct, which refers to the norms and ideas that form
around an IT artifact, was introduced to explain the use of technology in organizations
(Orlikowski and Gash 1994) and was applied promptly to an IS security context (Phillips
1998). However, there exist two obstacles to including this construct in our study 1)
aspects of a technological frame are often unconscious or at least implicit and 2) a
technological frame is a social rather than a purely individual phenomenon. (Orlikowski
and Gash 1994). To include such a construct in our study would require an in-depth
examination of user interactions in situ, which is outside the scope of this research. As
such, no questions designed to isolate this construct were developed for our study.
Revisions during Data Analysis
During the process of data analysis, it became clear that two of our identified constructs,
trust and suspicion, were inadequately distinct despite our initial attempts to choose
stable and relevant constructs. Thus, it became necessary to broaden our literature review
to include IS research on trust, distrust, and suspicion outside the IS security research
context, in order to properly situate these constructs in their wide nomological network
and resolve construct ambiguity.
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During data analysis, we found that a higher order view of trust was insufficient to map
our findings. Fortunately, there exists a rich stream of IS trust research outside of the IS
security context. The work of McKnight and his collaborators was extremely helpful in
clarifying our understanding of participant views on trust (McKnight and Chervany
2001b). Trust is presented as a multi-stage process (McKnight and Chervany 2001b). In
order for trust to occur, users must also have the disposition to trust: a willingness to
depend on others (McKnight and Chervany 2001b). They must have institution-based
trust in the protective structures that exist within an environment (McKnight and
Chervany 2001a). They must have trusting beliefs that the trustee is willing and able to
act in their interests (McKnight and Chervany 2001a). These lead the trusting intentions
and, ultimately, trusting actions.
Issues surrounding the trust and suspicion constructs are discussed more fully in our later
analysis section, where they can be presented alongside the relevant data.
Summary
In closing, based on the arguments above, we identified four individual characteristics of
users drawn from prior work likely to form antecedents to users’ external guardianship
beliefs. Specifically, we expected the individual characteristics of risk perception, trust,
suspicion, and self-efficacy in information security to influence the development of users’
beliefs about external guardianship. In the next section, we combine these constructs
from prior IS security research with constructs in RAT to create a tentative model of the
process by which users develop online routines in light of their reliance on external
guardians and the effect of data breach on this process. We then used our model to
develop an interview script designed to elicit the lived experience of users.
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Model Description
To test our research questions, we define and contextualize our chosen constructs,
describe the relationships between them, and depict those relationships in the form of a
process model. The model can be found following our construct definitions in Figure 1.
The constructs and relationships of this model provided a structure for the design of our
interview script.
Constructs
Individual Characteristics
User’s possess individual characteristics which we define as aspects of individual
personality, aptitude, or experience. We have identified constructs that we argue
comprise the individual characteristics affecting users’ external guardianship beliefs. We
define these constructs below.


Risk perception is an individual’s assessment of potential threats based on their
online routine and any fear of computer crime victimization that they feel as a
result of this assessment.



Self-efficacy in information security (SEIS) is defined as “a belief in one’s
capability to protect information and information systems from unauthorized
disclosure, modification, loss, destruction, and lack of availability” (Rhee et al.
2009, p 818).



Trust is the user’s expectation that an organization intends to provide
guardianship and their expectation that the protective technologies that
organization employs will be sufficient to execute that guardianship role.
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Suspicion is the perspective that others must be judged cautiously in an ongoing
fashion because they are not intrinsically well-meaning. (Wright & Marett 2010
and Bobko et. al 2014).

External Guardianship Beliefs
In the preceding sub-section, we defined four individual characteristics from prior
literature that we argue affect users’ external guardianship beliefs. We will now define
the construct of external guardianship beliefs.
Types of Guardianship
Computer crime researchers have subdivided guardianship into five levels, shown in
Table 5: personal, physical, social, technological, and national (Yar 2005, Bossler & Holt
2009, Reyns et al. 2011 and Williams 2015). These divisions describe either the method
of enacting guardianship, as is the case with physical or technological guardianship, or
they describe the level of social order at which the guardianship is performed, as is the
case with personal, social, and national guardianship.
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Table 2: Types of Guardianship
Construct
Personal

Physical

Social

Technological

National

Meaning
A user’s ability to
protect
themselves from
computer crime

The presence of
target hardening
measures

The presence of
formal or
informal online
others who
discourage
criminal acts

Any technology
the presence of
which
discourages
criminal acts

Mature national
cyber-security
strategies

Operationalization
Computer selfefficacy, willingness
to share passwords,
changing passwords,
risk awareness

the presence of
firewalls and security
programs

On-site network
admins, systems
security staff, friends’
behavior, online
peers, and industry
self-regulation

Antivirus software,
firewalls, intrusion
detection systems,
profile tracking
software

Months since
instantiation of
national
cybersecurity
strategy, internet
penetration
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Works
Bossler & Holt
(2009)

Findings
Not Significant

Williams
(2015)

Significant only if
country-level
guardianship is
excluded from
model.

Leukfeldt &
Yar (2016)

Significant

Bossler & Holt
(2009)
Reyns,
Henson, and
Fisher (2011)
Williams
(2015)
Yar (2005)

Not Significant

Bossler & Holt
(2009)

Significant

Reyns,
Henson, and
Fisher (2011)

Significant

Yar (2005)

Theoretically
Supported

Reyns,
Henson, and
Fisher (2011)
Leukfeldt,
(2014)

Significant

Leukfeldt &
Yar (2016)

Not Significant

Williams
(2015)

Significant

Significant

Significant
Theoretically
Supported

Not Significant

These divisions are well suited to the study of guardians; however, in research such as
ours, which turns its attention to users, this level of granularity may not be appropriate. In
the following section, we offer an alternate division of guardians that we believe is more
appropriate to our research problem.
The argument for an External Guardianship construct
When a person makes a decision, they do not do so from an omniscient view of reality,
but rather based on their understanding given incomplete information (Kahneman 2003).
A person choosing what websites to visit or what information to share online will not
always know which organizations hold their data or what forms of guardianship those
organizations employ (Schneider 2009). While physical, social, technological, and
national guardianship may affect the guardianship an organization provides, these forms
of guardianship are not subject to separate assessment and alteration by users. Users are
unlikely, for example, to know the extent to which an organization relies on social
guardianship behaviors such as the presence of on-site network administrators. Nor are
they likely to be aware which guardianship technologies an organization uses or how
sturdy are the locks to the server rooms. In this way, all external guardianship, (i.e., any
guardianship aside from a user’s personal guardianship behaviors) forms a single,
unknown whole. When undertaking this study, we anticipated that, in the absence of
transparent and accurate knowledge, an individual’s beliefs about external guardianship
would be based on the user’s individual characteristics.
User Online Routine
In the preceding sub-section, we presented a case for external guardianship beliefs. We
argue that these external guardianship beliefs affect users’ online routines. Now we will
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define the construct of users’ online routine and the two lower order constructs of which
it is composed.
Routine
RAT posits that we all have routines which place us in proximity to one another (Cohen
and Felson 1979). These routines are composed of our day-to-day activities. The study of
routines in relation to crime was brought into an online context by criminologists (Yar
2005). IS security researchers applied the construct to an organizational setting (Willison
& Backhouse 2006).
Online Activity and Personal Guardianship Behaviors
Researchers using RAT have drawn a distinction between a routine online activity and an
individual’s personal guardianship behaviors; though both take place online, online
activity and personal guardianship behaviors may change independently of one another
(Leukfeldt and Yar 2016). Based on these findings, we have divided online routines into
two lower-order constructs: online activity and personal guardianship behaviors.


Online Activity refers to any actions an individual takes online that do not have a
security motive; for example, the websites they visit, the content they post, games
they play, etc. (Yar 2005).



Personal Guardianship Behaviors consist of acts that an individual performs to
keep themselves secure online, such as changing one’s passwords regularly or
studying common attack methods (Leukfeldt & Yar 2016).
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Breach Announcement
A data breach is any “unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or confidential data
resulting in the compromise or potential compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the affected data” (Sen and Borle 2015, p. 315). In many countries,
including the United States, laws and regulations dictate the circumstances under which
an organization that experiences a breach must notify those whose data was affected
(Hodges 2013). In addition, extensive media coverage of large breaches can also lead
individuals to seek out information about a specific breach as well as whether their data
was exposed in that breach.
Breach Notification
We consider a breach notification to have occurred when a user receives a notice from an
organization through any media stating that their data has been affected by a security
breach. We include both notices originating from the organization without user action
and notices that are the result of an inquiry by the user. To illustrate, participants would
be eligible for inclusion whether their notification occurred through an unprompted email
from the breached organization or as a result of the user going to a website created by the
breached organization to allow people to determine if their account was impacted. For the
purposes of the Equifax case, we recruited participants who were notified of the data
breach.
Breach Awareness
We consider breach awareness to have occurred when a user reports that they are aware
of a specific data breach. This awareness can be the result of a breach notification, news
coverage of a specific breach, television programs or podcasts discussing the breach, or
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any other means by which an individual gain knowledge that the breach has occurred. For
the purposes of the Facebook case, we recruited participants who were either notified or
aware of the data breach.
Effect on Users
We argue that breach awareness may affect users’ perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors,
resulting in changes to their online routines.
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Research Model

Figure 1: Research Model
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Summary
This chapter we have reviewed IS research on security, introduced the theoretical lens of
Routine Activity Theory, and presented the constructs we determined likely to have
relevance to our research questions. Finally, we provided a model, derived from elements
in IS security research and Routine Activity Theory, that we developed to assist in our
creation of an interview script to address our research questions. In the next chapter, we
will give the scope of our research, discuss our chosen research method, and describe our
sample selection process and our data collection methods.
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Chapter Three: Methodology and Research Approach
Chapter Three will include a delineation of research scope, a discussion of the research
method and its appropriateness to our research questions, a description of the research
sample selection process and our data collection methods.

Research Scope
While Routine Activity Theory offers a foundation for a host of interesting research
questions and future areas of research, the scope of this work is limited to RAT applied to
the examination of antecedents to the beliefs of users about external guardianship, of how
external guardianship beliefs determine users’ online routines, and of how awareness of a
data breach alters those processes for users who self-identified as affected by or aware of
the Equifax or Facebook data breaches.

Methodology
The primary motivation for this study is the elaboration of Routine Activities Theory.
RAT is not a new theory and has been applied to various contexts including those in IS
security research (Willison & Backhouse 2006, Ransbotham & Mitra 2009, and Wang et
al. 2015). Filling in gaps in existing theory (Pratt 2009); proposing relationships between
existing theoretical constructs and new constructs (Edmondson & McManus 2007); and
investigating new antecedents, moderators, or mediators to enhance the explanatory
power of an existing theory (Ridder 2017) are all forms of theory elaboration, also called
theory development (Pratt 2009 and Ridder 2017). Qualitative methods, in general, are
appropriate for theory elaboration (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007).
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Qualitative methods are able to “offer insight into complex social processes that
quantitative data cannot easily reveal” (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007, p. 26). We chose to
conduct a qualitative dual-case, interview-based research study to address our research
questions. The qualitative case study, in specific, is a type of “empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003, p. 13).
Case studies are suitable for research that seeks to answer “why” or “how” subjects
respond to a given contemporary stimulus over which the researchers lack control (Yin
2018). Our research seeks to answer two “how” questions: “how do individuals
determine their online routines given that they are reliant for data protection on external
guardians over whom they have little or no control” and “how does awareness of a data
breach impact this process.” Nor can we reasonably control the occurrence of a data
breach without harm to our participants. Thus, our research meets the suitability criteria
outlined by Yin (2018), and for these reasons, case study research is a fit for our study.
Case Selection
The selection of an appropriate case or cases is critical to the success of any qualitative
case study research (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). As the focal point of a study, the case is a
system bounded by time and activity (Creswell 2014). A case can be an individual, an
entity, or an event (Yin 2018). Poetically stated, a case is a “quandary, that will invoke
layers of understanding about the system” (VanWynsberghe & Khan 2007, p.81-82).
More prosaically, a case is “a real world phenomenon with some concrete manifestation”
(Yin 2018, p 77).
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In our study, the cases selected are 1) the 2017 data breach at the consumer credit agency
Equifax and 2) the Facebook Cambridge Analytica data compromise that became public
in 2018. We have chosen two cases rather than one, because, while studies based on
single cases offer value, multi-case studies allow deeper understanding of processes
(Miles et al. 2014). Since our research questions seek to describe a process of user’
determining online routines and any relationship between breach awareness and that
process, a multi-case study seems appropriate.
We selected these instrumental cases, because they are typical of the population of data
breaches in terms of types of data compromised; they also possess intrinsic significance
due to the volume of affected users (Marshall & Rossman 2016). We have chosen two
cases with broad similarities, but with some notable differences in their characteristics, in
order to draw on another methodological strength of multi-case studies. Multi-case
studies with differing, but similar, focal events allow for the emergence of common
conclusions which provide evidence of generalizability (Yin 2018). Table 3 compares
these two cases. In both cases, users experienced data breaches. However, the type of
data compromised, the contrast in the voluntariness of user profile creation, and the
manner in which the data compromise occurred represent differences. These differences
hold the potential to reveal meaningful variations in perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors
or, through the absence of such variation, provide initial evidence of model
generalizability across breach types.

34

Table 3: Case Characteristics
Equifax

Facebook

Financial data affected

Personal and social data affected

143 million affected users

87 million affected users

Involuntary profile creation

Voluntarily profile creation

Data collected primarily via third parties
Data exfiltrated by hackers

Data provided primarily by users and their
social network
Data sold to a third party, and then used in
violation of the Terms of Service

Data Collection Method
Case studies can employ a variety of data collection techniques including interviews,
participation in a relevant setting (e.g., spending time attending meetings at the focal
organization), and analyzing secondary materials and artifacts (e.g., company memos or
process documents) (Marshall & Rossman 2016). While some case studies rely on
several types of data to triangulate findings, (Yin 2018), in-depth interviews alone are
accepted as an efficient method of gathering rich, detailed data relevant to specific
phenomenon (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). Interviews allow researchers to precisely
delineate constructs and relationships (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). In-depth interviews
offer the added benefit that follow-up questions and clarification of meaning can take
place immediately during data collection (Marshall & Rossman 2016). Based on these
merits, we selected in-depth, semi-structured interviews as our data collection method.
Semi-structured interviews “allow the systematic and iterative gathering of data”
(Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007, p150). The iterative aspect of this approach gives
researchers an ability to adapt data collection as a study progresses and to combine
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inductive and deductive findings to create a more complete picture of existing dynamics
within a problem space (Miles et al. 2014).

Sample
Our study examines the implications of two major recent security breaches: Equifax and
Facebook. These cases represent the breach of two distinct types of data: 1) financial
information and 2) personal and social information. The number of users who
experienced these breaches were 143 million individuals and 87 million individuals,
respectively (Ponemon Institute 2017a and Solon 2018). Based on recent findings
regarding the optimal range of interviews in order to reach thematic stability, we
recruited 12 users for each case (Marshall 2013).
Recruitment
To recruit participants, we employed a non-probabilistic approach combining participant
self-selection with snowball sampling. This allowed us to capture the experiences of
users affected by the phenomena of interest who were capable of providing descriptions
of their experiences that were true to life (Miles et al. 2014).
Individuals were recruited via social media posts and emails to social and professional
contacts. Internal Review Board (IRB) approved recruitment materials can be found in
Appendix A. Digital recruitment messages included requests that recruitment messages
be forwarded as widely as possible in an effort to minimize the incidence of ties between
researchers and participants. Additionally, participants were asked to inquire amongst
their social networks for possible eligible participants, as is typical in studies employing
snowball sampling (Robinson 2014).
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Inclusion Criteria
Our initial inclusion criteria were as follows: individuals must be 18 years of age older,
residing in the US outside of incarceration, and report being notified of one or both data
breach under study. Individuals who had worked for the organization experiencing the
breach were excluded from selection. Inclusion criteria and demographic survey
questions can be found in Appendix C.
After recruitment commenced, it became clear that the breach notification criterion posed
a meaningful obstacle in the case of the Facebook breach. After reexamination of our
research questions, we determined that expanding our inclusion criteria to permit
individuals who were aware of the Facebook breach, but who were not notified of their
own data being affected, would allow us to increase the pool of potential participants
without sacrificing relevance. Subsequently participants were included who selfidentified as “aware of” or “notified of” the Facebook breach.
Sample Demographics
In an effort to balance the need for sufficient data to achieve construct and model stability
with need for parsimonious data collection in funded research, we recruited 12 users for
each case (Marshall 2013). Some participants were eligible for inclusion in both cases. In
these cases, participants were included only in the case for which they answered
questions first. To protect participant confidentiality, each participant received an
identifying code, which is used in research documents in lieu of names. Subsequent
sections give demographic information by case.
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Equifax Demographics
The sample gathered for the Equifax case included 12 participants: eight male users and
four female users. Nine participants in the sample identified as White/Caucasian, one as
Asian, one Black/African American, and one as Mixed Race. The majority of these
participants were between 35 – 44 years of age and possessed a bachelor’s degree. Their
median approximate annual household income was $100,000 - $149,999. Full details of
participant demographics for the Equifax case are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Equifax Participant Demographics
ID

Equifax

Gender

Ethnicity

Age

P001

Notified

Female

White

35 - 44

P002

Notified

Male

White

35 - 44

P004

Notified

Male

White

35 - 44

P005

Notified

Female

Asian

35 - 44

P006

Notified

Male

White

35 - 44

P007

Notified

Female

White

65 - 74

P008

Notified

Male

White

55 - 64

P009

Notified

Male

White

55 - 64

P010

Notified

Male

White

55 - 64

P011

Notified

Male

Mixed Race

35 - 44

P012

Notified

Male

White

35 - 44

P013

Notified

Female

Black or
African
American

45 - 54
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Education
Bachelor's
Degree
Bachelor's
Degree
Bachelor's
Degree
Graduate or
Professional
Degree
Some college
Bachelor's
Degree
Bachelor's
Degree
Associate's
Degree or
Professional
Certification
Bachelor's
Degree
Some college
Some
Graduate
School
Graduate or
Professional
Degree

Income
$35,000 $49,999
$100,000 149,000
$200,000 or
more
$150,000 199,999
$100,000 $149,999
$200,000 or
more
$75,000 $99,999
$200,000 or
more

$50,000 $74,999
$200,000 or
more
$35,000 $49,999

Facebook Demographics
The sample gathered for the Facebook case included 12 participants: six male users, five
female users, and one non-binary user. Ten participants in the sample identified as
White/Caucasian, two as Black/African American, and one White/Caucasian participant
additionally identified as American Native or Alaskan Native. The majority of these
participants were between 35 – 44 years of age. Participant education ranged from High
School to Graduate or Professional Degree with the most common response being
Graduate or Professional Degrees. The median approximate annual household income
was $50,000 - $74,999. Full details of participant demographics for the Facebook case
are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Facebook Case Demographics
ID

Facebook

Gender

Ethnicity

Age

Education
Graduate or
Professional
Degree
Graduate or
Professional
Degree
Bachelor's
Degree
Graduate or
Professional
Degree
Graduate or
Professional
Degree

Income
$150,000 199,999

P003

Notified

Female

White

35 - 44

P014

Aware

Female

White

35 - 44

P015

Aware

Male

White

35 - 44

P016

Aware

Female

White

35 - 44

P017

Aware

Male

White

35 - 44

P018

Aware

Female

White

65 - 74

High School

$100,000 $149,999

P019

Aware

Nonbinary

White and
American
Indian/ Alaskan
Native

18 - 24

High School

Less than
$25,000

P020

Aware

Female

White

35 - 44

Graduate or
Professional
Degree

$200,000 or
more
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$75,000 $99,999
$35,000 $49,999
$50,000 $74,999
$35,000 $49,999

Table 5: Facebook Case Demographics
ID

Facebook

Gender

Ethnicity

Age

Education

P021

Aware

Male

White

35 - 44

Some college

P022

Notified

Female

White

35 - 44

Some college

P023

Notified

Male

25 - 34

Some college

P024

Aware

Male

55 - 64

Bachelor's
Degree

Black or African
American
Black or African
American

Income
$35,000 $49,999
$100,000 $149,999
$25,000 $34,999
$50,000 $74,999

Limitation of the Samples
We acknowledge that both self-selection and snowball sampling have known drawbacks.
A limitation of these recruitment methods is that we are unable to report response rates to
recruitment messages; since the number of individuals viewing the messages is unknown
and outside of our control. Additionally, self-selection samples tend to bias towards
candidates who are open, interested in the subject under examination, and female
(Robinson 2014). Snowball sampling, which is dependent on social networks, can lead to
the over-representation of socio-demographic sub-groups within the sample (Biernacki &
Waldorf 1981).
We attempted to mitigate the potential biases of our sampling methods through purposive
selection of those prospective participants who entered our selection process. However,
our final samples for both cases illustrate the tendency of snowball samples to reflect the
characteristics of those recruiting. This bias was particularly notable in terms of age and
education. Across cases, 35-44 was most commonly reported age range, while, in the
Facebook group, five participants reported holding a Graduate or Professional Degree.
An oddity appeared in the Equifax sample. Though the median approximate annual
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household income was $100,000 - $149,999; the mode was $200,000 or more. This is not
representative of national income demographics and may be an example of self-selection
samples’ bias toward individuals who are interested in the subject under examination. It
may be that individuals with higher incomes are more concerned by and responsive to
financial data breaches than individuals from other income ranges.
Instrumentation
When preparing for interviews, researchers must find a balance between unstructured,
open-ended questioning and tightly structured questioning. The type of appropriate
interview depends on the nature of the study. When a study examines a single case, is
exploratory, and primarily inductive, open-ended questions work best (Miles at al. 2014).
At contrast, in a study such as this one, which is driven by prior theory and involves
multiple cases, a semi-structured question set focused on the constructs and relationships
of interest decreases superfluous information collected and improves the efficiency and
power of the analysis (Miles at al. 2014). Too much rigidity, however, is unwelcome and
counterproductive. Semi-structured, rather than rigidly structured interview scripts are
used, because they make it possible to delve into a participant’s answers in order to
identify underlying assumptions and to allow participants to explain ambiguous or
unclear statements in their own words rather than relying on the researcher to assign
meaning to their answers (Miles et al. 2014).
Our interview protocol went through several cycles of revision and review both by the
research team and by the University of Memphis’ Interval Review Board (IRB). This led
to an interview protocol containing both questions highly specific to our model and
questions intended to allow participants to provide information regarding their
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characteristics, perspectives, beliefs, behaviors, and experiences unanticipated by our
theoretical foundation. Inclusion criteria and demographic survey questions can be found
in Appendix C. Questions include demographic questions to address representativeness
and qualification questions to ensure the appropriateness of the participant for inclusion
as a study subject. The interview script itself can be found in Appendix D and takes the
form of a semi-structured body of questions to test our chosen constructs and
relationships. Appendix E illustrates just how the research questions map to the model.

Data Collection
Data collection took the form of semi-structured interviews with individuals notified of
the Equifax breach or notified or aware of the Facebook breach. During these interviews,
we employed an interview script (found in Appendix D) intended to elicit the user’s
individual characteristics, their beliefs about external guardianship, their online routines
and the individual’s reaction to the breach including any changes to their individual
characteristics, beliefs about external guardianship, and their online routines made as a
result.
Interviews took place at a suitable location or via phone, based on the participant’s
preference and practical considerations. Across the two cases, half of the interviews were
conducted by phone and half face-to-face. In the Equifax case, seven interviews were
face-to-face and five were online. In the Facebook case, five interviews were online and
seven face-to-face. When conducting the interviews, questions were added or slightly
rephrased to clarify participant responses and were omitted when the construct or
relationship was fully addressed in response to a prior question. At the end of our script,
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we offered the users an opportunity to provide additional information on data breaches,
breached organizations, or any other related insights.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed with the user’s consent. Full consent
document templates can be found in Appendix B. Once transcribed, interview
participants were given an opportunity to review the transcripts of their interviews in
order to confirm that the content reflects the words and intended meaning of the
participants (DeMarrais 2004). Participant review of research material in this way is
recommended to ensure data trustworthiness (Saldaña 2016). Additionally, participants
were offered access to the final analysis, so that they may benefit from any findings that
result from this inquiry, in alignment with contemporary perspectives on the ethical
inclusion of participants in all phases of the research process, including its final benefits
whenever possible (DeMarrais 2004). If ambiguity emerged in the process of data
analysis, participants who consented to future communications could be contacted
enabling them to provide clarification, if they desired.

Summary
In this chapter, we defined the scope of our research study as the elaboration of Routine
Activity Theory through the examination of antecedents to the beliefs of users about
external guardianship, of how external guardianship beliefs determine users’ online
routines, and how awareness of a data breach alters those processes for users who selfidentified as affected by the Equifax or Facebook data breaches. The research method
used in this study is a qualitative dual-case study using in-depth, semi-structured
interviews, conducted either in person or over the phone, with users affected by one or
both of two major recent security breaches: Equifax and Facebook. We recruited these
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participants using a non-probabilistic approach combining participant self-selection with
snowball sampling. This gave us our data set of twenty-four user interviews. In Chapter
Four, we will discuss data analysis for both cases as well as a cross-case analysis.
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Chapter Four: Analysis
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to answer the research questions: 1) How do individuals
determine their personal online routines given that they are reliant for data protection on
external guardians over whom they have little or no control? and 2) How does awareness
of a data breach impact this process? Our data analysis revealed six theoretical categories.
Each of these play a role in the process by which users determine their online routines, in
an environment where data breaches are common and users must rely on external
guardians over which they have little or no control. This chapter will provide a thorough
examination our data analysis process, the categories present in the Equifax case, how
those categories differed or remained stable in the Facebook case, and a comparison of
the cases.

Analysis
The data analysis methods employed in this study were derived from the best practices
assembled by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014), whose guide to qualitative research
has been widely adopted by researchers in the IS field and elsewhere. Our data analysis
plan began with the creation of a code list deduced from our research model. These codes
included all constructs and sub-constructs within the model:


Individual Characteristics (IC)
o Risk Perception (RP)
o Self-Efficacy in Information Security (SEIS)
o Trust
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o Suspicion


External Guardianship Beliefs



User Online Routine
o Online Activity
o Personal Guardianship Behaviors



Breach Notification

In qualitative analysis, concepts often emerge from the interviews which do not fit the a
priori constructs of one’s chosen theory. Understanding this, we expected codes to
emerge from inductive analysis of the interview data, in addition to our ten deductively
derived codes. When unexpected concepts arose, we inductively coded the relevant data
using in vivo, descriptive, or process coding as appropriate to the content, so that it could
be included in second-stage categorical coding (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). These
three code creation methods are defined as follows. In vivo coding uses the participants
own words. It is useful in retaining the participant’s voice and honoring their expression
of lived experience (Miles et al. 2014). Examples of in vivo codes in our first round of
coding included “trigger moment” and “I did not think about Equifax.” Descriptive
coding is another type of first-round coding we employed. To create descriptive codes,
the researcher labels sections of text with words or phrases summarizing that content
(Miles et al. 2014). Examples of descriptive codes in our first-round coding included
“mandatoriness” and “data collection.” Process coding was also used to show steps taken
by users before and after data breaches. Process codes are gerunds (i.e., verbs functioning
as nouns) used to show action within the data (Miles et al. 2014). Examples of first-round
process codes include “tiering data.” The process of coding each interview both
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inductively and deductively allows a thorough examination of relevant constructs and
permits unanticipated constructs to emerge (Miles et al. 2014).
Addressing Data Quality
A Note about Solo Coding
While trustworthiness can be established in part through inter-rater reliability, team
coding is not the only rigorous method of data analysis. Trustworthiness of a researcher’s
account can also be assessed by the steps a researcher takes when coding and analyzing.
Multiple rounds of coding, pausing to write reflective memos, and confirming
interpretations with participants are all methods of ensuring trustworthy findings (Saldaña
2016) By collecting data from a range of subjects, we hope to have captured some of the
breadth of individual experience relating to the process of developing online routines and
experiencing data breach through no fault of one’s own. In the following passages, we
describe the ways we have attempted to mitigate bias introduced through the use of a
single data coder.
Credibility
Credibility refers to the accuracy with which researchers portray their participants
(Bloomberg & Volpe 2019). We have endeavored to present the experience of our
participants as accurately as possible. Participant interviews were recorded and then
transcribed verbatim. After the interview, participants had the opportunity to check their
transcripts for accuracy and to add more information if they desired. Through the data
collection and analysis process, members of the research team met regularly to discuss
study developments. Research memos created during the research process tracked
emerging trends and difficulties in the data collection and analysis process. Participant
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summary memos were written using encoded initial transcripts. These memos have been
included in Appendix G to allow additional depth in the reader’s understanding of each
participant. Finally, participants were given the option to receive the final research
document; in this way, misinterpretations or misrepresentations can be corrected even
after analysis.
Dependability
“Dependability refers to the stability and consistency of data over time” (Bloomberg &
Volpe 2019, p 204). In this research, data was collected from February 22, 2019 to March
22, 2019. By keeping data collection in a fairly tight time frame, we avoid instability due
to unexpected and impactful social, cultural, or political events. Data was coded
iteratively in multiple rounds to reduce construct drift from the beginning of the coding
process to the end.
Confirmability
Confirmability in qualitative research parallels objectivity in quantitative research
(Bloomberg & Volpe 2019). We aspire to confirmability, not in the sense that we assert
an unbiased and objective view of our research subject, but rather in the sense that our
assertions should be clearly tied to and deeply grounded in data. We must acknowledge
our biases and seek to faithfully present the methods, theories, and analysis that led us to
our conclusions. It is our hope that we have accomplished this aim through the
presentation of this research document.
Transferability
We designed this research project as dual case study with the intention of testing the
ability to transfer the theoretical contributions from one case to the other. By examining
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two cases with similarities but notable differences, we could research common
conclusions which demonstrate the ability to transfer our findings to new contexts (Yin
2018). To that end, we performed all analyses of the first case (Equifax) before analyzing
the second case (Facebook). This process revealed areas of difference which may provide
fertile ground for future research in the problem space.
Coding
The Equifax Case
Coding began by analyzing six of the twelve interviews in the Equifax case. Dividing the
sample allowed us to test a variety of coding techniques to determine which best suited
the data, research questions, and researcher ability. First all six transcripts were printed in
hard copy and hand coded. The following represent a sample of insights that emerged in
this first round of hand-coding. Some inductive codes appeared at once. Immediately the
repetition of phrases such as “have to,” “make me,” and “no choice” indicated that
mandatoriness was an issue of concern for users as they went about their online routine.
Also featuring prominently were various forms of the phrase “no control.” This phrase
described user control over data both as it went into the hands of Equifax from third-party
sources and after data was in Equifax’s possession. Several users also perceived
themselves as “the product” rather than “the customer” in their relationship with Equifax.
Users expressed skepticism about any changes to Equifax’s security after the breach.
They reported the view that Equifax would make “superficial changes,” due to fear of
lawsuits and bad PR. These inductive codes occurred often enough that they held clear
importance for the process under examination.
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While inductive codes gained credibility through repetition, some pre-selected deductive
codes appeared lacking. In initial coding, it became clear that “suspicion” could not be
applied to both individuals and corporations as one construct. Participants consistently
distinguished between their view of whether or not humans have other’s best interests at
heart and their view of whether or not corporations have people’s best interests at heart.
Participants varied in their suspicion of humans, while most felt that corporations always
act in their own interests. Throughout the hand-coding processes, deductive codes were
used where applicable, issues and difficulties with specific codes were written into
memos, and new codes that emerged inductively during this process were added to a
running code list.
Hand-coding proved useful but had its drawbacks. The sheer amount paperwork it
generated could easily lead to concepts being overlooked. Paper-based analysis lacked an
uncomplicated way to gather all similar codes together. Thus, the next round of coding
used NVivo software.
Coding with NVivo
NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software package designed to enable researchers to
store, organization, categorize, analyze, and visualize data in textual, audio, and video
formats (QSR 2019). Transcripts of the first six Equifax interviews were imported into
NVivo and coded using the code list deduced from our research model, as well as codes
such as “no control,” “mandatoriness,” “the product,” “the customer” and “superficial
changes” that arose inductively during hand coding. Analysis of each interview required
new codes to capture relevant passages related to our research questions. These codes
were expressed either in vivo, as direct quotations; as gerund-form process codes; or as
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descriptive phrases. Through coding participants P001 and P002, 50 codes appeared in
the data, which added to the ten codes from the research model, gave us 60 codes. This is
a normal part of open coding as many of these early codes collapse; though, some remain
as new constructs to be included in the model (Saldaña 2016). Over time the number of
new codes needed for each interview diminished. By the fourth interview there were 69
codes. By the fifth interview, there were 73 codes, with most new codes related to a
decision to divide types of personal guardianship behaviors into subcategories such as
passwords, limiting information given, and layered security. The sixth interview held
steady at 73 codes. A full list of these first-round codes, along with their sub-codes, can
be found in Appendix F.
Examining Codes
At this juncture, it seemed appropriate to examine the identified codes more closely.
Qualitative analysis is an iterative process, as we have mentioned. One cycles from
reading and coding data to examining codes and back again many times. However, at
some point one’s primary focus becomes, for a time, determining the meaning and value
of the codes identified in the data as they stand in relation to the research questions
proposed. “Just because something [in the data] is noticeable does not mean that it is
meaningful or noteworthy in terms of [a] study’s analysis” (Bloomberg & Volpe 2019).
In order to determine which codes were relevant to the study at hand, we created a
codebook following the design recommended in by Saldaña (2016). An example
codebook entry can be found in Table 6.
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Table 6: Codebook Example
Abbreviation
Short Description
Long Description
Code Origin
Revisions in code
Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Typical Exemplars
Atypical Exemplars
Close, but no

Work
Work Background
A participant’s current or past work environment or experience
Inductive
No revisions
Must be the participant’s work
Second-hand assessment of fields
e.g., “mostly, like, in the service industry, but based on my
experience of working with people”
e.g., I think it is true of healthcare)
Not (e.g., My background is the humanities)

Researchers gave codes more concise phrasing, fully described codes, made explicit
criteria for inclusion and exclusion in codes, resolved ambiguities between codes, and
collapsed redundant codes. During this process, it became clear that some codes remained
too large and amorphous to be useful, while other codes appeared sparsely and
represented ideas or experiences not related to our study’s research questions. An
example of the latter was “the dark web,” an in vivo code arising in a single interview.
The phrase appeared at two points. One was a reference to a participant’s information
“showing up on the dark web” and another was an explanation of why that occurred:
“I probably think of the dark web more, because I occasionally get emails that I'm
popping up on it. I mean, you know, a bunch of credit cards these days come with
free monitoring. And so, you know, every once in a while, I'll get a pulse from,
like, Capital one or Amex or whoever, just like you showed up on the dark web
change everything.” (P006)
This material is relevant to our research questions only through the participant’s use of
“free monitoring” and his reaction to the notices he receives (which is to do nothing
different). Both of these are captured by other codes. Thus “the dark web” as a concept
was not given an entry in the codebook, since it was deemed unlikely to arise as a
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meaningful theoretical component. Nevertheless, in a surfeit of caution, this encoding
was retained in the dataset, since only half of the Equifax data and none of the Facebook
data had been coded at that juncture. The code was left attached to the quoted phrases
enabling researchers to include those early observations were “the dark web” to emerge
as relevant later. Unfortunately, not all problems with these early codes were as easily
resolved as “the dark web.” Two constructs from our a priori model gave considerable
difficulty.
Problematic Constructs
Trust and suspicion, two constructs from our initial model, proved problematic very early
in the coding process. Overlap was common between the two constructs. Participants
frequently used “suspicious” and “trust” without the clear discrimination between the
concepts expected our review of prior research and indicated in our model. It was
apparent that being “less trusting” of Equifax and being “suspicious” of Equifax were not
distinct from one another as we expected from findings in prior work (i.e., Wright &
Marett 2010).
Unexpected distinctions within the suspicion construct also arose. Our research question
regarding suspicion asked individuals if they were “inclined to believe that people are
generally out for their own best interests or that they generally have other’s best interests
at heart.” People often had difficulty answering, because they did not see the two ends of
that spectrum as mutually exclusive. One participant explained:
“I think it’s a combination of both, right? I mean, I think that’s an interesting
binary to put self-interest in, because I think that looking after the self-interest of
one’s self and looking after the self-interest of others is sort of in a lot of ways the
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same goal. Cause, like, looking out for your community, your community looks
out for you.” (P001)
In addition, some participants emphatically clarified that, while they felt people had the
best interests of others at heart, corporations absolutely did not:
“I think somewhere between there. I mean, people I think are interested in other
people’s well-being. Companies I think are very much— I'm very suspicious of
companies in this definition of suspicion.” (P002)
Furthermore, a few participants distinguished between the behavior of individuals in
groups versus individuals alone. One participant, P001, stated this clearly: “people, for
the most part, are quite good, but once you get them in a group, they are terrifying.”
Another, P002, expressed the belief that while a corporation would not care about his
well-being, an individual within that company might be persuaded to care. “You know, if
I talked to a person, they might be more interested in my wellbeing.” In short, suspicion
lacked both convergent and discriminant validity at this point.
The trust construct, in itself, was also proving problematic. Not only did it easily overlap
in participants’ minds with suspicion, but trust didn’t always align with the definition we
assigned based on prior work in the IS security space (i.e., Shankar et al. 2002). As noted
earlier in this work, we defined trust as “the user’s expectation that an organization
intends to provide guardianship and their expectation that the protective technologies that
organization employs will be sufficient to execute that guardianship role.” In our
interview script this construct was measured primarily by the questions 1) “We trust
companies to act in certain ways in certain situations. Prior to being notified about the
breach, to what extent did you trust that [Equifax/Facebook] would be willing and able to
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protect your data?” and 2) “How did the notification affect your sense of trust that
[Equifax/Facebook] would be willing and able to protect your data?”
Our expectation was that individuals would reply to our trust-related questions with
conclusive responses, and we did receive some decisive answers. Trusting participants,
like P005 discussing her view pre-breach, said, “I had a high level of trust simply because
of their reputation.” Less trusting participants like P004 and P005 discussing their views
post-breach said, “[the breach] definitely decreased my level of trust,” or “I have a lot
less trust with [the] organization's ability to keep data safe.” There were some
participants who felt trust or the lack of it very decidedly. However, alongside these
clear-cut responses, we also heard more ambiguous answers: one participant, P002, said,
“[the breach] did not affect my trust at all. I did not trust them to begin with. I had
expectations and hopes, but I did not trust them.” Phrases like “I would hope,” “I hoped”
or even “In the words of Fox Mulder, ‘I want to believe,’” from P005, arose repeatedly
over the course of analysis. These phrases seemed to warrant further examination of the
trust construct in this context.
Next, the second six Equifax interviews were coded to determine if the coding
complexities arising from the first half of the data set were present in the second half. By
and large, the data sets were similar. The overlap between suspicion and trust and the
distinction between trust in people and trust in organizations were each present in the
second six interviews. For example, when asked about their views post breach P009 said,
“after it happened, of course, I was more suspicious of [Equifax], and would be less
trusting of them.” The distinction between companies and humans were present in
phrases such as “individuals are gonna have a lot more motive for protecting your things
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than a company would,” from P008. Given the persistence of these issues, it was clear
that revision and restatement would be necessary to clarify our codes.
Reexamining Trust and Suspicion in IS Literature
At the suggestion of a member of our research team, we made a closer review of IS
literature on trust and distrust outside the IS security space. As mentioned in chapter two,
the work of McKnight and his collaborators quickly revealed a more nuanced view of
trust, the process of trust development, and associated sub-constructs. McKnight shows
trusting behaviors as having antecedent beliefs. The trust model has been elaborated on
and expanded over time, but a simple, early version is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Trust Model from McKnight, D. H., and Chervany, N. L. (2001b). What
trust means in e-commerce customer relationships: An interdisciplinary conceptual
typology. International journal of electronic commerce, 6(2), 35-59.
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The high-level trust model separates trust into stages. Disposition to trust is the “extent to
which a person displays a tendency to be willing to depend on others across a broad
spectrum of situations and persons” (McKnight et al. 2002, p. 339). This construct can be
further decomposed into “faith in humanity” and “trusting stance.” Faith in humanity is
when “one assumes others are usually upright, well meaning, and dependable”
(McKnight et al. 2002, p. 339-340). Trusting stance describes the perspective that
“regardless of what one believes about peoples’ attributes, one assumes better outcomes
result from dealing with people as though they are well meaning and reliable” (McKnight
et al. 2002, p. 340). Institution-based trust deals not with trust between people, but with
trust in a situation. For example, institution-based trust would be present when an
individual feels confident that laws and regulations are in place to protect them from
harm within a given context (McKnight et al. 2002). It also decomposes into two subconstructs “structural assurance” and “situational normality.” Structural assurance is the
belief that “protective structures – guarantees, contracts, regulations, promises, legal
recourse, processes, or procedures – are in place” (McKnight and Chervany 2001a, p.
37). Situational normality is the belief that a “risky venture is normal or favorable or
conducive to situation success” (McKnight and Chervany 2001a, p. 38). In combination,
these antecedents lead to trust in specific others. In context of our study, for example,
someone might tend to believe the best in people and to rely on them (high disposition to
trust). They may also believe that there are laws and regulations in place that protect them
when sharing data with financial companies online (institution-based trust). These
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together may lead them to feel confident in trusting a specific company such as Equifax.
Armed with these additional constructs, we returned to the Equifax case data.

Participant Summary Memos
Coding data, by its nature, fragments participant’s narratives (Bernard et al. 2016). When
coding, a researcher focuses on small meaningful slivers of a participant’s responses.
When this work is done well, these slivers, combined with other slivers, begin to form
patterns that illustrate the lived reality of participants in a research context. However, it
can be easy in the coding stage to lose sight of the overall narratives from which these
data points are drawn. In an attempt to stay grounded within the users’ real experiences,
at this point, participant summary memos were created for all twelve of the Equifax
participants. These memos included a brief demographic description of the participant
and a condensed participant narrative written using a combination of quotations from
interview transcripts and the researcher’s own descriptions. The memos can be found in
full in Appendix G. The writing of these documents served to re-anchor the analysis in
the real-world experiences of users from which the data arose.
The Facebook Case
In the Facebook case, coding took place in NVivo. The initial codes were drawn from the
code list of the Equifax case. As before, six of the twelve interviews were coded, then the
codes were assessed to determine what refinement they needed.
Examining Codes
Eight new codes arose from the first six Facebook interviews. Of these seven were
related to user online routines: automaticity of Facebook use, decreased use, not linking
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or unlinking accounts, leaving the mobile app, leaving Facebook, leaving other social
media, and restricting third party apps. The remaining code created was “distrust of
information,” a code that refers to users greeting information online with distrust due to
the prevalence of fraudulent or ill-intentioned accounts and sources. All of these codes
seemed relevant, concise, and within scope for our research questions. Thus, no
substantial revisions were deemed necessary. The stability of the coding structure gave us
confidence that this code list was appropriate to the data (Rubin & Rubin 2011). As a
result, the remaining six interviews were coded without returning to the literature for
clarification.
New Inductive Codes
When coding the final six Facebook interviews, five new codes emerged. Two of the new
codes were simply types of personal guardianship behaviors. “Incognito browsing” refers
to a browser feature that suspends browser tracking of one’s activity. “Limiting
interaction” refers to choosing not to have conversations online; P019 explained their use
of this behavior as “I don't really interact because I don't want people seeing me.”
Another code that emerged was an individual characteristics sub-code “prior experience
of online harassment.” This code mirrors the code “prior experience of fraud” found in
the Experian case; data breaches on social media can lead to harassment or stalking in an
analogous manner to a financial breach leading to experiences of fraud. The final code
that emerged was a sub-code of situational characteristics: “no competition.” This code
refers to the lack of substitutes for firms like Facebook as well as the firm’s immense size
and market dominance.
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Participant Summary Memos
As with the Equifax case, upon completing first-round coding, we returned to the users’
full interview transcripts. After reading and listening to these, participant summary
memos were created for all twelve of Facebook participants. These memos included a
brief demographic description of the participant and a condensed participant narrative.
Several participants expressed strong emotions regarding the Facebook breach, its effect
on their lives, and its implication for the world. Even more than the Equifax summaries,
writing these memos proved important in re-grounding the research in real-world lived
experiences of users that these interviews and codes represent. The memos can be found
in full in Appendix G.
Categories
The process of initial coding and then category refinement is central to sense-making in
qualitative research (Miles et al. 2014). After coding, we grouped our existing codes into
categories, beginning with the Equifax case. These categories consist of constructs from
routine activities that arose in the data as well as themes/constructs that emerged from
inductive coding. This ability to combine inductive and deductive findings to create a
more complete picture of existing dynamics within a problem space represents one of the
great strengths of qualitative methods (Miles et al. 2014).
The six categories that emerged were: Individual Characteristics, Situational
Characteristics, Data Characteristics, Breach, External Guardianship Beliefs, and User
Online Routine. In following sections, we provide definitions of and support for these
categories.
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Individual Characteristics
Based on prior research in the security context, we expected that individual
characteristics of users would affect users’ external guardianship beliefs and online
routines. Our analysis supported two constructs from prior research as relevant: risk
perception and self-efficacy in information security. However, as noted earlier in this
work, trust and suspicion proved insufficiently precise to serve. Instead, a new construct
was employed: beliefs about human nature. This construct manifested with two subconstructs “faith in humanity” and “suspicion of humanity.” Another construct emerged
as relevant to users’ security beliefs and behaviors: work background.
Risk Perception
All participants discussed their view of risk, and participant risk perspectives covered a
wide range. Some participants felt fairly secure about giving their data to companies
operating online, such as P008 who said, “I didn't see it as that risky for the most part”
and P007 who said, “I didn't think there was a risk.” Some participants felt the risk was
more moderate, such as P012 who stated, “on a scale of one to ten with ten being the
most risky, I would say probably a six.” On the other extreme there were participants
such as P006 who described the risk of giving away data as: “Nightmarishly awful in all
cases.”
Self-efficacy in Information Security (SEIS)
All participants discussed their view of SEIS, and these assessments included statements
such as P004 saying, “I don't know if I ever had necessarily a great amount of faith in my
ability to predict my data online.” In contrast with P012, who said “I would say more
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than average in competence…. I felt like because I could assess the risk, I could make the
right choice.”
Beliefs about Human Nature
Subject beliefs about human nature as expressed could be described by two subconstructs: “faith in humanity” and “suspicion of humanity.” The majority of participants
described themselves as more suspicious of humanity, with statements including P010’s
“Everyone's a potential danger” and P012’s “I would say that I'm probably more
suspicious. Altruism is not an innate thing.” Three participants described themselves as
having faith in humanity. Examples of this include P001 saying “And I just kind of trust
the people who are good at that to do their best,” and P002 saying “I mean, I think people
in general are good. I'm not too suspicious of them.”
Work Background
The final individual characteristic that recurred in the data was participant work
background. Half of the Equifax participants used their experiences at work as a
comparative benchmark when assessing Equifax and its security practices. P007 provides
an example: “I thought that most companies were as secure as the company I work for
and because we take security so important.” P010 expressed a similar sentiment: “I mean,
I've done a lot of work in the medical profession. My last job was at Baptist, and it's like
data is sacred.”
Situational Characteristics
Another category that emerged during analysis was one which we have chosen to call
“situational characteristics.” Based on participant interviews, factors related to the
context (i.e., situation) of creating online routines affected users’ security decision62

making. McKnight’s institution-based trust construct seemed, at first, to describe these
participants’ views. Institution-based trust is, in essence, trust in the structures and
conditions that enable success in a particular situation (McKnight and Chervany 2000).
We wondered, though, whether institution-based trust had relevance in the case of
Equifax given the fact that users could not chose to exclude their data from Equifax’s
guardianship. “Freedom to act is assumed in trust relations,” (McKnight and Chervany
2001a); yet, in data collection, participants used phrases expressing their sense of
powerlessness, such as “no control”, “had to”, and “made me”. Half of participants used
language reflecting a sense that they felt Equifax was a mandatory part of their
experience. For example, P004 said, “they're sort of the evil, you know, you can't do
without.” Another participant stated:
The one that I know I've been hit was Equifax, which is incredibly frustrating,
because that's not a voluntary service. You know, I've never given [them] my
information. That's one that they are given by others for me having the privilege
to take part in economy. (P006)
Furthermore, two-thirds of participants reported feeling no control over Equifax and its
data collection. Users expressed a lack of control over their data once Equifax was in
possession of it. Even when they felt as though Equifax might protect their data, they still
expressed frustration at the lack of agency over their own information. P001 described it
as, “I think there’s sort of a definition of protection. Like, they weren’t asking us what we
wanted them to do with it.” Another participant expressed a variation on this sentiment:
I can only control what I have access to, right? So, saving my information into a
website, that is my choice. That is something that I could control. I don't know
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that I've ever seen where a bank says you can opt out of having your information
online. So, there's no opt out there. (P005)
Trust assumes freedom to vary one’s actions (McKnight and Chervany 2001). Thus, the
overall institution-based trust construct, which requires freedom to act and implicitly
freedom to refrain from acting, was not a good fit to our data. On the other hand, most
participants did express some trust in what McKnight and others have called structural
assurance, a sub-construct of institution-based trust. Structural assurance refers
specifically to a belief in the protective structures present in a situation that contribute to
good outcomes (McKnight and Chervany 2001).
Many participants expressed a belief that fear of negative consequences such as lawsuits
encouraged companies to keep data safe. P005 said, “I assumed that they can sue. So,
most organizations want to avoid lawsuits. So that keeps them on the straight and
narrow.” P013 agreed with this: “So wherever the legalities of how they get to sued fall
into place, they will rub up against those. Regardless of whether it's ethical or not.”
Some participants argued for regulatory intervention to improve security in the future.
I'm not a fan of big government, but obviously some things do have to be
regulated. I would say that that's the case where regulation could be good is if a
company ... It costs them dollars to obviously protect that data, and maybe they
were trying to not spend those dollars. Therefore, maybe if they'd been a little
more protective, and we'd had some regulations in place, then they would have
had to spend those dollars. (P009)
Overall, participants expressed the belief that adverse consequences for failure to protect
user data would result in improved guardianship of user data over time.
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In sum, the category of situational characteristics is a part of the process we seek to
understand. Within this category, participants reported that their perceptions of
mandatoriness, lack of control, and structural assurance affect their beliefs and behaviors.
Data Characteristics
Another inductively derived category that appeared was data characteristics. Target value
is a construct present in much of Routine Activity Theory research (Cavusoglu et al. 2008
and Png & Wang 2009). Researchers have found that directed attacks are motivated by
diverse types of value including tangible value, iconic value, or reprisal value.
(Ransbotham & Mitra 2009). We did not expect a value construct to arise in our research,
because in prior works target value has usually assessed by the offender (Cavusoglu et al.
2008, Png & Wang 2009, and Ransbotham & Mitra 2009) or the guardian (Wang et al.
2015), rather than the target. Nevertheless, such a construct did appear, as users assess
their data’s value to themselves, to offenders, and to guardian organizations.
Examples of participants views include P009’s discussion of the amount of data Equifax
held, “I would of thought they would have been one of the most trustworthy agencies
because they have so many people’s data.” P007 argued that data sensitivity demanded
specific protective actions: “They have so much sensitive data that they should have had
secured servers.” P002 compares the likelihood of someone targeting Equifax’s store of
data versus his own: “Obviously, since they have so much financial and sensitive data,
they're going to be targeted more than, for example, me.”
Some users reported assessing the value of their data. Some users also placed value on
the mass of data held by organizations. While only half the Equifax participants discussed
data characteristics, all who did argued that data characteristics were important to the
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calculus of security. These assessments of data affect users’ perceptions of risk, their
beliefs about what constitutes appropriate action on the part of external guardians, and
their willingness as users to commit to personal guardianship behaviors.
Breach
This construct was present in our original research design as “breach notification.” It was
modified to include “breach awareness” in order to overcome obstacles to participant
recruitment. Our Equifax participants all received notice from Equifax through some
media stating that their data has been affected by a security breach. Facebook participants
included users who self-identified as either “aware of” or “notified of” the Facebook
breach
During data collection a few interesting facets to the breach construct emerged. Learning
of a breach was explained as an inciting incident, or “trigger moment.”
I mean, I changed my passwords that one time. It was sort of like a trigger
moment where I, you know, what? I should probably do that. And since then it's
been consistent. So, I really, I haven't in my mind chalked it up to Equifax. (P002)
Further, the number of breaches that a user had observed in a certain time prior to the
breach under examination could result in action when one breach would not.
You know, based on prevalence of the hacks in last two years, maybe not this one
specifically. I have changed the way I do passwords. I've started using
grammatically correct sentences. (P006)
Finally, users attended to the delay between when a firm became aware of a breach and
when that firm notified users. When users deemed the delay between discovery and
announcement lengthy, users felt less favorably about the firm.
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I was really glad [Equifax] notified me. I can't remember the timing on when they
sent the notification versus when the hack happened. I seem to recall, there might
have been a delay. I may be thinking of a different one, but I thought there was a
slight delay. In when they notified versus... I understand they want to get all the
information together to really understand what exactly happened and how many
accounts were affected. Um, but I always feel like there's a responsibility to notify
people as soon as possible. (P005)
[Equifax] didn't immediately notify people. They found out they'd been breached,
they sat on it, they tried to fix it, they tried to sweep it under the rug, instead of
just owning it, which I don't think a company today would do that. Because there
have been enough breaches now that you're not going to find a company that's
going to feel the need to sweep it under the rug. (P012)
Not only does awareness of a breach trigger changes to a user’s perspectives and
behaviors, but participants report that the manner in which a breach is announced and the
prevalence of other breaches in the same time period also influences their experience.
External Guardianship Beliefs
Initially, we defined external guardianship beliefs as a user’s beliefs regarding any
guardianship aside from that user’s personal guardianship behaviors. We further argued
that these external guardianship beliefs would reflect a view of external guardians as a
single unknown whole. The guardian-target dyad is central to our research questions.
Individuals rely on these guardians but have little to no control over them. Nor do users
have visibility into any guardianship behaviors other than their own. We began this
research deeply curious as to what would emerge related to this dynamic.
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According to the data, prior to the breach, the majority of participants did not have
external guardianship beliefs about Equifax. Three-quarters of participants either were
not aware or did not think about Equifax having a role in protecting their data. Of those
who did consider Equifax as a data guardian, only one, P012, reported a change in their
view of Equifax as a result of the breach. However, P012 had prior work experience
related to Equifax, which affected his initial view of the firm’s guardianship. After the
breach, users rapidly developed views of Equifax as inadequate.
Participant P004 expressed the consensus view well:
I don't know, like, I don't think I ever really thought about it. I knew they had an
enormous amount of data. I knew that getting a hold of what was in my credit
report and confirming that it was accurate was an unfortunate consequence of
them having a lot of data and having sort of that role in our society.… But yeah, I
don't think I spent any time thinking about, like, what kind of security they might
have in place. Or even thinking about the fact that they would be a relatively
detrimental target if someone did target them…. But again, like it was never as a
company I interact with directly. I didn't have firsthand knowledge of what their
security practices were…. I guess they went from not having a perception
necessarily to having a perception that they suck (P004),
In sum, the majority of participants in the Equifax case did not have external
guardianship beliefs about Equifax, but after the breach, users developed largely negative
views of Equifax as a data guardian
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User Online Routine
Drawing on Routine Activity Theory, we included in our interview script questions about
the construct “user online routine” as composed of two sub-constructs: “online activity”
and “personal guardianship behaviors.” Based on prior literature, we defined online
activity as actions a user takes online without a security motive (Yar 2005). Also based
on prior literature, we defined personal guardianship behaviors as acts an individual
performs to keep themselves secure online (Leukfeldt & Yar 2016). Both sub-constructs
of user online routine appeared in our data.
Online Activity
Online activity presented exactly as expected, with users’ readily describing their daily,
weekly, monthly, and even yearly routines online. All participants willingly disclosed
their online activities. These ranged P011 who does almost all financial transactions
online; “I pay all my bills online. I order a lot of my stuff online through Amazon. I don't
think I've written a check since 2000.” To P006, who doesn’t transact online with
frequency due to security considerations:
I've always been fairly security conscious. Oh, so my typical routine, for example,
I don't do online banking. I'm that guy that actually calls on the phone. I have two
credit cards that are specifically used for online transactions or PayPal, because it
sets up a layer between my information and any potential either intercept or hack.
(P006)
Most participants reported, like P010, online activity that included online “banking, and
investments, and purchases.”
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Personal Guardianship Behaviors
Personal guardianship behaviors offered a small twist. It was necessary to refine the
definition to include not only acts an individual performs to keep themselves secure
online, but also acts they avoid taking.
When it came to personal guardianship behaviors, passwords were the most commonly
reported security measure. Two-thirds of participants said that they used passwords for
security. P011 said that before the breach he “used a password rotation” and after the
breach he began to use “a password manager.” The majority of participants also manually
monitored their online finances in some way, like P005 who said that after the breach “I
checked all my banking accounts, and I was monitoring them myself.” Others report even
more rigor to their behaviors using both manual monitoring and setting automatic alerts:
I'm good. I watch stuff very closely. I'm very quick to catch anything that doesn't
make any sense. … I set tighter parameters for a charge. It used to be anything
above $200 I got a notice. Now I keep it at $100. If I can make it less than that, I'll
do that, too. Because, again, the sooner you know something, the easier it is to
stop it from actually becoming permanent. (P013)
A third of participants reported limiting the data they provide.
I'm very hesitant to give out things like social security number, stuff like that. Too
much personal data. Which I think any time somebody asks you for your full
social security number, that's probably a little more than they need to know…. I
was just cautious with it. I would not give it out to people unless needed. I would
say that was it. (P009)
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In total, participants reported the following personal guardianship behaviors: automated
alerts, credit freeze, layered security, limiting information given, link validation, manual
monitoring, passwords, security through obscurity, tiering data by sensitivity, using
trusted networks, two-factor authentication, and VPNs. Some participants also mentioned
obstacles to personal guardianship behavior including forgetfulness, inconvenience, the
need to allow access to credit checks, and simply not knowing what else it is possible to
do. Choosing what not to do or what not to share appears as important a component of
personal guardianship behaviors as using complex passwords or two-factor
authentication.
Questioning Categories: Equifax versus Facebook
Having identified categories within the Equifax case, the necessity at this point was to
determine whether the categories in the first case could appropriately be applied to the
second. The codes were quite similar across the two data sets; however, that is not
sufficient to assure that the same categories would best serve the Facebook case data.
One of the primary indicators of good qualitative research – in fact good research in any
form – is to seek disconfirmation rather than confirmation (Miles et al. 2014). In the
following sections, we will demonstrate the relevance of categories from the Equifax case
to the Facebook case in two ways. First, we review each category and provide evidence
from the Facebook cases to support each one. Second, alternative categorizations for subcodes appearing only in the Facebook case will be discussed, as will our rationale for
their inclusion in each category.
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Individual Characteristics
In the Equifax case, the category individual characteristics was revised to include the
constructs: “risk perception;” “self-efficacy in information security;” “work background;”
and “beliefs about humanity,” which contains the sub-constructs “faith in humanity” and
“suspicion of humanity.” The Facebook data did not suggest any new categories for these
constructs; however, a type of risk not present in the Equifax case was perceived by some
Facebook participants
Risk Perception
All participants discussed their view of risk, and participant risk perspectives covered a
wide range. Some participants felt that the risk to them was low, such as P017 who said,
“It was not especially risky to me, because I did not share vital data.” Some participants,
like P016, felt that the risk was low before the breach, but changed that view once the
breach occurred “Pretty high. Actually, very high. I feel like it's very risky.”
In addition to this general risk assessment, a few participants expressed that they no
longer felt safe assuming that information was what it appeared to be online. This view is
typified by the following quotation.
I can no longer trust the news sources and the profiles that I'm looking at to be
reflective of those individual people, and it makes me suspicious of absolutely
everything that I see on Facebook now. So, my level of suspicion went from
virtually none to now I don't trust anything that I'm seeing. And it kind of broke
that innocent awareness of thinking that all of our data was protected to now
realizing that these kind of social media sites like Facebook had the ability to
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damage individual lives and has consequences on a global scale that I just had not
thought possible before. (P016)
Self-efficacy in Information Security (SEIS)
All participants discussed their view of SEIS, and these assessments included emotional
statements such as P016 saying, “I feel incapable of protecting my information online and
that's a very scary feeling.” Another perspective on SEIS presented protection as a matter
of context.
My ability to protect my information is about keeping my phone out of people's
hands and having decent passwords so casual criminals or ne'er-do-wells can't
mess with me. It's a little like home security in the way that I don't think it
particularly is possible for me at my level to defend against an actual professional
or talented or skilled or resourced attack. (P021)
Beliefs about Human Nature
All participants discussed their beliefs about human nature. The majority of participants
described themselves as more suspicious of humanity. Unlike in the Equifax case,
however, some people reported that this suspicion of humanity was fairly new. P024 said,
“I really don't know, I'm just guessing, but my perception is that people are thinking more
about themselves now than they used to. But I don't know.” He did not link this change to
the breach, but rather to the political climate of our day. It is unclear whether his
experience of social media in general affected his view. If so, it would align with the
assertion of P023, who said, “they kind of want you to view all the bad things, and that
includes view time for them, more engagement…. you start to feel worse the longer
you're on there.”
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Also, there were some comments that gave us pause regarding the division of beliefs
about humanity into faith in humanity and suspicion of humanity. These resolved through
the realization that a single comment might be coded for both sub-constructs. This dual
coding occurs, for example, in this passage discussing the futility of labeling human
nature as innately benevolent or selfish:
It's still the same, because, like, people say, you know, when they argue about the
idea that humans are inherently good or evil and every time people make that
debate I'm like, you know that's so stupid, no, we're neither, we're both, all of it.
(P023)
Other than this momentary faith/suspicion quandary, beliefs about human nature applied
to the Facebook data set well.
Work Background
Unlike the Equifax case, work background rarely appeared in the Facebook case. The
only meaningful instance was a reference by P017 to training on internet security
provided by the Navy.
Situational Characteristics
Based on inductive analysis of the Equifax case interviews, the category of situational
characteristics was included our category set. This was a general category that included
the structural assurance construct as well as other situational characteristics such as
mandatoriness and lack of control. In the Facebook case, several participants felt a sense
of Facebook as mandatory. This was somewhat surprising, since deleting a Facebook
account is not procedurally difficult. Nevertheless, largely due to social needs or
obligations, several participants reported feeling trapped on Facebook. When Facebook
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provides one’s main communication, as it does for P019, “a lot of people in my situation
have to use it for every single communication” or one’s primary social access as it is for
P014 and P024 leaving can be a hardship.
That's the thing. That's one of the reasons it's been so difficult for me to break
away from Facebook. I've wanted to break from it since the breach, but some of
my social groups, like my gaming group, we coordinate on Facebook, and so…
But I'm having to give up, and I'm willing to give up, a lot of that convenience….
I'm going to give up the majority of social contact that I have, and it is the last
form of public social contact that I have, because Twitter and everything are gone.
I will have Google Hangouts with a few very close friends, and then the same
very close friends are on my journal. There's no public access whatsoever. (P014)
The sense of lacking control, so commonly reported in the Equifax case, was present only
for a single Facebook participant, P019, who said, “It feels very stalkerish. It feels very
much vulnerable, like Facebook has given binoculars to somebody in the world into my
window and I don't have any control over it.” Only one participant touched upon
structural assurance in any form, and that was without any expectation that such
assurances would come to pass. P023 summarized the situation succinctly if profanely
“the government is fucking inept because they're too old to understand [Facebook], and
they probably would be bribed out even if they did.”
In short, the primary situational characteristic to affect participants who included in the
Facebook case was mandatoriness. Despite the fact that Facebook is an optional service
in the sense that a user is not enrolled automatically and can delete their account, users
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rely on Facebook for social support, communication, and other activities central to their
lives.
Data Characteristics
It became clear in the Equifax case that some users consider their data’s value and
sensitivity. Half the participants in that case argued that data characteristics were
important to the calculus of security. In the Facebook case, two-thirds of participants
discussed their data. Users reported not realizing the risks of aggregate data.
“If everyone's talking about politics, I'm like, "Well, everybody's talking about
politics, so this information's probably not really needed since it's just like the
general noise….there were so many people [posting their political opinions], that
we can all just do it willy-nilly almost, and not have to worry about anybody
being interested in that because already is, everybody's doing it….Of course, then
afterwards, I was like that's exactly why it was vulnerable.” (P015)
P015 went on to say “I guess I really underestimated what value that data might have to
others.” P016 said “the breach kind of— it increased my awareness of how important that
information was, if that makes sense.” Many users discovered through the breach that
they had much more at stake than they had thought:
I thought they basically had access to my posts, people I interacted with, and
again like any cute cat pictures or anything that I put up. I guess I felt that that
data was fine, but that was also data that I was willing to share with other people
anyway. A lot of that comes from a place of ignorance for me, where I just didn't
realize how much... Again, if I had known how much they were gathering, I
would never have signed up for it anyway. (P014)
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The main theme of these all these discussions centered on the difficulty for users to
determine what data was being collected and to assess the value of their individual data
as part of a larger aggregation.
Breach
This construct was present in our original model as “breach notification.” It was modified
to include “breach awareness” in order to overcome obstacles to participant recruitment.
This data in the Facebook case regarding breaches was quite similar to the data in the
Equifax case. Participants reported that breach awareness triggered changes to their
perspectives. P014 said, “I never took [online security] seriously before the Facebook
thing, and now I take it ultra-seriously.” Also as with the Equifax case, Facebook
participants reported that combinations of breaches caused changes in protective
behavior. P018 says “it’s kind of hard because I’m not sure which came first Facebook or
Equifax but the combination of both of those things [caused me to change my protective
behaviors].”
In addition to the findings from the Equifax case, in our analysis of the Facebook data we
discovered that the method of breach notification can be quite important to how the user
feels about the company Facebook notified users of the breach through a statement of
their Facebook news feed. This notification disappeared once the user interacted with it.
This lack of permanence struck some as questionable.
I don't have anything in my email about it. I don't have anything in my like
Facebook messenger…. There's, like, so it's obviously gone from my news feed,
so really nothing that I can find immediately that like this even happened. Yeah.
It’s just …there’s nothing. It feels a little…shady. (P003)
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External Guardianship Beliefs
The majority of participants in the Equifax case did not report holding external
guardianship beliefs about Equifax prior to the breach, but after the breach, users
developed largely negative views of Equifax as a data guardian. The same dynamic did
not arise in the Facebook case. Unlike Equifax, which collects user data from third
parties, Facebook gathers data directly from their users. Thus, it was no surprise to find
that all participants were aware of Facebook, even prior to the data breach. Instead, the
surprising revelation during data analysis was the view of Facebook as a product provider
with no guardianship responsibilities, despite the amount of data in their possession.
Discussing her view prior to the breach, P014 said, “In the same way that I would
download a computer game, and the download goes kind of the same way, and then I
play the game, and then I can take it off the computer when I want to. I felt like [social
media platforms] were much more basic structures than they are.” Some users changed
their view once the data breach occurred, but for others this perception extended past the
breach into present day. Post-breach, P022 said, “I don't think Facebook's a guardian of
my data.” P021 said. “I assumed Facebook isn't a meaningful guardian of my data.” Even
the users who felt that Facebook should be guardians of user data, did not express any
belief that they would act in that way. P020 said, “no one else [but me] is looking out for
my data.”
User Online Routine
User online routine is composed of the sub-constructs: “online activity” and “personal
guardianship behaviors.” Our definition of online activity has remained stable: actions a
user takes online without a security motive (Yar 2005). Our definition of personal
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guardianship behaviors was revised slightly during analysis of the Equifax case to include
both acts an individual performs to keep themselves secure online, and also acts they
avoid taking. The definition of these constructs remained stable in our analysis of the
Facebook data. However, there was a major shift in the meaningfulness of online activity
as a measure of breach impact.
Online Activity
In the Equifax case, users did not change their online financial activities as a result of the
breach, possibly due to the fact that users lacked the ability to leave Equifax or remove
their data from Equifax’s control. By contrast, many participants reported changes to
their online social media activities after the Facebook breach. All participants willingly
disclosed their online activities. These ranged from P024 who uses only Facebook: “It's
pretty much Facebook and that's it, really.” To P006, who has accounts on “Instagram,
Twitter, Snapchat, and Patreon” as well as Facebook. Most participants reported using
Facebook less after the breach. P018 said simply, “I get on Facebook less.”
A third of participants reported leaving or planning to leave Facebook. On the subject of
leaving Facebook, P014 said: “At this point, one of the reasons I'm leaving Facebook is
because I have become increasingly aware of the data that they're continuing to gather,
despite reassurances that everything is fine.” In addition, half of the participants reported
reduced Facebook use. Some participants also reported uninstalling the Facebook app in
an effort to gain distance from the site. Oddly, some users reported leaving other social
media, but remaining on Facebook. P014 says, “I had a Twitter account at the time. I'd
started an Instagram account. I locked both of those down and deleted them immediately
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[after the breach].” P019, who is reliant on Facebook for their primary communication
says, “I stopped interacting on Facebook as often,” but they did not leave the site.
Personal Guardianship Behaviors
When it came to personal guardianship behaviors, in the Facebook case, passwords were
surpassed by two other personal guardianship behaviors. Privacy controls were the most
commonly reported security measure in the Facebook case. All participants said that they
used privacy controls for security. The majority of participants also reported limiting the
information they provided, such as P017 who said, “So my personal mitigation for [risk]
was to give Facebook less of my data.” P003 wondered if these restrictions “would defeat
the purpose of social media.” Nevertheless, she and most other participants have made
use of these data limitation techniques to protect themselves and their social media data
online.

Cross-Case Analysis
Multi-case studies allow the emergence of common conclusions which can provide
evidence of transferability as well as indications as to the boundaries of a chosen theory
(Yin 2018). We chose two cases with similar characteristics, but with enough differences
that we hoped comparison of the two cases would be illumination. Between our cases,
there were many similarities in the themes. In fact, at the categorical level, the cases
supported one another.

Summary
This chapter provided a complete description of our data analysis. In it we also presented
the six theoretical categories found in the Equifax and Facebook cases. These were
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individual characteristics, situational characteristics, data characteristics, breach, external
guardianship, and user online routine. The ways in which aspects of these categories
differed or remained stable between cases was demonstrated both through explanatory
text and participant quotations. Finally, a comparison of the two cases was provided. In
the next chapter, we will discuss our findings regarding how these theoretical categories
relate to our research questions and present propositions based on our findings.
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Chapter Five: Findings
Introduction
The goal of this study has been to elaborate on existing Routine Activity Theory research
to answer the research questions:1) How do individuals determine their personal online
routines given that they are reliant for data protection on external guardians over whom
they have little or no control? and 2) How does awareness of a data breach impact this
process? In Chapter Four, we described our analysis of participant interview transcripts
and identified six theoretical categories arising from this analysis. In this chapter, we will
show how these categories relate to our research questions, discussing how the categories
affect the process by which users determine their online routines in an environment
where data breaches are common and users must rely on external guardians over which
they have little or no control. Finally, we will offer propositions based on these findings
to help guide future research.

Findings
At the outset of this research project, we reviewed relevant research in the IS security
field and identified a promising theory from criminology to assist in our investigation.
From these sources, we weighed and selected constructs that we deemed likely to play a
role in users’ process. Next, we developed an interview script based on our tentative
model of the process by which users make decisions about their online routines. Given
relative paucity of research into this specific topic, we chose a qualitative research
method due to its flexibility and robustness. By gathering a rich qualitative data set, we
could find support for a priori constructs and retain the ability to uncover new constructs
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of relevance (Miles et al. 2014). In the process of this research, we found six theoretical
categories which hold relevance for users creating and continuing their online routines.
This chapter is devoted to the discussion how our inquiry answered our primary research
questions. We will take a step back from the constructs and sub-constructs discussed in
prior chapters in order to give a high-level view of users’ process as it develops and
changes over time.
Research Question 1
How do individuals determine their personal online routines given that they are reliant
for data protection on external guardians over whom they have little or no control?
Determining Online Routines
Online routines are, exactly that, routines: sequences of actions performed habitually
(Visetelly 1936). Individual users develop and modify those routines over time, based
their needs, personal preferences, and many other factors (Cohen & Felson 1979 and Yar
2005). In answering the question of how users select online routines given their reliance
on external guardians, we have found that the individuality of users plays a central role.
To be an individual is to have a unique mosaic of characteristics including one’s
personality, aptitude, experiences, and more. When we present individual characteristics
as a category relevant to the process by which users develop and maintain online
routines, we refer to that uniqueness. Through our analysis of interview data, we
identified specific individual characteristics that our participants described as affecting
their decision-making online: risk perception, SEIS, beliefs about human nature, and
work background. These guide participants’ perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. But we
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also found that characteristics outside the individual affected participants’ decisionmaking process regarding their online routines.
Our analysis revealed that user’s perceptions the characteristics of a situation came into
play when determining online routines These situational characteristics are not innate to
the user but, instead, relate to their view of the interactions taking place between
themselves, the sites they visit, and the online environment. Structural assurance
mechanisms, such as regulations, are an example of such a characteristic. Participants
reported that their understanding of these situational characteristics and the options
available to them as a result influenced their online routines.
In addition to characteristics of the individual and of the situation, users reported that
their perceptions of data characteristics also played a part in choices about what to do and
how to do it online. The way users see data that they generate, how that data is collected
and combined by third parties, and the value of that data to potential attackers’ forms part
of the calculus they use to determine their online routines.
Ultimately, users consider each of these characteristics – individual, situational, and data
– when determining their online routines. Who a person is, what they perceive the nature
and structure of online interactions to be, and their views about data all interact to
influence their choices regarding online routines. But, what of external guardians? In
undertaking this research, we sought to uncover how reliance on external guardians over
whom they have little or no control affected the online routines of users. In the following
section, we describe our findings on this matter.
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Reliance on External Guardians
The relationship between external guardianship beliefs and users’ online routines is more
complex that we initially expected. Our analysis shows that users often do not think about
organizations that are responsible for their data until something bad happens, like a data
breach. When users do consider organizations that are in possession of their data, they
don’t necessarily see those organizations as guardians. In fact, many users seem to
perceive these relationships as almost adversarial – a struggle between those
organizations that want data and users who want to access services without putting
themselves or their data at risk.
In the Equifax case, external guardianship beliefs were not meaningfully present prior to
the breach. By this we mean that many users reported that they simply did not think about
Equifax having their data and therefore being responsible for its protection. Users did not
consider Equifax as a data guardian, because they did not think about Equifax’s role in a
user’s online presence. This view was exemplified most often by the phrase, “I did not
think about Equifax at all.” Three quarters of participants in the Equifax case exhibited
this view, including some individuals with strong positive feelings of SEIS and/or
professional security backgrounds. It is not the opinion of the researchers that users were
to blame for not attending to the security posture of Equifax.
At first, we expected that this phenomenon would be limited to participants in the
Equifax case. The relationship between Equifax and its users is markedly different from
the relationship of Facebook to its users. Equifax collects data on its users primarily from
third parties, and its customers are not the users considered by our study but rather
financial and other organizations seeking information about those users for various
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purposes. Perhaps, users didn’t consider Equifax as a data guardian, because they didn’t
know Equifax had their data in the first place. This possibility was supported by
participant statements such as:
I didn't really think about them much. They're just a credit reporting agency is the
way I saw them. I don't think I even considered that they stored our data online,
which I guess they would have to for all the banks and, you know, loan
application folks to get your information. (P005)
Surprisingly, though, even in the Facebook case, several users reported that they did not
view Facebook as a guardian of their data. Rather they saw Facebook as either a product
supplier, a semi-public venue, or an actively exploitative actor. These views are reflected,
respectively, by the following participant quotations.
I figured that all social media platforms were doing their one thing, and that was
the thing they were doing, and they were all basically doing it the same way. In
the same way that I would download a computer game, and the download goes
kind of the same way, and then I play the game, and then I can take it off the
computer when I want to. I felt like they were much more basic structures than
they are. (P014)
Oh, I don't think Facebook's a guardian of my data…. I think of them like a
bulletin board in a coffee house. It's a place where I can put things. I can control
that the people in that coffee house are the ones seeing it, but somebody could
wander in, you know? (P022)
A data guardian? I have no faith in Facebook as a data guardian whatsoever.
When a company amasses billions of dollars in such a short amount of time, the
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idea of them at all having any kind of perspective towards the best interest of the
consumer is laughable, in my opinion. (P023)
Strong negative emotional charge was evident in the responses of participants with this
view. Rather than relying Facebook or Equifax as external guardians, many participants
described feeling reliant on their own individual characteristics, situational
characteristics, or data characteristics to protect them from harm online.
Participants also spoke of the limits of these protections. Some users perceived online
risk as insurmountable for anyone, such as P006 who, as mentioned earlier, views the
security of online exchanges as “nightmarishly awful in all cases.” Other participants
feared, rather, that their own lack of skill made them individually powerless where
different person might be capable of protect their own data. One user spoke feelingly of
her reliance on security through obscurity:
I mean there’s a lot of information out there, and so I just sort of picture my
information as being one of many chunks of data just kind of floating out in the
world, and people who try to catch that data are maybe using nets and maybe they
catch some of my data and maybe they catch some of other people’s data. I just
kind of honestly for a very long time I’ve been counting on my data not being
particularly useful to people and that that keeps me safe. (P001)
When a user felt that they had done all they could to protect themselves, a sense of fear,
anger, or hopelessness at times appeared.
Negative emotions were also evident in the interview of those participants who did view
Equifax and/or Facebook as external guardians of their data. Participants argued that it is
reasonable to assume that organizations in possession of one’s data have a duty of care
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which they take seriously and enact responsibly. Users reported that they developed their
online routines based on the assumption that firms were willing and able to fulfill their
duty to protect the data in their possession. For these users, this belief affected both their
choice of online activities and the extent to which they adopted personal protective
behaviors, in addition to the individual, situational, and data characteristics that
influenced the online routine of all users in our study.
Research Question 2
How does awareness of a data breach impact this process?
Breaches and External Guardianship Beliefs
Unsurprisingly, in many instances, users reported that breaches affected their external
guardianship beliefs. As mentioned in the previous section, without a breach, users might
not even think about external guardians or might not consider the guardianship element
of a relationship between themselves and an organization. In the Equifax case, the
majority of users never considered Equifax’s guardianship before the breach occurred.
However, our findings show that after users become aware of a breach, they reassess.
The majority of participants in the Equifax case reported a negative view of Equifax’s
guardianship since the breach. P004 described this succinctly, “I went from not having a
perception, necessarily, to having a perception that they suck.” P007 said “Oh, I don't
think Equifax can provide protection for the data. I don't think they really offered a
solution.” In the Facebook case, many users reported profound changes to their beliefs.
P016 describes her shifted view:
I very much kind of lumped Facebook and Google and a lot of these major
organizations into the same category…as this progressive new age of companies
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that were willing to go the extra distance to make sure that they protected my
security and that they had my own best interests at heart because they kind of "got
it". … And I don't feel that now.
It was not always true that awareness of a data breach changed users’ views of an
organization’s guardianship. One quarter of participants in the Facebook case did not
report a change to their external guardianship beliefs after the breach. However, this
generally occurred when the user in question already held a negative view of Facebook.
P022 explained beginning with the assumption that Facebook “cannot and do not and
would not” protect her data. Thus, news of the Facebook breach left her feeling
“vindicated” in her view, rather than triggering an alteration to that belief. Nevertheless,
many users reported that awareness of a data breach caused them to develop more
negative beliefs about an organization’s guardianship. In addition to these findings,
analysis revealed another unexpected aspect to users’ revisions of external guardianship
beliefs: expectations of improvement.
Many participants across both cases said that they expected external guardianship at the
breached organization to improve for a time after a breach announcement. Some thought
the changes to security would be superficial, while others expected substantive
improvements, but nevertheless many participants reported the belief that both Facebook
and Equifax would devote considerable resources, in effect, to locking the barn door now
that the horse was free. Users with this view did not demonstrate positive sentiment
toward these external guardians, possibly due to the fact that users did not attribute this
improved performance to benevolence on the part of the firms. These participants argued,
rather, that fear of lawsuits or falling stock prices drove a belated focus on security.
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Analysis revealed one additional insight regarding the relationship between breaches and
external guardianship beliefs. The manner in which an organization handles a data breach
announcement matters to users. When an organization delays, minimizes, or attempts to
deflect blame for the breach back on the individual, users express negative beliefs about
the external guardians.
Breaches and Characteristic Categories
As reported in our discussion of research question 1, users consider individual,
situational, and data characteristics when determining their online routines. After learning
of a data breach, users reported changes to their perceptions of these characteristics.
While, in general, it our intention in this chapter to provide a high-level view, our
findings on the nature of these changes yielded some information regarding the effect of
breach awareness on specific individual characteristics, which we feel is best approached
by a brief discussion of two constructs within the category of individual characteristics.
Our findings show that, for our participants, breach awareness affected risk perception
and SEIS. This was particularly evident in the responses of users who reported feeling
fairly secure prior to the breach. In the Facebook case, half of all users reported that the
breach increased their sense of risk. Illustrating this, P018 said, “I thought it was less
risky [before the breach] than I think it is now.” In the Equifax case a smaller proportion
of users reported an increase in risk perception, though the shift was present for some.
This difference may be result from the fact, mentioned previously, that many users did
not hold conscious views about Equifax as a guardian prior to notification of the breach.
Nevertheless, some participants in the Equifax case did report this view. P10 said that
before the Equifax breach occurred, he thought sharing data with financial companies
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online was: “Not very risky. I have a basic assumption that they know what they're
doing.” After the breach, he says “If it happens once it can happen again.” This finding
aligns with prior work showing that adverse events result in changes to user perceptions
(Rhee et al. 2009).
When users already viewed the situation as risky, awareness of a data breach
understandably reinforced that risk assessment rather than causing that perception to
change. Across both cases, most users who reported no change to their risk perception
stated that the breach confirmed their risk assessment. For example, P013, a participant in
the Equifax case, said that her view of risk didn’t change after the breach, because the
breach provided support for her preexisting view: “Didn't really change it. I think it's all a
racket.” Similarly, P017, a participant in the Facebook case, said “I would say [the
breach] was in the confirmation category.” From this evidence, we determine that breach
awareness affects the individual characteristic of risk perception, except where a breach
occurrence would confirm a user’s preexisting view.
Another individual characteristic, SEIS, was affected by breach awareness. This finding
is in keeping with prior research that states security breach incidents affect SEIS (Rhee et
al. 2009). In the Equifax case, half of all participants described changes to their SEIS
after notification of the breach. For example, P012 said the breach “made me doubt
slightly my ability to protect [my information].” This was effect was evident across both
cases, but in the Facebook case, response reflecting this position constituted a majority of
all participants.
So it lowered my confidence, kinda like what we’ve been talking about. I realized
that some of it is just out of control no matter how careful I am. Like, we’re all
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connected on social media, so all it takes is one person in the web to take a wrong
step and then everyone’s data is just out there. So, I—as far as what I can do
about it—I can not have friends, but that sort of defines social media. (P003)
Participants in the Facebook breach case also used more emotive language when
discussing this shift in view. P016 said that since the Facebook breach “I feel incapable
of protecting my information online, and that's a very scary feeling.”
In addition to the impact of breach awareness of user’s individual characteristics, user’s
perceptions of situational characteristics also changed after users became aware of a data
breach. Participants reported that they expected their online routines to be protected in the
same way that their offline routines are governed by laws and norms. They expected
systems to be in place to protect routines that they see as normal and commonplace. In
describing the discovery that data breaches can occur without external guardians
experiencing any adverse consequences users described feeling angry and betrayed.
It kind of feels like emotional blackmail kind of thing. Like, we’re not going to
protect your data but if you don’t use us then your kind of cut off from your
family, because they all use Facebook and they’re not going to quit. (P003)
Breach awareness also altered the way users perceived their data. The fact that they data
had been stolen or sold seemed to result in a revision of participant’s perspective about
what data these organizations hold and what that data is worth. After the becoming aware
of the breach and its implications, many participants reported reassessing their perception
of data characteristics.
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In sum, the categories of individual, situational, and data characteristics affect users’
online routines. Awareness of data breaches can result in changes to users’ perceptions of
these categories. Next, we will address how breaches affect online routines.
Breaches and Online Routines
Individual users develop and modify their online routines over time (Yar 2005). Across
both cases many participants reported that, when they became aware of a data breach,
they changed their routines in some way.
User online routines are comprised of two sub-constructs: online activity and personal
guardianship behaviors (Yar 2005 and Leukfeldt & Yar 2016). In the Facebook case,
many users reported substantial, meaningful changes to their online activities after the
breach. P016 said, “honestly as a whole, it decreased my Facebook use and made me a lot
more aware of any posts that I was making and what personal information somebody
could gather from that.” P018 reported, “I think I get on Facebook less.” P019 no longer
comments the way they used to, “I don't really interact because I don't want people seeing
me.”
By contrast, in the Equifax case, users generally reported no changes to their online
activity. This lack of alteration reflects participants’ statements about feeling a lack of
control when it came to their financial routines. Participants seem to see no way to extract
their data from Equifax, and thus continue with their online activities unaltered. Our
analysis suggests that when users don’t feel that they can control an external guardian’s
possession or management of their data, they tend to maintain their online activity
without alteration.
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In both cases, most users reporting changing many of their personal guardianship
behaviors after becoming aware of a breach. Equifax users such as P004 reported now
“using strong passwords and different passwords for every account.” P006 said, “I have
changed the way I do passwords.” P009 says, “Setting up the alerts, of course, was a
thing that gave me more comfort in the transaction part of it.” P013 says she now avoids
purchasing from websites she doesn’t know “I'd rather pay a few more dollars just to go
to someplace that I know the reputation is there.” Facebook participants also changed
their behaviors. P003 now restricts what information she provides: “I just don’t give any
more information than I absolutely have to.” P017 no longer relies on Facebook for
security:
I no longer use the Facebook single sign-on, which there were a couple of
accounts that I did use it before. That's not true. There is one account that I still
have to use the Facebook single sign-on, and it grates upon me… That's exactly
right. Yeah, my library application, the web app, I have logged once with
Facebook. When I'm like, okay, delete that account, log in as new account, it says
nope, we actually already have a record at this address, this email address. It will
not let me log in as my email address. It makes me use Facebook.
P017 resents the library presenting an obstacle to his chosen protective behaviors.
In both cases, the majority of users reported increasing their personal guardianship
behaviors in one or more ways.
After awareness of a breach, many users enact protective measures, but those measures
have an upper limit. Users can only add the personal guardianship behaviors that they
know exist and are capable of performing. This upper limit of self-protection left some
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participants feeling unmitigated vulnerability. As an exemplar of this view, P001 said, “I
just sort of picture [data breaches] as like car accidents. They happen sometimes. They
don’t happen sometimes. I don’t feel like I have a lot of control over the situation.”
Interestingly, data breaches prompted changes online activities and personal guardianship
behaviors not only to the online routines associated with the breached organization, but
also in entirely unrelated aspects of online life. One might expect such an occurrence if
users made sweeping changes across all aspects of their online routine, and that did
occur. Some users changed all their passwords everywhere, for example. But,
paradoxically, some users reported making changes to their online activity in ways that
affected their routine with the exclusion of the breached organization. This was evident in
the case of Facebook participants. Several participants in this case reported leaving other
unbreached social media sites, such as Twitter, Tumblr, or Instagram, but retaining their
Facebook accounts. When asked about these decisions, users discussed viewing
Facebook as a mandatory part of their lives. This was true chiefly for participants relying
on Facebook for social connection to friends or family with whom they had limited
access through other means. It is evident that, whether due to a literal inability to extract
themselves from an online relationship, such as users experience in the case of Equifax,
or a practical inability to sever an online relationship, as in the case of some Facebook
users, some users continue behaviors they see as risky, because they not see an alternative
to the routines they currently enact.
Finally, participants explained that not all breaches have equal effects. The larger the
breach, the more valuable the data breached, and the more breaches of which a user is
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aware, the more dramatic the changes users are motivated to make to their online
routines.
Propositions
In the following section, we put forward a set of propositions to build upon our findings
in future research. Herein, we articulate our propositions and discuss how they align with
or diverge from prior understanding.
Proposition 1
Across both cases, individual characteristics of users affected user’s online routines.
Specifically, users’ risk perception, self-efficacy in information security, beliefs about
human nature, and work background all played a part in both user’s online activity and
personal guardianship behaviors. This leads to our first proposition:
P1: Users’ individual characteristics – including risk perception, self-efficacy in
information security, beliefs about human nature, and work background –
influence users’ online routines.
Proposition 1 aligns with existing work in the IS security field stating that users make
decisions about security based on their assessment of risks (Liang & Xue 2010) and
extent to which their SEIS enables them to avoid that risk (Herath et al. 2014). It also
integrates well with findings from IS research on the mechanisms of trust formation
stating that in order for trust to occur, users must also have a willingness to depend on
others (McKnight and Chervany 2001b). Prior research has also found aspects of
personal experience relevant to decision making (Liang & Xue 2009 and Wang et al.
2017). Thus, the relevance of work background is in good alignment with existing
understanding. Given the ample support in prior research showing that individual
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characteristics significantly affect security perceptions (Wright & Marett 2010), decisionmaking (Dinev & Hu 2007), and behaviors (Rhee et al. 2009), we are unsurprised to find
sufficient evidence to put forward this proposition.
Proposition 2
Across both cases, user perceptions of situational characteristics affected user’s online
routines. Relevant situational characteristics included structural assurance as well as
perceptions of mandatoriness and lack of control. This leads to our second proposition:
P2: Situational characteristics, including structural assurance and perceptions of
mandatoriness and lack of control, influence users’ online routines.
Proposition 2 builds on work in the IS field of trust research, which states that users
consider situational characteristics such as structural assurance when choosing which
behaviors and technologies to adopt (McKnight & Chervany 2000, McKnight and
Chervany 2001b, McKnight et al. 2011). We believe that applying constructs from the
trust literature to IS security research will provide a fruitful avenue for future research.
Mandatoriness has also been found in prior IS research to affect the emotions of
technology adopters (Beaudry and Pinseonneault 2010). However, the construct has not
been studied in much depth in the context of user’s determination of online routines. We
suggest that, going forward, researchers in this area would do well to consider the effects
of both functional and perceived mandatoriness on users’ online routines.
In IS research on privacy, control or lack thereof has been found relevant to users’
decision making around e-commerce (Malhotra 2004). Users also consider their level on
control when adopting new technologies (Crossley & Posey 2017). Our findings align
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with this prior work and offer another research area where user’s perceptions of control
impact behavior.
Considering situational characteristics in future research on users’ development of online
routines should provide useful insights going forward.
Proposition 3
Our findings show that user’s perceptions of data characteristics play a part in user’s
determination of online routines. The value users place on the data that they generate,
their perceptions of organization’s data collection and aggregation, and the usefulness of
that data to potential attackers are all part of user calculus in determining their online
routines. This leads to our third proposition:
P3: Data characteristics influence users’ online routines.
Prior RAT research focused on guardians and offenders includes target value as a
construct that affects the decision making of both guardians and offenders (Cavusoglu et
al. 2008 and Png & Wang 2009). Yet, we can find no prior IS security research that
considers, in detail, users’ assessment of the value of their data as a potential target for
comprise. Further examination of how users assess the value of their data and how that
assessment influences their development of online routines could provide valuable insight
into user behavior online.
Proposition 4
Our research supports the idea that when users 1) possess external guardianship beliefs
about an organization and 2) perceive an organization to be a data guardian, their external
guardianship beliefs affect their decisions regarding online routines. This leads to our
fourth proposition:
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P4: Users’ external guardianship beliefs affect users’ online routines.
Researchers using RAT have drawn a distinction between a routine online activity and an
individual’s personal guardianship behaviors (Leukfeldt & Yar 2016). Prior IS research
has found that beliefs about external guardianship affect personal guardianship behaviors
(Rhee at al. 2005). Our research also found support for the effect of external guardianship
beliefs on online activity, a finding not present in other IS security research. Analysis
revealed considerable complexity around the formation external guardianship beliefs and
their impact on users’ online routines, which provides a broad and fertile area for future
study.
Proposition 5
Across both cases, after becoming aware of a data breach, users reported changes to their
individual characteristics, with the most frequently affected characteristics being user’s
risk perception and SEIS. This leads to our fifth proposition:
P5: Data breach awareness affects users’ individual characteristics.
Prior IS security research supports the view that users’ perceptions and beliefs change
when adverse events occur (Rhee et al. 2009). Given that a data breach represents an
adverse event, we are in alignment with existing research. We provide this proposition as
an additional context to which existing understanding can be applied.
Proposition 6
Our analysis shows that user’s perceptions of situational characteristics changed after
users became aware of a data breach. In both cases, users reported that they expected
systems to be in place to protect their online routines. Awareness of a data breach led
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users to conclude that no such sufficient protections exist. This finding drives our sixth
proposition:
P6: Data breach awareness affects users’ perception of situational
characteristics.
As in our discussion of proposition 5, we note that prior IS security research supports the
view that users’ perceptions and beliefs change when adverse events occur (Rhee et al.
2009). IS researchers have found that data breaches result changes to customer behavior
and can lead to spillover effects that can impact entire industries (Culnan & Williams
2009). Further examination of how data breaches affect users’ perception of situational
characteristics may yield additional discoveries.
Proposition 7
Our participants report that data breaches trigger reassessment of the characteristics of
their data. After becoming aware of a data breach, users across both cases reported reevaluating the value of their data to organizations and offenders. This leads to our
seventh proposition:
P7: Data breach awareness affects users’ perception of data characteristics.
Though IS researchers have found that users exercise personal guardianship selectively
based on their perceptions of the importance of data and its likely security (Chen &
Zahedi 2016), at present, we have uncovered no prior work in the IS field explicitly
studying the relationship between data breaches and user’s reassessment of data
characteristics. Prior research does show that users choose what to share online based on
their perceptions of data value (Tow et al. 2010). Thus, we suggest that future study of
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this proposition could form a foundation enabling meaningful contributions to
understanding user’s decision-making online.
Proposition 8
Across both cases, users reported that data breaches affected their external guardianship
beliefs. In the Equifax case, many users formed their initial external guardianship beliefs
about the firm for the first time after notification of the breach. In the Facebook case,
users were more likely to report changes to, rather than instantiation of, guardianship
beliefs. Nevertheless, in both cases, data breach awareness played a role in user’s external
guardianship beliefs. Thus, we propose:
P8: Data breach awareness affects users’ external guardianship beliefs.
Though IS security research in this area has generally focused on preventing data
breaches, prior IS research in the realm of service recovery foreshadowed our findings
regarding a relationship between data breach awareness and user’s external guardianship
beliefs, having shown effects on user continuance intentions occur when organizations
experience a data breach (Goode et al. 2017). However, given that this research focused
solely on means by which organizations could mitigate adverse outcomes post-breach,
there remains a wide field of investigation available related to this proposition.
Proposition 9
User online routines are composed of a user’s “online activity” and “personal
guardianship behaviors” (Yar 2005). In the Facebook case, many users reported changes
to their online activities after the breach, while in the case of Equifax, users generally did
not report a change to their online activity. Across both cases participants reported that,
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when they became aware of a data breach, they changed their personal guardianship
behaviors. Thus, we propose:
P9: Data breach awareness affects users’ online routines.
We have found little existing research that examines this relationship explicitly and
centrally in the context of individual users outside a work context. Future research is
necessary to identify the boundary conditions that govern when a user changes their
online activity and personal guardianship behaviors, as compared to those contexts in
which users’ change their personal guardianship behaviors alone, and to identify cases of
which users make no changes. Longitudinal studies capable of establishing causation
would be of particular help building understanding of relationship described by this
proposition. In short, we believe that the dynamic between data breach awareness and
users’ online routines, in all its variations, warrants extensive scrutiny.

Summary
In this chapter, we discussed how our findings answer our two research questions,
introduced propositions based on these findings and related those propositions to prior
research. In our next chapter, we will present our conclusions including contributions to
theory and practice, study limitations, and directions for future research.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions
Introduction
This chapter is presented in three sections: contributions to theory and practice, directions
for future research, and study limitations. The contribution section relates
the findings and propositions in the chapter five to existing literature. In areas that prior
literature fails to cover or where our findings diverge those of prior works, we articulate
how the results of our study fit with the extant nomological network.
The goal of our study has been to use Routine Activity Theory to illuminate the process
by which users outside organizations determine their online routines, how the process is
affected by awareness of a data breach, and in what manner user reliance on external
guardians over which they have little to no control affected this process.
At the end of our research we understand this process somewhat better. We know now
that user’s online routines are affected by individual, situational, and data characteristics.
We also now understand that there exist relationships between these characteristics and
users’ beliefs about external guardians, and that these relationships are complex and
multi-faceted. We have also seen that users’ awareness of external guardianship of their
data is affected by whether users interact with a guardian actively or passively through a
third party. We found support for a relationship between users’ external guardianship
beliefs and online routines, but it is also clear from our analysis that beliefs about
guardianship are not the only factors that users consider with determining these routines
and deciding whether to alter their online routines after a breach occurs.
Users change their beliefs about themselves, their online environment, their data, and
their external guardians when breaches occur. Breaches can act as trigger moments
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resulting in widespread changes to perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. Additionally, we
have learned that users react to data breaches even when their data is not directly
impacted, as was shown by users in our Facebook case, who were aware of but not
targets of that data compromise. Also, we have seen that the manner in which data
breaches are announced and the timeliness with which affected users are notified has an
effect on users’ external guardianship beliefs. It is our earnest hope that work has made
valuable contributions to understanding the process by which users determine their online
routines, in light of their reliance on external guardians, and how this process is affected
by awareness of a data breach. In the next section, we outline specific contributions to the
literature present in this dissertation.

Contributions
In this section, we present our contributions to theory first and then contributions to
practice.
Theory
This research extends our current knowledge in the IS security socio-behavioral research
stream which positions security within the realm of human decision making (Hua &
Bapna 2013). Our first contribution to theory is identification of three theoretical
categories that affect user’s online routines: individual characteristics, situational
characteristics, and data characteristics. Versions of these categories have been employed
within IS literature in the past. Prior IS security research has shown that individual
characteristics significantly affect security perceptions (Wright & Marett 2010), decisionmaking (Dinev & Hu 2007), and behaviors (Rhee et al. 2009). Prior IS research on trust
states that users consider situational characteristics such as structural assurance when
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choosing which behaviors and technologies to adopt (McKnight & Chervany 2000,
McKnight and Chervany 2001b, McKnight et al. 2011). To a limited extent, prior RAT
research includes data value as a construct that affects the decision making of both
guardians and offenders (Cavusoglu et al. 2008 and Png & Wang 2009). Our work
extends these findings. Our contribution here lies in the application of these categories to
users’ determination of online routines.
Our second theoretical contribution elaborates on RAT. In our work, we introduced
partitioning of the guardianship construct into a binary. Prior RAT research on the role of
guardianship in online crime considers physical, social, technological, and national
guardianship constructs in addition to the personal guardianship construct (Yar 2005,
Bossler & Holt 2009, Williams 2015, and Leukfeldt & Yar 2016). These affect the
guardianship an organization provides, but the mechanisms such constructs represent are
not subject to separate assessment and alteration by users. Thus, we have argued that,
when studying the target/guardian dyad, a simple division between personal guardianship
and external guardianship is most useful and appropriate. The reduction of guardianship
to this binary enabled us to gain insight into users’ beliefs about external guardians.
As anticipated by prior works, we found that users do not always know which
organizations hold their data or what forms of guardianship those organizations employ
(Schneider 2009). We built on that understanding through the discovery that the
development of external guardianship beliefs can be triggered by awareness of a breach.
Our research also presents the new but logical finding that when a user holds a negative
view of an external guardian prior to a breach, their external guardianship beliefs are
unchanged by the breach announcement. We also discovered that users perceive
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mandatoriness to be a relative concept and include both a literal inability to remove
themselves from an online relationship as well as a practical inability to sever an online
relationship, when describing online routines that they must continue to perform.
We found support for a relationship between external guardianship beliefs and online
routine, a relationship not adequately covered by prior IS security research. Our evidence
shows that external guardianship beliefs influence users’ adoption of personal protective
behaviors and to some extent online activity as well.
Though existing research has already shown that data breaches affect consumers’
perception of firms and their continuance intentions (Goode et al. 2017), our research
confirms that data breach awareness affects online routines. We uncovered complexity in
the nature of this effect that highlights the need for further research to identify the
conditions that govern when a user changes their online activity and personal
guardianship behaviors, when users change personal guardianship behaviors alone, and
under what circumstances users make no changes. Furthermore, our study shows that data
breach awareness affects individual, situational, and data characteristics, triggering
revisions to each with the following caveat: when awareness of a data breach supported
rather than challenged a perception of a characteristic that characteristic did not change.
Practice
This research also has implications for practitioners. Firstly, our research indicates that
when making breach announcements organizations should act promptly, take
responsibility for the security lapse, and clearly convey what improvements the firm will
undertake to ameliorate any negative effects and prevent future breaches. Secondly, we
have learned that breaches serve as trigger moments for the adoption of improved
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personal guardianship behaviors. This finding has relevance for firms offering protective
measures, security-oriented non-profits, and government agencies charged with
improving the online safety. In the period after a noteworthy breach or series of breaches,
users are likely to seek out new methods of self-protection. Firms with products or
services enabling such self-protection should consider marketing strategies in alignment
with this finding. In turn, government agencies and security-oriented non-profits should
consider the interval after a noteworthy breach or series of breaches opportune for the
release of relevant cybersecurity training materials.
Lastly, we wish to highlight for policy makers the expectations users expressed regarding
structural assurances. Participants reported a presumption that structural assurances in the
form of regulations and opportunities for civil suits applied when their data was held by
an organization and comprised during a data breach experienced by that organization.
This assumption affected users’ online routines. When expectation and reality are out of
alignment on matters of safety, a dangerous ambiguity is formed. Policy makers should
consider the benefit of alterations to our laws and regulations to bring them into
alignment with user expectations or else assess methods to improve users’ understanding
of the laws and regulations as they stand, in order to resolve this area of
misunderstanding.

Directions for Future Research
In chapter five, we innumerate nine propositions, the further study of which we feel
would enable scholars to better predict user decision-making in this period of frequent
data breaches. In addition to these avenues for future research, we add here one final area
for exploration.
107

The Missing Motivated Offender
In our research, we have examined the relationship between the user and the
organization. To do this we employed Routine Activity Theory to shed light on the
dynamics present in the interaction between these two actors. As a conscious decision,
we omitted from our study and our interview questions the third actor present in this
criminology theory: the motivated offender. Nevertheless, the motivated offender peaked
from the edges of our data. This is not surprising. If we had researched the interaction
between 7-11 owners and customers who had been present when the 7-11 was robbed, we
would reasonably have expected the occasional mention of the masked gunman. What
was surprising was that in all our interviews not one negative word was said about the
attackers who took the data. Offenders were described not only in neutral terms, almost
like the weather, but also with positive diction. They are “savvy,” “resourceful,” and
“creative.” These are not the kind of language we expected to hear in relation to the
villains of the piece. This creates a point of interest. Our research indicates that users, at
present, place blame for breaches on the organization breached. This is a marked
difference from offline interactions where individuals usually place the blame for stolen
material on the robber. We consider this puzzling revelation worth investigation.
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Limitations
This study examined data breaches in light of the user’s routine activities. It did not
consider external social or environmental factors. Additionally, the study used a single
method: qualitative case study interviews. While we believe this method is most
appropriate given our research questions, other methodologies may provide additional
insight into these phenomena. A further limitation is that data gathered was self-reported
and much of it retrospective. Self-report can provide valuable insight into an individual’s
experience of an event. However, information provided in this way cannot be assumed to
be objectively accurate. Future use of objective measures that track individual behavior
prior to and subsequent to a breach could be used to test the robustness of our findings.
Recruitment for this study employed self-selection and snowball sampling. We attempted
to mitigate the potential biases of our sampling methods through purposive selection of
those who entered our selection process. However, our final samples for both cases
illustrate the tendency of snowball samples to reflect the characteristics of those
recruiting. Further, our final sample was not representative of national demographics, a
more diverse sample may have resulted in more transferable findings. While efforts were
made to gather a representative sample of participants, restrictions of time, geography,
and reach may limit the transferability of these findings.
Another limitation is the specific breaches selected: the Equifax and Facebook breaches
were chosen because they affected a substantial portion of the US population and
represented different types of data breach. However, it is possible that the selection of
different breaches would result in different results. Additionally, during the process of
data collection, it became evident that we would be unable to recruit an adequate number
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of Facebook participants in the available time frame. We thus expanded our inclusion
criteria to allow users who were aware of the Facebook breach, but who were not notified
that their data had been compromised. It is possible that using only participants whose
data was breached would have yielded different results.
It is our hope that future research will mitigate these known limitations as well as any we
have overlooked, and that this work will provide a foundation for future exploration into
the relationship between users and those whose role it is to guard them from harm.
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Appendix A
Recruitment Flyer
University of Memphis

Participants Wanted for a Research
Study
Examining Breach and Post-Breach Behaviors and Attitudes
The goal of this study is to increase our understanding of the
behaviors and assumptions individuals make related to their
data and how it is protected and the effects that being the victim
of a data breach has on those behaviors and assumptions. If
you choose to participate, you will be asked a series of
questions about your attitude, behaviors, and experiences. This
will take approximately one hour.
By doing this study, we hope to learn about how data
breaches affect people.
You must be at least 18 years old to participate.
You must be a US resident to participate. To
participate, you must have been a victim of either
the Equifax data breach, the Facebook data
breach, or both.
To learn more about this research, contact Ruby Booth
(rbooth@memphis.edu).
This research is conducted under the direction of Dr.
Sandra Richardson, Associate Professor of Business
Information and Technology at the University of
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Memphis. To contact Dr. Richardson email
srchrdsn@memphis.edu
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Recruitment Social Media post
University of Memphis
Participants Wanted for a Research Study
please share
Examining Breach and Post-Breach Behaviors and Attitudes
The goal of this study is to increase our understanding of the behaviors
and assumptions individuals make related to their data and how it is
protected and the effects that being the victim of a data breach has on
those behaviors and assumptions. If you choose to participate, you will be
asked a series of questions about your attitude, behaviors, and
experiences. This will take approximately one hour.
By doing this study, we hope to learn about how data breaches affect
people.
You must be at least 18 years old to participate.
You must be a US resident to participate. To participate,
you must have been a victim of either the Equifax data
breach, the Facebook data breach, or both.
To learn more about this research, contact Ruby Booth
(rbooth@memphis.edu).
This research is conducted under the direction of Dr. Sandra Richardson,
Associate Professor of Business Information and Technology at the
University of Memphis. To contact Dr. Richardson email
srchrdsn@memphis.edu
please share
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Recruitment Email
Subject Line: Participants being sought for a voluntary data breach research study

This email message is an approved request for participation in research
that has been approved or declared exempt by the University of Memphis
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
You are being invited to take part in a research study about data
breaches. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be
one of approximately 50 people to do so.
The goal of this study is to increase our understanding of the
behaviors and assumptions individuals make related to their data
and how it is protected and the effects that being the victim of a
data breach has on those behaviors and assumptions. If you
choose to participate, you will be asked a series of questions
about your attitude, behaviors, and experiences. This will take
approximately one hour.
You must be at least 18 years old to participate.
You must be a US resident to participate.
To participate, you must have been a victim of either the Equifax
data breach, the Facebook data breach, or both.
By doing this study, we hope to learn about how data breaches
affect people.
This research is conducted under the direction of Dr. Sandra
Richardson, Associate Professor of Business Information and
Technology at the University of Memphis. To contact Dr.
Richardson email srchrdsn@memphis.edu
To learn more about this research, contact Ruby Booth
(rbooth@memphis.edu).

126

Feel free to forward this message to anyone you think might be
interested in participating!
Thank you.
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Appendix B
Consent for Research Participation
Examining Breach Behaviors: Individual
Change in the Aftermath of Information
Compromise
Ruby Booth, University of Memphis
Sandra Richardson, University of
Memphis
901-484-8685,
rbooth@memphis.edu
srchrdsn@memphis.edu

Title

Researcher(s)

Researchers Contact Information

You are being asked to participate in a research study. The box below highlights
key information for you to consider when deciding if you want to participate.
More detailed information is provided below the box. Please ask the
researcher(s) any questions about the study before you make your decision. If
you volunteer, you will be one of 30-80 people to do so.
Key Information for You to Consider

Voluntary Consent: You are being asked to volunteer for a research study. It
is up to you whether you choose to participate or not. There will be no penalty of
loss of benefit to which you are otherwise entitled if you choose not to
participate or discontinue participation.
Purpose: The goal of this study is to increase our understanding of the behaviors and
assumptions individuals make related to their data and how it is protected and the
effects that being the victim of a data breach has on those behaviors and assumptions.
If you choose to participate, you will be asked a series of questions about your attitude,
behaviors, and experiences.
Duration: This will take approximately 60 minutes and addition 30 mins follow up
may occur to clarify responses.
Procedures and Activities: You will be asked to answer questions about your
perceptions about how your data is/was protected, your online routines, and your
reactions to discovering that you were affected by a data breach. You will need to be
interviewed by a researcher once during this subject and may be contacted to clarify or
elaborate on your answers in a follow up phone call in the weeks after your interview.
Interviews may take place on campus at University of Memphis or by phone. You will be
asked if you permit audio recording of the interview.
Risk: To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of
harm than you would experience in everyday life.
Benefits: You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study. Your
willingness to take part, however, may, in the future, help society as a whole better
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understand this research topic.
Alternatives: Participation is voluntary, and the only alternative is to not participate.
Who is conducting this research?
Ruby Booth, LI of the University of Memphis, Department of Business Information and
Technology is in charge of the study. Her faculty advisor is Sandra Richardson. There
may be other research team members assisting during the study.
Why is this research being done?
The purpose is to increase our understanding of the behaviors and assumptions
individuals make related to their data and how it is protected and the effects that being
the victim of a data breach has on those behaviors and assumptions. You are being
invited to participate because you were affected by the Equifax or Facebook data
breaches. You are 18 years of age or over, not currently incarcerated, and are not now
nor have ever been an employee of the company associated with your data breach.
How long will I be in this research?
The research will be conducted at University of Memphis. The interview should take
about one hour. After the interview you will receive a transcript of your comments, to
which you may make corrections or clarifications. Correcting or clarifying your
statements, if necessary, may take approximately 30 mins. The total amount of time you
will be asked to volunteer for this study is approximately one hour on the day of your
interview and approximately 30 mins for clarification in the weeks following your
interview.
What happens if I agree to participate in this Research?
If you agree you will be asked to answer questions about your online routines, your
beliefs about organizations that protect your data, and how data breach affects those
beliefs and actions. These questions will take the form of an interview, which will either
take place on the University of Memphis campus or by phone. With your consent, the
audio of interview will be recorded to ensure accurate transcription of your responses.
You may also be contacted in the weeks following your interview to clarify comments
you have made. Throughout this process you can skip any question that makes you
uncomfortable or that you do not wish to answer for any reason. You can, also, stop any
time. We will tell you about any new information that may affect your willingness to
continue participating in the research. We will also provide you with a copy of the final
report, if you wish.
What happens to the information collected for this research?
Information and recordings collected for this research will be used to create a model of
people’s decision making about what they do online before and after experiencing a data
breach. We may publish and/or present the results of this research. However, your
information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study.
When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the
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combined information we have gathered. We may publish the results of this study;
however, you will not be personally identified in these written materials.
After the completion of this research all recordings will be deleted. Transcripts and
related documents will be purged of identifiable data and stored for no longer than five
years under lock and/or on secure computers. After five years all data will be destroyed.
Paper materials will be shredded. Digital materials will be deleted.
How will my privacy and data confidentiality be protected?
We promise to protect your privacy and security of your personal information as best we
can. Although you need to know about some limits to this promise. Measure we will take
include:
All information gathered -- including notes, interview transcripts, and consent documents
-- will be kept in a locked environment or on password protected computers. We will
make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that
you gave us information, or what that information is.
After the completion of this research all recordings will be deleted. Transcripts and
related documents will be purged of identifiable data and stored for no longer than five
years under lock and/or on secure computers. After five years all data will be destroyed.
Paper materials will be shredded. Digital materials will be deleted.
We will keep private all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law.
However, there are some circumstances in which we may have to show your information
to other people. Individuals and organization that monitor this research may be permitted
access to inspect the research records. This monitoring may include access to your
private information and audio recordings. These individual and organization include:
Institutional Review Board
Law Enforcement officials in the event of a disclosure required by law.
What if I want to stop participating in this research?
It is up to you to decide whether you want to volunteer for this study. It is also ok to
decide to end your participation at any time. There is not penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled if you decided to withdraw your participation. Your
decision about participating will not affect your relationship with the researcher(s) or the
University of Memphis.
As described above, you will be audio recorded while performing the activities described
above. Audio recording will be used for creating a transcript of your answers to study
questions. Initial the space below if you consent to the use of audio recording as
described
____ I agree to the use of audio recording.
With your permission, your name will be used in follow up emails to you asking for
clarifications of your comments. Initial the space below if you consent to the use of your
name as described

130

___ I agree to the use of my name in study correspondence.

Name of Adult Participant

Signature of Adult Participant

Date

Researcher Signature (To be completed at the time of Informed Consent)
I have explained the research to the participant and answered all of his/her questions. I
believe that they understand the information described in this consent form and freely
consent to participate.

Name of Research Team
Member

Signature of Research Team
Member
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Date

Appendix C
Eligibility Questions Survey
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. I’d like you to remind you that if there
are questions you do not want to answer or if you wish to stop at any time, you are free to
do so with no consequences.
What is your age?
 18+, include
 Below 18, exclude
Were you notified that your data had been compromised by the Equifax data breach?
 Yes, include
 No, exclude from Equifax questions
Were you notified that your data had been compromised by the Facebook data breach?
 Yes, include
 No, exclude from Facebook questions (revised to allow inclusion for awareness)
Have you ever been an employee of Equifax?
 Yes, exclude from Equifax questions
 No, include
Have you ever been an employee of Facebook?
 Yes, exclude from Facebook questions
 No, include
What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
 Non-binary
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What is your ethnicity?









Caucasian / White
African American / Black
Hispanic / Latino or Latina
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Mixed Race
Other ____________________

What is your age?









Under 18
18-24 years old
25-34 years old
35-44 years old
45-54 years old
55-64 years old
65-74 years old
75 years or older

What is your highest level of education?







High School
Some College
Associates Degree or Professional Certification
Bachelor's Degree
Some Graduate School
Graduate Degree or Professional Degree

What is your approximate household income?









Less than $25,000.
$25,000 to $34,999.
$35,000 to $49,999.
$50,000 to $74,999.
$75,000 to $99,999.
$100,000 to $149,999.
$150,000 to $199,999.
$200,000 or more.
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Appendix D
Interview Script
Introduction
“Thanks for taking the time to talk with me. I’m doing research to investigate people’s
online routines. I’m particularly interested in how you view those responsible for
protecting your data and how your behaviors may have changed after you were notified
that your data was affected by a breach.”
May I record this interview?
May I take notes of our conversation?
We also usually send copies of your transcript to allow you to check for accuracy. Would
you like that?
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Remember, we can stop at any time,
and any questions that you do not feel comfortable answering we can skip.
I’d like to start with your current behaviors online.
[Note: The terms in brackets indicate the text used for each breach. Participants who
experienced the Equifax breach are asked about financial activities and attitudes towards
Equifax. Participants who experienced the Facebook breach are asked about social
activities and attitudes towards Facebook.]
I.
a. I’m interested in your routines online. What kinds of routine [financial /
social] activities do you usually do online in a typical day?
b. Tell me about any safety precautions you routinely take online to protect
yourself or your [financial / social] data.
134

II.

You were notified that your data had been compromised in the
[Equifax/Facebook] breach.
a. How were you notified about the security breach that affected your data?
b. How did the notification affect your view of how risky you think it is to
give your data to [financial/ social media] companies that operate online?
c. Did that feeling of risk affect your perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s
ability to provide protection for your data?
d. How did the notification affect your confidence in your own ability to
protect your information and information systems online?
e. How does that confidence in your own ability to protect your information
and information systems online affect your beliefs about
[Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to provide protection for your data?
f. How did the notification affect your sense of trust that [Equifax/Facebook]
would be willing and able to protect your data?
g. Some people are more innately suspicious than others. Are you more
suspicious (inclined to believe that people are generally out for their own
best interests) or lacking suspicion (inclined to believe that they generally
have other’s best interests at heart), since the breach?
h. How do your feelings of suspicion affect your perception of
[Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to provide protection for your data?
i. Did you take specific steps [like signing up for LifeLock or freezing your
credit / Leaving Facebook, changing your privacy settings, or giving up
use of third-party apps on Facebook]?
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i. [if they use LifeLock due to a free subscription] Will you continue
to subscribe to LifeLock after your free year expires?
j. How well do you think [Equifax/Facebook] is protecting your data now?
k. Do you think [Equifax/Facebook] is doing anything differently now to
keep your data secure?
III.
a. How are your routine [financial / social] activities online different, since
you were notified of the breach?
b. ] What specific changes did you make to your online routines after you
were notified of the breach?
c. How does your current perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to
protect your data affect your online activities?
d. Did you start taking any particular routine safety online precautions after
you were notified of the breach?
e. How does your current perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to
protect your data affect the safety precautions that you take routinely since
you were notified about the breach?
f. Can you think of anything else that changed about what you routinely do
online or how you do it as a result of being notified about the breach?
IV.

I’d like you to think back, if you can, to before you received notification of
the breach.
a. What was your perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to provide
protection for your data before the breach?
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b. did you know about [Equifax/Facebook]’s data collection before the
breach?
c. How did the breach change your perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s
ability to provide protection for your data?
V.

We are looking at whether breach notifications change an affected person’s
beliefs, characteristics, or behaviors. The questions I’m about to ask are about
the way you felt and acted before you were notified that your data had been
affected by the breach.
a. I’m interested in how your online routine was changed by being notified
about the breach. What kinds of [financial / social] activities did you
usually do online in a typical day, before being notified about the breach?
b. How did your perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to protect your
data affect those activities?
c. Tell me about any safety precautions you routinely took online to protect
yourself or your [financial/ social] data before being notified about the
breach.
d. How did your perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to protect your
data affect the safety precautions you took before being notified about the
breach?

VI.

One of the things we are trying to understand is how changes to a person’s
individual characteristics such as attitudes and abilities affect the way you
perceive those who are responsible for protecting your data.
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a. Prior to being notified about the breach, how risky did you think it was to
give your data to [financial/ social media] companies that operate online?
b. How did those perceptions of risk affect your perception of
[Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to protect your data?
c. Prior to being notified about the breach, how confident did you feel about
your own ability to protect your information and information systems
online?
d. Prior to being notified about the breach, how did your level of confidence
in your own ability to protect your information and information systems
online affect your perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to provide
protection for your data?
e. We trust companies to act in certain ways in certain situations. Prior to
being notified about the breach, to what extent did you trust that
[Equifax/Facebook] would be willing and able to protect your data?
f.
i. Prior to being notified about the breach, were you inclined to
believe that people are generally out for their own best interests or
that they generally have other’s best interests at heart?
ii. Prior to being notified about the breach, how did your suspicion
affect your perception of [Equifax/Facebook]’s ability to protect
your data?
VII.

Is there anything further you would like to share with me about your
experiences?
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VIII.

Would you like a copy of our final research document when it is complete?
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Appendix E
Questions Mapped to Research Model
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Appendix F
Equifax: Stage One Codes
Primary Code

Sub-code

Attacker skill level
Breach
Business model
Comparison
Competition
Complacency
Consequences
Convenience
Corporate Nature
Data Characteristics
Data collection
“Do not know”
“don't know what else to do”
Duty of care
Ease of Use
“embarrassing for them”
External Guardianship Beliefs
“extra safety precautions”
Fear
Higher standard
Human nature
“I did not think about Equifax”
“I don’t feel like Equifax is part of my
community”
“I do not think very often about who is
protecting my data”
“I would hope”

Individual Characteristics

“keep an eye on it”
Lack of Awareness
Lack of Care
Likelihood of being targeted

Breach Awareness
Breach Notification
Number of breaches
-------Amount of data
Data value
Sensitive data
--------------

Sub-code’s subcode
---

---------

--------------

--

--

-Risk Perception,
Self-Efficacy in Information
Security,
Suspicion,
Trust
-----

---
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-----

Primary Code

Sub-code

Mandatoriness
Mistakes
“my reputation”
No control
No effect
Not a customer
“on their own side”
Past experience of fraud
Poverty vs Wealth
Regulation
Responsibility on user
Risk Minimization
Safety measures
Security expertise
Selling data
“shocked but not surprised”
“skeptical”
Superficial change
“the dark web”
“the product”
Third party
Tiering data
“trigger moment”
Unintentional change

------------------------Online Activity

Sub-code’s subcode
--------------------------

User Online Routine

Personal Guardianship
Behaviors

Information
Restriction,
Layered security,
Obstacles,
Passwords

Where I work

--

--
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Appendix G
Participant Narratives
P001
P001 was affected by the Equifax breach. She is a white woman, between 35-44 years of
age. She holds a bachelor’s degree in the Humanities, has worked primarily in the service
industry, and reports a household income between $35,000-$49,000. Her face-to-face
interview took place on Feb 26, 2019.
Prior to the Equifax breach P001 says “I did not think about Equifax at all.” She reports,
“I knew that people were collecting my data. I knew that there were data collectors out
there in the world. I did not know really about Equifax specifically, until the breach.”
P001’s online financial routines at that time were similar to her routines today. However,
in the past two years, her financial situation improved substantially. Thus, she reports
some changes due to her improved financial stability. In 2016 and late 2017, she was not
as willing to check financial information such as her credit score, both due to mistaken
beliefs “I was under the impression that checking my credit score too often would hurt
my credit score” and anxiety about her financial standing “Also, I was afraid of what I
would see.” Today she checks her credit score regularly, not as a personal guardianship
behavior resulting from the breach, but because “[showing her credit score] is something
that [her] credit card actually does for me which is pretty sweet.”
Prior to the breach, P001’s personal guardianship behaviors were limited to a set of
common passwords that she uses on various sites. Fear of forgetting passwords motivates
this repetition of use: “If they make me come up with a unique password, I end up having
to do the ‘I’ve forgotten my password’ thing every single time I log in.” In addition to the
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use of passwords, she tried not to access financial information on unsecured networks.
“Like, I wasn’t gonna go to the library and access my bank information. I was going to
do that from trusted machines. I, I don’t think I used the school computers for any kind of
financial information.” Today, her guardianship behaviors are much the same, though she
reported that she now tries to only access financial information “at home and on [her]
own WiFi.” She is also more “attentive to spam emails,” because she is concerned “about
people emailing me viruses by accident.”
Prior to the breach, P001 perceived there being a “a small amount of risk” in giving data
to financial organizations that operated online. She felt that her own risk was small,
because she had little financial stability. “It seemed to me like something that only people
with financial stability need worry about, because I had so little to lose” She still feels
this way. Though she reports “actively trying to change that right now, because … being
financially stable, I feel like I should protect that stability more.”
P001 both now and in the past reports very low feelings of self-efficacy in information
security. In the past, “I did not feel confident. I knew that I was doing my best.” And
today,” I do not think of myself as protecting my information very well. And so, it really
didn’t change my self-assessment of my ability to protect my information. I just kind of
count on my information being lost in the shuffle.”
When it comes to trust in Equifax or in companies in general, P001 reports that she is
“inherently a bit skeptical.” She was reluctant to attribute protective qualities to Equifax,
due to their collection and use of individuals’ data without their consent. “I think there’s
sort of a definition of protection. Like, they weren’t asking us what we wanted them to do
with [our data].” Prior to the breach, she did believe that large companies like Equifax
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would “protect [data] from hackers.” After the breach, her immediate thought was, “oh,
well, people are collecting our data, and they’re not taking care of it at all.”
P001 reports a fairly high faith in humanity. This extends to individuals working for
Equifax, who she sees as “as basically just normal people who have standard level of
flaws and abilities.” This view seems to affect her tolerance of breaches: “people make
mistakes in every profession, and when people make mistakes in financial professions it
affects people’s financial, ah, standing.” Her low SEIS also affects her view of these
individuals within the organization charged with guardianship: “Honestly, I think they are
probably better at it than I am. But that’s not saying very much, because I’m not very
good at protecting by data.”
Overall P001 rarely, if ever, thought about Equifax as a data guardian prior to the data
breach. After the data breach, once the firm came to her attention, she views them as she
does all companies that hold her data. “For the most part, if a company has my data, I
trust it to look after my data if it is in their best interests to look after my data.” When it
comes to Equifax, she feels that they are probably doing more to protect her data than
they were, because the breach was “hugely embarrassing for them.” “I think they
probably implemented new safety protocols. And I think probably what led to the breach
was, just, given a certain amount of time and uniformity of behaviors, people get a little
lackadaisical about things. They stop worrying about things, because there hasn’t been a
problem. And so when there is a problem they’re like: Oh! And they tighten everything
up.” She does not view Equifax negatively for the breach itself, which she sees as an
inevitable part of the environment now. “I just sort of picture [data breaches] as like car

145

accidents. They happen sometimes. They don’t happen sometimes. I don’t feel like I have
a lot of control over the situation.”
P001’s primary concern about data breaches is not financial. She worries instead about
the compromise of her social media accounts. “I feel like people respect me and my
opinion on certain matters, that there are areas where I have expertise and areas in which
I’ve built trust in my peers and my community that I really value, and the thought of
someone hacking into my social media scares me more, because it could ruin my
reputation.”
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P002
P002 was affected by the Equifax breach. He is a white man, between 35-44, who holds a
bachelor’s degree. He works in the Healthcare field and reports an annual household
income of $100,000-149,000. His face-to-face interview took place on March 2, 2019.
P002 is one of the participants for whom the Equifax breach was a trigger moment. “It
was sort of like a trigger moment.… It was more like, well, I guess it's getting worse, so
let's do something.” Prior to the breach his online financial routines consisted of checking
his banking account daily, his credit cards monthly, and his stock portfolio when there
were market fluctuations. These have not changed meaningfully since the breach. What
has changed are his personal guardianship behaviors. Both before and after the breach he
implements two-factor identification whenever possible. However, prior to the breach he
used “pretty much the same [passwords] across the board.” Now he has changed to
password phrases. However, he still describes his passwords as “terrible and not very
secure.”
When it comes to selecting protective measures, P002 uses a tiered system with
passwords chose by risk level. For what he considers low risk sites such as this mortgage
company, he uses simpler passwords. He considers credit card company sites to be
medium risk. High risk site, such as his bank account, are given the highest amount of
security including fingerprint-based log-on access and complex passphrases.
P002 “basically assumed that [financial companies] were insecure,” even prior to the
Equifax breach. But he expressed surprise that “Equifax would be the first that I would
hear from.” He explained that this surprise came from a belief prior to the breach that
given the amount and sensitivity of the data Equifax held, that they would keep their data
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“locked down.” He knew about Equifax and their data collection, but did not think of
them except when accessing his credit report. His perception of their ability as guardians
did not affect his behavior on other sites.
In terms of his own ability to protect his data, P002 feels that he is above average, but
draws a clear distinction between the protections an above average user is capable of that
that of a security expert. “I am not a security expert. Nor do I have one on my staff.” “I
assumed they would be better.”
After the breach, P002 examined his beliefs about Equifax and came to the following
conclusion. “What that makes me think of is, you know, is Equifax more inclined to hire
people or to have in place better rules. I don't think it has anything to do with me. I mean,
now that I think about it, there's no real incentive, because I'm not paying them anything.
So why should they protect my data? If their actual clients, if their data was breached
then I think they have I think they have more incentive to protect that. And if there were
more competition, they would be more interested in holding onto my data. But there's not
lot of competition. It's not like if my data gets out there...it's not like a credit card
company is going to check with the hackers to get it. So it doesn't change anything for
Equifax to have my data available to somebody else. Like my data has no real value
except that they have it. Like, either they have it or they don't. If someone else has it
Equifax doesn't really lose anything by getting hacked. It's not like the data is gone. So I
guess my suspicion is kind of warranted really. There's no incentive for them. “
P002 sees the changes that Equifax made as cosmetic: “they did a PR thing.” He doubts
their willingness to provide additional guardianship, because “they have no more
incentive now other than the bad PR.” He argues, “their business model is still the same.”
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His overall sentiment towards Equifax is quite negative: “So I'm the product they don't
care so much about, right? So, yeah, I'm very suspicious of that. And why would I trust
that, right?” He sees the company as “beholden to their shareholders….that's not me,
right? Unless I'm a majority shareholder in the company.” His view of individual differs
however, even when discussing individuals working for Equifax: “people are different.
You know, if I talked to a person, they might be more interested in my wellbeing.”
When asked if there was any addition information he would like to share, P002 told the
story of why he stopped using the Facebook app:
“I stopped using Facebook a couple of years ago, because they were doing some weird
experimental things on Android users….I read an article that Facebook was doing a
social experiment to see how many crashes it would take for someone to uninstall the
app. And when my app started crashing, frequently, more frequently it had been, I
assumed I was part of that program. … I uninstalled it because I assumed that was part of
the program, not because it was actually crashing. Because that made me feel much more
suspicion that they were actively doing things. Made me much more suspicious. And
then, I mean, you go off and on Facebook because you kind of have to sometimes it feels
like, from a social perspective, but, um but I've never installed the app again.”
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P003
P003 was affected by the Facebook breach. She is a white woman, between the ages of
35 -44, who holds a graduate or professional degree. Her approximate annual household
income is $150,000 - 199,999. Her phone interview took place March 4, 2019.
P003’s primary online social media activities are Facebook, Nextdoor, and YouTube. On
the latter two platforms, she describes herself as “more of a consumer, than a producer.”
Though she does occasionally “upload home videos of the dog and baby” to YouTube.
Her online activity in terms of where she goes online didn’t change much due to the
breach. Her son was born after the breach, though, so her posting frequency on YouTube
did increase due to that life change.
P003’s safety precautions include limiting the information she puts online: “I try to only
give information that I absolutely have to, like as far as stuff on my profile.” She is also
quite conscious of who can view the content she does post. Some content she sees as
acceptable for public view “so the dog, like, okay, so most all of my videos are public.”
Other content she creates for her close social network. “[Videos] that have my son in it.
Those are unlisted. Because I want to be able to share the links with like my parents, my
in-laws, my family. But I don’t want anyone else to really see the video.”
Prior to the Facebook breach, P003 felt that using Facebook and other social media was
fairly low risk. She thought the risk was “pretty directly proportional to your security, to
your behavior. Like I thought the risk to my privacy was, like, what are my privacy
settings, what is my password, do I share password.” Now she feels much less secure,
because she no longer sees her own actions as defining her security. “So that was kind of-- kind of eye opening to me like in some sense it doesn’t matter how careful I am. You
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know, the issue was with my friend. If I have a friend who isn’t then my data is out
there…. And I have obviously not control or no visibility into what my friends are doing
so it’s not like you know I can go to my friends like and be like this one’s not going to be
responsible”
P003 was then and is now fairly suspicious of companies in general but felt that
Facebook was “Like on a scale of 0-10 where 0 is like you know wholly unethical and 10
is perfectly ethical, I thought that they were like an eight. You know. Pretty good.” Now
she views them fairly negatively: “Oh, God, like, 3, 4?” Even so, she says, “I mean I
didn’t have that moment of: I trusted Facebook and the violated my trust.” She says, “I
guess I never had a whole lot of faith in Facebook to protect my data. So, in that sense, I
guess in some ways I was kind of surprised that it happened and in others I wasn’t.”
P003 even questions Facebook’s true business model at this point. “Like maybe they are
just kind of in…like maybe their business isn’t entirely social media, maybe their
business is collecting data and selling it.” She doesn’t believe that Facebook has
improved its security, but instead thinks that “to be honest I think maybe they are just
trying to not get caught, as of now.”
The Facebook breach made P003 much more cautious of what she puts on social media.
“Um, it definitely made me more mindful about just not giving away more data than I
need to on anything. If I’m setting up a profile for anything, for grubhub, whatever, I just
don’t give any more information than I absolutely have to.” The breach also affected how
she feel about using social media. “I guess just inwardly I just accepted that my data is
being used in ways that I did not consent to. Maybe that’s just the price of using
Facebook.”
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P003 feels in some ways trapped by Facebook:
So if it were not for my family being so active on Facebook, I would not do it. But it’s an
easy way to connect with my parents, my siblings, and my friends too. But I would
sacrifice that for my friends, but I won’t for my family. Like, so, my husband quit
Facebook after that happened. And he said he just doesn’t want Facebook to have his
data, that he doesn’t think Facebook deserves to have him as a consumer of their product.
And I kind of feel the same way. Like they don’t really deserve it. Like I’m not using
Facebook because I support them. I’m just using it because I want to keep in touch with
my family and it’s the easiest way.
And in that way it kind of feels bad. It kind of feels like emotional blackmail kind of
thing. Like, we’re not going to protect your data but if you don’t use us then your kind of
cut off from your family, because they all use Facebook and they’re not going to quit.
By far the most emotionally charged and barbed issue for P003 concerns her young son:
Um, so I’ve just kind of accepted that my data is going to be out there. But that’s kind of
weird. You know, like, I find I feel exposed in a way that I didn’t expect to. I have put
pictures of my son on Facebook. So I’m sure his face is in some facial recognition
software out there. I don’t know exactly how I feel about it. Whether I should just…I
should have been, like really strict, like not putting any pictures of him on Facebook. My
family will just have to deal with it. We can text and do other sorts of things. Or if like
it’s unavoidable, like, even if I don’t put pictures of him on Facebook like someone else
might. Like an aunt or whatever. And what am I going to do, like, tell them not to?
Right, so I think I have just kind of accepted that um data breaches happen and are
happening probably. And I don’t know how I feel about that yet. Especially will my son.
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Because I can make a choice to have a Facebook profile and to put whatever I want up
there. But I’m posting his pictures on Facebook without his consent. Yeah, so I don’t
know how I feel about that yet. I feel weird about it, but it’s going to take some time for
me to process.
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P004
P004 was affected by the Equifax data breach. He is a white male, between 35-44, who
holds a bachelor’s degree. He reports an approximate annual household income of
$200,000 or above. His
P004 describes himself as “a data person.” He finds looking online at records of
purchases made or things he’s done enjoyable. As a result, he reports reviewing
purchases and investments fairly often both before and after the breach. P004 does not
see a relationship between his online activity (where he goes and what he does) and his
view of Equifax as a data guardian, either before or after the breach.
Prior to the data breach he did not think much about Equifax. Despite knowing that
Equifax had “an enormous amount of data,” he didn’t spend “any time thinking about,
like, what kind of security they might have in place, or even thinking about the fact that
they would be a relatively detrimental target if someone did target them.” Once he was
notified of the breach he “went from not having a perception necessarily to having a
perception that they suck.” Negative phrasing is present throughout his interview in
which he described Equifax variously as “morons” and “the evil you can't do without.”
He feels that any changes Equifax made to their security is “just superficial.”
Prior to the breach, P004 believed, in general, that “a company the size of Equifax would
have been more successful at taking the long-term view and realizing what they need to
do to be successful over a longer period of time.” He felt that organizations were
generally better as assessing their best interests than individuals and that firms’ best
interests over time generally align with pro-social action. In his own words, “I do believe
that companies that have a long view on what is best for them generally will do things
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that are best for everybody…. But the companies that are more short-sighted about that
can act to the detriment of society.” After the breach, he revised this view: “I think that
the Equifax data breach highlighted fact that companies can be just a stupid as
individuals.”
In terms of his own behaviors, he uses strong passwords and a password manager online.
He also now uses different passwords for every site. He is unsure whether this can be
attributed the Equifax breach, rather than to improvements in password management
technology. As a result of the breach, he did consider freezing his credit, but decided that
ongoing job searches made this step too inconvenient.
P004 does not see himself as particularly able to protect himself online, despite a fair
amount of technical knowledge. He believed before the breach that “if [he] used the tools
that were available then [he] would be more secure.” But he views himself as dependent
upon the companies to be able to have secure mechanisms and to make use of the secure
mechanisms. Given his decreased faith in companies, despite using more tools for
security, he has less confidence in his ability to protect himself.
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P005
P005 was affected by the Equifax breach. She is an Asian woman, with a graduate
degree, between 35 and 44 years of age. Her approximate annual household income is
$150,000 - 199,999. Her face-to face interview took place on March 6th, 2019.
P005’s financial activity online didn’t change due to the breach. She still checks her back
account online, deposits checks, pays bills, and does a little stock trading. Even before the
breach she knew that giving data to financial institutions that operate online could be
risky. To her, every business interaction poses a risk “even just from the basic employee
taking your information”. However, she made an effort to protect her data by checking
for https or secure locks on websites, avoiding public wifi, and generally keeping eye on
her accounts. However, she acknowledges that all these efforts are weighed against their
convenience. “Just because when you're busy, your life is busy. You've got kids running
back and forth. You have to weigh that risk of what you want to be able to manage, so I
just take it as one of the things that I know it might happen, might affect me. I know like
my debit card have occasionally been tagged for fraudulent charges. I just had to
minimize [risk].”
She felt before and after the breach that individuals and organizations are both motivated
by their own self-interest, which can sometimes align with the interest of others. Before
the breach, she had a high level of trust in Equifax, “because of their reputation. And,
because we live in a litigious society that if there was very well known, documented
negligence on their part, people would sue. I assumed that they can sue. So most
organizations want to avoid lawsuits; so that keeps them on the straight and narrow.”
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The breach caused P005 to realize that all her data was online. “I didn't really think about
it. I just. I don't know. It's like one those things where you just didn't quite realize all that
information's online.” After that realization, she reported feeling as though she had no
control over her information. “I can only control what I have access to right? So, saving
my information into a website, that is my choice. That is something that I could control. I
don't know that I've ever seen where a bank says you can opt out of having your
information online. So there's no opt out there.”
This lack of control and the unavoidability of Equifax’s possession of her data distressed
her. “So [I’m] not happy, right? I'm not happy that they are major agency. I don't have a
choice in where my information is stored with them. And so, they should have the
highest-level security, the best cyber experts. They should do frequent testing and
monitoring of their systems enough to be able to catch anything like this because we don't
have a choice there.”
P005 said she “want[s] to believe that organizations like that understand their
responsibility to our information.” But she has concerns that “organizations cut a little too
much in terms of cyber expertise, because they get complacent…. They don't innovate
their practices.” This concern is exacerbated by her view that hackers are “very savvy.”
In her view, hackers “find creative ways in and out. And if you don't have a top notch and
creative cyber security team, who is staying abreast of everything going on, your
organization will at some point be breached.”
These days she believes that Equifax is “probably being very vigilant and probably will
be for the next few years.” “I think they are probably gonna be vigilant for a while and
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for now. But I don't trust them to keep my information safe. But I don't have much of a
choice either.”
She concluded her interview by discussing our increasing relance on digital spaces. “Now
we live in a very digital world, so that's just a risk that we have. And I wish there was
other ways. I don't...I like my digital world. I don't want to go off the grid, so to speak. I
think there's some situations, I mean, there's definitely ways that you can't go off the grid.
Right? Credit reporting agencies have your information. Banks have your information.
We don't live in a cash only world.”
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P006
P006 was affected by the Equifax breach. He is a white man between 35-44 years of age,
who attended college. He has an approximate household income of $100,000 - $149,999.
His prior work experience includes working in real estate, military service in the army,
and work in a security field. His phone interview took place on March 4, 2019.
P006 describes himself as “fairly security conscious.” His online activity reflects that. His
only online financial transactions are purchases. For that purpose, he has two credit cards
selected for their fraud protection. If he asses a site as risker he uses “PayPal to a credit
card.”
When P006 discusses his security behaviors online, some pride is evident. “I'm one of the
only people I know that Facebook's visual tagging does not work.” He enjoys creating
amusing and difficult to crack passwords. The Equifax breach made him “mad” and
“incredibly frustrating, because that's not a voluntary service.” “That's one that they are
given [my data] by others for me having the privileged to take part in economy”
He sees giving information to financial companies that operate online as “nightmarishly
awful in all cases.” From his work in real estate, he was very familiar with Equifax’s data
collection practices even prior to the breach. He argues that with their current business
model, true security would be impossible. He sees this mandatoriness as a risk that cannot
be mitigated by the individual. “There's a handful of these that there's nothing you can do
about it. I mean, like, from an individual citizen standpoint.” Given the steps he takes to
control his data security as an individual, the lack of recourse adds to his frustration. “It's
extremely, extremely frustrating, because there's no way to remove your data from
Equifax. It's not like you can send them an email or a letter, even you know, like, sue
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them to remove all your information which they have without your permission.” “There
wasn't even someone I could send a snippy e-mail to.”
“I don't think their security problems are lack of ability. I think they are lack of interest
and allocation of resources. You know, anybody has the ability to absolutely one hundred
percent lock down data by not putting it online. You know, it's one hundred percent in all
cases to that have the ability. Now, and I'm saying this for research purposes, not because
it's not really obvious to you, but we all choose the amount of access to that data based on
convenience for our needs. And for the convenience for their needs for their business
model they have to give incredible access to it. Because people that they have no way of
verifying if they know me or not access my data through their service. For eleven
dollars.”
P006’s perspective that anyone can protect data by taking it offline is unique among are
participants, who otherwise assume that online financial operations are inevitable in the
modern era. He sees Equifax’s business model as logical given their profit motive, but
incapable of providing security. He further believes that “They are going to be wanting to
protect the financial companies that use their service, not the product.” Despite this sense
of inevitable poor data guardianship on the part of Equifax, recent breaches did trigger
changes to his behavior. “I have changed the way I do passwords. I've started using
grammatically correct sentences.” He also signed up for a notification service that alerts
him when his information appears on the dark web. Otherwise, he has accepted these
online security risks as unavoidable and exerts his protective energy in the areas, such as
information rationing, where he feels they would be most productive.
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P007
P007 was affected by both the Equifax and Facebook data breaches. Her data is included
in the Equifax data set, but all her responses will be summarized here. She is a white
woman, between 65 and 74 years of age, who holds a bachelor’s degree. Her approximate
annual household income is $200,000 or above. Her face-to-face interview took place on
March 15, 2019.
P007 manages most of her finances online, including banking online, credit cards,
investments, and retirement accounts. Before the Equifax data breach, she used
passwords that were based on fairly public information such as names. Due to the
Equifax breach, she changed her passwords to “a series of letters, number, and special
characters.” She also now pays attention to her local network: “I do watch who, if
anybody is trying to ping my home network. Because you can tell what devices are
signed on. So, I do watch that for a breach.” She sees herself as an above average user
when it comes to security but expects “Equifax would have more ability than me. They
should. If they don't have somebody that's smarter than me on their IT security, then
shame on them.”
Before the Equifax data breach, P007 “figured companies had safe data.” Partly due to
the security measures in her own workplace, she views sound data protection as a core
business function. She expected Equifax to have excellent security. “I think they should
have had a strong IT department with all the sensitive data they had. They should have
had secure servers. They should have had back up information.” Based on the amount
and sensitivity of the data held by Equifax, she compares them to a bank. “They were
kind of like a bank. I trust that a bank is going to have a safe. Could somebody blow up
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the building and get into the safe? Sure. But could they really? How many people walk
around with a ton of dynamite?” “They should have been protecting their own stuff.
That’s their business. So, in order for them to make money and be trusted they should
have had their safe locked.”
P007’s view of the Facebook breach is somewhat different. She had been a fairly active
user of social media, checking regularly for pictures of children in her family and seeing
what family members were up to. Even before the breach, she viewed these platforms
with caution. “I think it is completely risky to give data to social media companies. I
wouldn't put my home address on there. I don't like them tracking me. I turn that off.”
Based on experiences in her workplace, she was aware of Facebook’s extensive data
collection. Nevertheless, the data compromise surprised her, because “I didn't think they
would sell the data, because they wouldn't share it with companies they had apps with. So
why would they just outright sell their database? Which is what they are doing.” She
knew that Facebook collected data but did not expect them to sell access to what she
interpreted as “their valuable asset.”
To protect herself and her data on social, P007 primarily relied on limited what data she
provided, prior to the breach. After the breach, she changed her privacy settings. She no
longer plays games on social media, nor will she “click forward within the Facebook
app.” She expressed frustration that “Facebook has gotten away from the purpose that I
liked it for, because I could go and just look at the family. And now there's so much crud
that it's not even worth getting on.”
To her, the most upsetting aspect of the Facebook breach was not their giving out access
to users’ data, but instead what they have allowed onto their platform. “To me, that's
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Facebook's biggest thing that they allowed people--- they didn't investigate who was
entering their site and what was being posted. And that to me is a bigger breach than
selling the information. Because, they allowed a foreign government to influence our
election, because they didn't monitor their own business. Now that's...that I think they
should truly be held accountable for. They probably had the right to sell our information,
and we were just stupid and didn't know it. But the other one. They're just not even
monitoring what's on their site. And they could definitely do that. They have the ability.
100%. They were greedy. You know, they were making money, and they were sloppy.”
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P008
P008 was affected by the Equifax breach. He is a white man, between 35-44 years of age,
who holds a bachelor’s degree. His approximate annual household income is $75,000 $99,999. His face-to-face interview took place on March 22, 2019.
P008’s routine financial online activities include Ebay, Paypal, and, less frequently,
investment accounts. He also makes online purchases, usually through Amazon, about
once a week. In terms of personal guardianship behaviors, he changes his passwords
when prompted. After the breach, he froze his credit.
P008 does not see giving data to financial companies that operate online as particularly
risky. Before the breach, he felt that Equifax “probably did a great job of what they were
doing.” This view was mainly due to the fact that since he “never had a problem with
them” there was no reason to view them otherwise. “Why would you think they were not
on top of their problem?”
The Equifax breach affected P008’s view “to some extent,” because protecting data
“should be one of their biggest priorities and they failed it.” However, this did not change
his online activities at all. He feels pretty confident in his ability to protect his data online
and considers himself an average user in that respect. One of the reasons for his lack of
strong concern is: “I'm probably not as big a target as some place like [Equifax], so I
don't see myself as in as big a danger in compromised.” He trusts Equifax a little less, but
mostly believes they are willing to protect his data, but he doubts their ability to do so a
bit: “I think they want to it's just they lost the ball on that one.”
P008 thinks that individuals are generally out for their own self-interest but believes that
this makes them better data guardians than large companies. “I think individuals are
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gonna have a lot more motive for protecting your things than a company would. It affects
an individual. Impact is greater on an individual than it is, I think, on a company.”
P008 believes that Equifax is likely to be protecting his data “better than they were in the
past,” but acknowledges that he is only assuming that they “scrambled to fix their
problems.” Today he believes: “it was in their interest to protect the data and they fell
down on the job.” Overall, the breach had a fairly small effect on his beliefs and routines.
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P009
P009 was affected by the Equifax breach. He is a white man, between 55 – 64 years of
age, who holds an associate degree or professional certification. His approximate annual
household income is $200,000 or more. His face-to-face interview took place on March
27, 2019.
P009’s routine online financial activities include online banking, credit cards, and
purchasing. He has alerts to notify him about purchasing and account balances. He
describes himself as “paranoid about giving my data to people” and feels that giving data
to financial companies that operate online is risky.
Prior to the breach, he did not consider the risk that credit reporting agencies could pose.
“Before, I never really thought about that data from the credit reporting agencies being
out .... It's kind of like the government, you never think about how that information might
get breached or put out to other folks that may not be honest with that information.”
P009 describes the Equifax breach as “an eye-opener” that made him realize “your data is
out there, so you need to protect what you can.” After the breach, he is even more
reluctant to give out information online. He says that he “lost trust in not only Equifax,
but the other credit reporting agencies too.” The breach made him feel as though he didn't
have any control over them having that information.” This lack of control “is one of the
reasons why [he] took steps that they suggested that if your data was possibly breached
you may want to lock your credit reporting, so [he] did that.”
P009 generally feels that individuals are out for their own interests. When it comes to
Equifax, he says: “I just try to do what I can to hold them accountable, which is not
much. Other than do my part, which was get on their site and ask for the data to be
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locked, and stuff like that. Then they followed up with a letter and communication saying
they had done that. That's about all I felt like I could do.”
In terms of Equifax having improve security, P009 has hope, but no trust. “Hopefully
[they are protecting data] a little better than they were before. But do I think they're going
to ace it? No. Will it happen again? Probably. He is, post-breach, even more hesitant “to
give out things like social security number, stuff like that, too much personal data.”
Social security numbers, for example, are “probably a little more than they need to
know.” He also now looks for the address bar lock indicating secure sites, and he tries “to
go to sites where people are generally using, not some site that is not frequented by lots
of folks.”
Despite describing himself as “not a fan of big government,” he said “that's the case
where regulation could be good…. It costs them dollars to obviously protect that data,
and maybe they were trying to not spend those dollars. Therefore, maybe if they'd been a
little more protective, and we'd had some regulations in place, then they would have had
to spend those dollars. “
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P010
P010 was affected by the Equifax breach. He is a British, white man, who has resided in
the US for many years. He is between 55-64 years of age and holds a bachelor’s degree.
He has over forty years of experience in the IT field. He declined to provide income
information. His face-to-face interview took place on March 28, 2019.
P010 describes his online financial activities thusly: “banking and looking at what's left
of my investments, and shopping anyway.” He currently uses a VPN for all site except
Amazon, which throttles VPN connections. He also encrypts whatever data he can. After
the breach, he signed up for credit monitoring.
Pp10 says that “anything online is risky,” but he was still surprised by the Equifax
breach. And, in fact, reports thinking that his perspective before the breach was that
Equifax could provide protection. He acknowledges some cognitive dissonance in this
view: “Even though I've spent so long work in the industry and know that they don't.”
P010 “lost faith” in Equifax after the breach. He says that “if it happens once it can
happen again.” While he considers himself to have an above average ability to protect his
data, He notes that he has no “control over any of the credit agencies having all [his]
information.” He adds that “you've got to rely on companies like that to be solid and in
control.” He also expressed frustration with how long it took for Equifax to notify users
of the breach: “I get annoyed when companies have a breach and wait a few months to
tell you.”
As for how well Equifax is doing now, he thinks they will have improved their security
about “90 something percent.”
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P011
P011 was affected by both the Equifax and Facebook breaches. His information is
included in the Equifax analysis. His interview was unique in format in that post-breach
questions regarding both cases were asked consecutively, followed by pre-breach
questions about both cases. This structure lead to the need for consistent clarification and
was therefore abandoned in future interviews. P011 is a mixed-race man between 35-44
years of age, who has attended some college. His approximate annual household income
is $50,000 - $74,999. He works for the University of Tennessee Health Science Center as
an IT security analyst.
P011’s online financial activities include banking, online billpay, and purchases. His
personal guardianship behaviors include the use of two-factor authentication and a
password manager. He views giving data to financial companies that operate online as
“very risky.” This is a marked change from before the breach when he “expected
[Equifax to have a great precaution against [breaches].”
P001’s initial reaction to the Equifax breach was “Oh, here we are. Another breach.” He
says he did not trust Equifax before and does not trust them now. Though, since the
breach, he expects Equifax to “remediate and probably a year later they'll be improved.”
His generally expectation is that people are about 50/50 benevolent versus self-motivated.
Perhaps more importantly, when it comes to security, he feels that “usually everybody
hears about [the breach] for a week and then goes back to their life and they don't think
anything else.” Companies, he says, are motivated “to watch out for my data otherwise
they lose trust,” especially after a breach when “their stock price can't take another hit.”
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The Equifax breach did not change his protective behaviors much, but he has added a
password manager due to improvements in the availability of those technologies.
P011’s online social media activities are limited to scrolling through Facebook and
making occasional comments. His personal guardianship behaviors include not posting
geolocation data and not posting vacation pictures while actually on vacation. In general,
since the Facebook breach he tries to post on Facebook less. Facebook prompted him to
reset his password, which he did. He also checked his privacy settings.
Since Facebook is a free service, he sees himself as their product. Both before and after
the breach he says he “had zero trust” in Facebook as a data guardian. Given the sheer
volume of data Facebook manages, he feels that they cannot protect user data. Between
user behavior and technical issues, he argues that such protection would be impossible.
“In no way are they actually able to protect all of your data like you would think.” Even
before the Facebook breach, he “never really expected them to do a great job at
[protecting data].” He argues that they cannot provide security, because they are likely to
be targeted by all types of attackers. “They're a big target for everything, hackers, nation
states, and everything else.”
Even with the best technical security possible, P011 feels that “if people don't take
privacy in their own hands, especially when it comes to social media and Facebook, it's
not going to do any good.” That said, he doesn’t believe that Facebook is providing good
technical security. Instead he thinks “they have a better PR firm and probably whatever
else they add but it's definitely going to come down to PR.” He sees future breaches as
“pretty much a fact of life at this point.”
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P012
P012 experienced the Equifax breach. He is a white man, between 35 – 44 years of age,
who attended some graduate school. His approximate annual household income is
$200,000 or more. He has a poly-sci background. His phone interview took place on
March 28, 2019.
P012’s online financial activities include checking his bank account and investments,
online billpay, purchases through Apple Pay or Amazon, and monthly checking of his
credit reports. His personal guardianship behaviors include using two-factor
authentication, using different passwords, only accessing sites through their apps, using
VPNs when on public Wi-Fi, never using public computers, active credit monitoring, and
frozen credit.
When P012 was notified of the Equifax breach he was surprised, because at the time he
saw Equifax as “very good.” But when it happened, he also saw the breach as “kind of
expected.” He describes his view of online risk as “I guess my view is that it's not
whether or not your data will be taken or will you be compromised in some way. It's how
quickly you recognize that you've been compromised.” He sees financial activity online
as less risky that social media, but still risky.
Regulations, in P012’s view, “don't necessarily make it less risky.” He sees regulatory
compliance as “maybe a cop-out.” “If they're complying with the regulation and they've
passed their audit, they don't necessarily have to go above and beyond. So I guess it's, I
have kind of cynical view towards institutions I suppose, and the way they protect
people's data.” “As soon as you regulate, you put a target for them to hit. If they're hitting
that target, they don't have to spend money going above and beyond the target.”
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P012 sees Equifax as just like other financial institutions, though he would like to “hold
them to a higher standard, because of the power that they have over an individual's ability
to obtain credit.” He sees his own ability to protect his data online as above average.
Since the breach, he believes that he has “a greater ability to protect [his] information that
Equifax does.” He believes that “most of what they're doing is probably superficial.”
P012 says that he hasn’t changed much in terms of online routines, since the breach. He
uses VPNs a little more frequently and checks his credit a bit more often, but overall, he
sees his routines as the same. What has changed is his level of caution and skepticism. He
is “more aware of the potential of a theft.” In the past he says, “I perceived Equifax as
capable of protecting my data and felt like they were a beacon in the data protection area
I guess.” The breach shook that trust and the time Equifax took to report the breach to
users disappointed him. “They didn't immediately notify people. They found out they'd
been breached, they sat on it, they tried to fix it, they tried to sweep it under the rug,
instead of just owning it.”
Now, P012 says “I guess just my general outlook is that your data is available. People can
access it. It's how quickly you identify that you've been compromised that matters. It's not
whether or not you'll be compromised.” “And there's humans, there's wires, you can plug
things together, there's the ability to compromise is there. The desire to compromise is
there. People want to steal stuff. It's there. So I mean, I just think it's a reality. And I think
it's taken society a long time to, I guess not really a long time, I'd say about 20 years, to
understand that it is a reality. Your data will be compromised. Things will get hacked.
And just to accept it.”
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P013
P013 experienced the Equifax breach. She is an African American woman, between 4554 years of age, who holds a Graduate or Professional Degree. She runs her own
business, and her approximate annual household income is $35,000 to $49,999. Her
phone interview took place on April 4, 2019.
P013’s online financial activities are limited to banking, QuickBooks, public trading, and
purchasing. Her personal guardianship behaviors include “whatever those strange
requirements are to create a password.” She vigilantly checks her accounts for fraudulent
charges and has notices set for purchases at the lowest threshold available.
P013 had a very consistent message thorough her interview. She does not trust Equifax.
This is her story:
“On my credit report, if you go back more than the 10 years until it rolls off, it looks as if
my house has been in foreclosure. It has never, ever, ever been in foreclosure. Not ever.
There are specific legal things that must occur for you to actually go into foreclosure.
Chase, who is now my current mortgage holder, now, I don't think they would be if I'd
gone into foreclosure. They were my mortgage holder then, too, had me reported as if
going into foreclosure on a second mortgage, which I no longer have. But no matter how
many times I present to Equifax: "this did not occur, there is no legal ... There's nothing.
No notification, no nothing on my end, there's nothing in the courts that would say that
this is true." Every single time, Chase would say, "Oh, it is true." Without any proof
whatsoever. And that stayed ... Well, technically it's not on your credit report because
they only go back 10 years, but the point is I had to wait like three years for it to roll off
my credit report for something that never happened, because a big company said, "Oh,
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yes it did," without any verification of that at all. This is why I don't trust Equifax, which
is why I believe that they're bought.”
Based on this prior experience of Equifax, she has absolutely no trust in them as a data
guardian or user advocate. “Well, the corporation's job is to maximize shareholder
wealth, so I'll think that Equifax will protect data only as much as it lines their balance
sheet, but they do not ... Their balance sheet grows better by not always protecting my
data. They may do it 99% of the time, but it's the 1% that creates the panic that then
allows them to benefit from the panic. That's what I believe about Equifax and all the
other public companies, public credit unions.”
Due to her lack of trust and her beliefs about Equifax’s business model, P013 does not
rely on the security products provided by them. ““Because my belief in that is, again, it's
there to create a false sense of security to then break that false sense of security to then
sell you LifeLock super. They'll supersize it. It never ends.” Since the breach, she is more
cautious about which websites she purchases from. “Well, I used to assume that any
website was probably a safe website if it looked legitimate and I wanted to buy
something, say some flowers. Flowers are a good example. You can call 1-800-Flowers
and send the information anywhere, but I would try to ... I'd just look for the best price
versus looking at a website and going, ‘How is this going to affect my security if I go
through this smaller website?’ The pages and stuff or the pictures are not quite aligned
with the words, because they probably did it themselves. It makes me pay closer attention
to that, and I'd rather pay a few more dollars just to go to someplace that I know the
reputation is there.”
P013 reminisces fondly about the days before Equifax became a publicly traded firm.
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“Well, you know, back a long, long time ago in the land of no gray hair. You were able to
go to the credit bureau on Summer and pull your credit report, people were nice to you,
they would tell you what was on it. It made sense, all the stuff matched up, and it was
really a matter of providing a service to the consumer, the person in front of you. I no
longer feel that. Equifax, and all the public credit bureau companies, are here to create
and to allow certain amount of breaches to benefit their own good. I firmly believe that. I
think that's how they make their money.”
P013 is very aware of the power differential that the current system creates, but her
concerns go further than Equifax, credit bureaus, and the like. “I just feel like we're being
led. We're going to go into a digital world whether you want to be there or not, and it
remains to be seen if that'll work to everybody's benefit or not. High technology, whether
you want it or not. Certain amount of technology I fully support, but I don't need all the
extra bells and whistles. My life was fine without them…. You don't have to do all of it
to have a full life, but I feel like we're being pushed in a direction where the highest
technology is what you're going to have to have, whether you want it or not. And if you're
not within certain income levels, you're just going to be left out. So, you won't even be
able to access what it is you need.”
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P014
P014 was aware of the Facebook breach. She is a white woman, between the ages of 3544, with a graduate or professional degree. Her reported annual household income is
$75,000 - $99,999. Her phone interview took place on April 10, 2019.
Today, P004’s online activities on social media are mainly limited to Facebook, Google
Hangouts, and an online journal accessible by a few close friends. Her routine personal
guardianship behaviors include randomize passwords which she changes monthly. She
describes herself as “incredibly careful about personal information.” She supports this
with examples: “I share very little personal information online, and that includes things
like my birthday. Not the entire date even, but just like the month and the day. I don't
want anybody to know my mother's name, regular or maiden. I don't want anybody to
have my address information. I don't put anything in to do with like cities that I belong
into. I try to keep personal information as private as absolutely possible.”
The Facebook data breach acted as a trigger moment for P014, resulting in substantial
changes to her behaviors. She now thinks sharing data online is “extremely” risky. “It's
very strange, because I think it's something that we knew, we being society, I think we
knew that it wasn't safe, but then there was this realization of exactly how unsafe that
could be. I ended up doing a credit freeze. My credit is still frozen. It was something
where I kind of avoided putting personal, like emotional information out there very
much, except for on my journal, but this is when I started saying, ‘Let's not mention
birthdays, let's not mention any of that.’ That's also where I started limiting purchases.”
As this quote indicates, the Facebook breach affected not only her social media habits,
but also her financial ones. “I try to pay online only for places that I feel confident with,
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so I don't... I'm careful about my purchases and where I purchase and whom I make
purchases through. I have a PayPal account that gets used, primarily for anything that
seems like a small business, because I don't want to put my data through them directly.
Then paying bills and that kind of thing. Amazon gets used for whatever I can't buy
locally. But I'm very careful about where I'm going to put that information.”
Prior to the breach, P014 saw Facebook as a product, like a game or other software. “I
figured that all social media platforms were doing their one thing, and that was the thing
they were doing, and they were all basically doing it the same way. In the same way that I
would download a computer game, and the download goes kind of the same way, and
then I play the game, and then I can take it off the computer when I want to. I felt like
they were much more basic structures than they are.”
The breach changed P014’s feelings about Facebook and the structures in which it
operates. “I feel that there's no actual oversight, and there were no— I don't know of any
penalties or anything, and I don't know that they've lost that many customers, and so I
feel like there's not enough— Why would they bother doing anything if they can still
continue running their business and everything is fine?” This distrust has resulted in a
decision to leave Facebook entirely. “I am very angry, both at myself and at them, for the
lack of knowledge that I had to begin with about how much data was being shared. I still
don't have a really full understanding of what they're taking, and that feels like a pretty
huge violation, which is again why I'm leaving [Facebook], so surprise, which I have
interestingly not announced on Facebook. It can hear me now though. It's going, "Oh no."
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P014 provided a vivid metaphor for the difference between what she thought Facebook
was doing in terms of data collection and guardianship and how she now perceives them.
This is her explanation:
It's the difference between going to a zoo, and then going into the safari, right? I'm
signing up for the zoo, where it's all contained and comfortable, and then finding out that
there's actually no walls and nobody has been given any food, and so everybody's super
hungry, and enjoy your run from the lions!
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P015
P015 was aware of the Facebook breach and affected by the Equifax breach. He is a
white male, between 35-44 years of age, who holds a bachelor’s degree. His approximate
annual household income is between $35,000 to $49,999. His face-to-face interview
regarding the Facebook breach took place on April 11, 2019; he was not interviewed
about his experiences regarding the Equifax breach.
P015’s has been a Facebook user, since the site was restricted to individuals attending
college. His social media activities online currently include Twitter and Facebook. In the
past, he was also an active Reddit user, but he has stopped frequenting Reddit for reasons
unrelated to the Facebook breach. His routine safety precautions include using trusted
networks and privacy settings. He considers himself an average user in terms of
information security ability.
The Facebook beach came to P014’s attention through news sites and social media posts.
His immediate response was “Well, shit, I guess, you know, I'm one of many so I guess I
didn't feel as personally violated since I'm like, well they're violating everyone so.” He
equates the breach to “doing their research for free, since they want to know rather than
paying people to answer all these questions about their personal beliefs by posting or
commenting and all that, I'm just giving the data for free.” He says he doesn’t view
Facebook as risky, because he never viewed it as private to begin with. “I wouldn't call it
risky since it's just sort of like, I mean, I guess it definitely didn't feel like that this is like
my own little place to post my own opinions, and they are limited to whoever's my
friends on there.”
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The Facebook breach did change his perspective somewhat. It “definitely made my
opinions feel more commodified.” But this feeling of commodification didn’t begin with
the breach; this was a feeling that P015 had already begun to have about the site. Around
the time of the breach he stopped using the app… it was about the same time. I think it
was just the growing distrust of Facebook and growing distrust of me being addicted to it.
I stopped using the app, and I did go in and check my privacy settings, too.”
The Facebook breach also changed P015’s view of the value of seemingly innocuous
data. “Again, I guess I really underestimated what value that data might have to others.
Since, like I said before, it felt like a lot ... there was not impediment to share your
thoughts and opinions about things because you're like, ‘Well, everybody's doing this
right now, so it's not very—’ Again, it's like, "Well of course, that's why it's valuable."
But then it's like, "Who would want to have to sift through all of that? But, again, like I
said, it's not sifting through it once you remove the personal, the people out of it, it
becomes more about just the information, the data then it's easier to violate people that
way.”
After the Facebook breach, P015 stopped using the Facebook app and made an effort to
reduce his Facebook use. His attempt to curb his Facebook use was not, in his mind,
directly linked to the breach, but rather to an overall sense that was that checking
Facebook had become an automatic reaction to using his phone: “you know, I wake up
and check the time on my phone, then immediately my thumbs choose to open up
Facebook… Then I'm like, ‘No thumbs, we don't need to look to Facebook right now.’”
Results of this effort have been mixed; during our interview, he jokes that Facebook was
open on the computer behind us.
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One change P015 does attribute to the breach is a decrease in posting. “[The breach] just
makes me less likely to want to participate in Facebook. I think I read more Facebook
than I am writing on Facebook than I used to is probably what I would say is the biggest
change.”
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P016
P016 was aware of the Facebook breach. She is a white woman, between 35-44 years of
age, who holds a graduate or professional degree. Her approximate annual household
income is $50,000 - $74,999. Her phone interview took place on April 14, 2019.
In a typical day, P016 skims Facebook and Instagram for news of her friends. In terms of
current personal guardianship behaviors, she tries not to link accounts to Facebook. She
also restricts the information she puts online “both in terms of the statuses [she posts] and
how specific they are to my location and specific information about me and my life like
pets names, addresses.” She also restricts access to her posts and information using the
site’s privacy controls.
P016 learned about the Facebook breach on the news. The breach made her “aware of
how important the seemingly unimportant stuff was like access to my birthdate or places
that I had been or the town that I live in because those are security questions that people
ask for, for a lot of other sites.” Before the breach, she was aware that “we're kind of
living in an age where we know that there is a risk to the information that we provide.”
After the breach, though, she felt very strongly that “these people are not protecting or
are not capable of protecting our information in a day and age when cyber warfare is
becoming as predominant. She went on to explain, “It made me feel like the company
itself, that whether or not their intention is to protect my data and I question whether or
not their intention really is to protect my data, but it made me aware of the fact that they
are incapable of doing so.” P016 is very scared by her belief that Facebook cannot protect
the data of its “two billion or however many users across the world.” This fear causes her
to “kind of shut down online information as much as I can.”
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The manner in which Facebook dealt with the breach also affected P016’s view of the
firm as a data guardian. “I feel like the number of data breaches that they have had and
the way that they dealt with the data breach being that ... being that there wasn't a lot of
information provided to the users about it. They didn't address it very publicly and then I
feel like when people tried to address it publicly, especially on Facebook, some of those
accounts were shut down and the posts were shut down. So, I felt like Facebook was
trying to kind of cover up the fact that there was a data breach in the first place. So, it
makes me feel like not only are they not capable of protecting my data, but they also
don't want me to have the tools and the information to know that I even need to protect
myself.”
Before the breach, P016 thought of Facebook positively. “I very much kind of lumped
Facebook and Google and a lot of these major organizations into the same category and
…. as this progressive new age of companies that were willing to go the extra distance to
make sure that they protected my security and that they had my own best interests at heart
because they kind of "got it". We were part of this similar generation with similar beliefs
and I put them separate for some reason in my head from a lot of the financial institutions
because I assume that they don't have my best interests at heart, but these other
companies I assume are part of this next wave and next gen that would fight against
governments getting access to our information and would go the extra mile to protect us.
And I don't feel that now.”
P016 feels a good bit of disillusionment since “I had previously used these platforms as
ways of engaging with my friends and had not realized the magnitude of the information
that I was sharing and what these platforms could be used for and how they could affect
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events on such a grand stage. And it ... yeah and it leads me to back away from all of it,
which I feel like can be very isolating in today's day and age. So this thing that I was
using to engage with people from distances is now fraught with danger, which I think
leads me to feel more isolated in a world where I would otherwise engage more
regularly.”
Isolation in the absence of alternatives to Facebook is only part of the negative’s P016 is
now experiencing. She is also wrestling with the ramifications of the breach for herself
and others. “It's terrifying. It is absolutely terrifying to know that the data that they can
gather from us as individuals can lead to affecting national elections or killings in
Myanmar or social uprisings in countries.”
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P017
P017 was aware of the Facebook beach and was affected by the Equifax breach. He is a
white man, between 35-44, who holds a graduate or professional degree. He works for
the US Navy. His approximate annual household income is $35,000 to $49,999. His
phone interview regarding the Facebook breach took place on April 15, 2019; he was not
interviewed regarding the Equifax breach.
P017 describes his online routine thusly: “On a typical day I will say that my activity
consists of maybe reading, like RSS feeds with articles, which will often have or be
prompted by tweets. So I will click and view those tweets generally without being logged
into a Twitter account. Yeah. More rarely I will get a link to a Facebook something,
which I am lately not following those links, yeah, I think in part driven by Facebook's
more aggressively making me log in to engage with those. Let's see, other social media.
I'll check Instagram usually on my phone maybe every other day or so.”
P017’s personal guardianship behaviors include two-factor authentication, unique
passwords, and limited posting. He also has automatic alerts for logins turned on to
ensure he will know is someone else accesses his accounts.
P017 considered the Facebook breach simply confirmatory. “I think by the time this
breach hit the news, I already didn't trust Facebook to keep my information controlled in
a fashion I could understand. So having my account compromised out there meant that
somebody at Facebook didn't approve of could access my information, but plenty of
people that Facebook did approve of, I'm under the impression, could already get my
information.” He did not trust Facebook before the breach, and the breach confirmed that
stance.
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P017 feels that he has a significantly above average ability to protect his data online: “I'll
say maybe, let's call it two-and-a-half sigma above the mean.” He does not see his own
ability to protect his data as coupled with Facebook’s role as a data guardian for the
simple reason that he does not see Facebook as a data guardian. He views Facebook as a
source of risk, rather than a source of risk mitigation. P017 does believe that Facebook
has made some changes to their security, since the breach. But he does not expect these
changes to meaningfully affect the security they provide.
P017 no longer posts often on Facebook. Before the breach, he “had already stepped back
[from Facebook], and [he] didn't feel the need to step back further.” However, for him, as
for many participants, his presence on Facebook is not entirely his to control. “So my
fiancé loves to post pictures of us on Facebook, and I make it clear that I have no secrets
and she should use Facebook as she wants. But I don't love it, and I don't know how to
decouple that. I don't know whether that is because of Facebook just as a social force and
how much of it is concerns about the privacy. Yeah. Although, I guess I am, due to some
other unrelated parts of my life, I am aware that everything that she posts, or I am under
the impression that everything she posts, has been available to anybody who has more
than a passing interest in the connect-the-dots picture of my life.” This quandary of
balancing social responsibility to others with one’s own desire for privacy is a common
and difficult calculus for several of our Facebook breach participants.
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P018
P018 was aware of the Facebook breach and affected by the Equifax breach. She is a
white woman, between 65-74 years of age, with a high school education. Her
approximant annual household income is $100,000 - $149,999. Her face-to-face
interview regarding the Facebook breach and Equifax breaches took place on April 15,
2019. Her data is included in the Facebook case data set.
P018’s online social media activity is limited to Facebook and Instagram, which she
checks daily. Her protective behaviors include using privacy settings to limit who she
allows to access her accounts. She first heard about the Facebook breach on the news.
The breach made her feel that social media was a little riskier than she had previously
though. It also changed her view of Facebook as a guardian. Before the breach she
viewed Facebook as trustworthy. She thought “they had the technology set into place that
it would not be penetrated.” She felt, after the breach, that protecting her data was not a
high priority for Facebook. She realized at that time that she didn’t really understand the
risks posed by social media, nor what steps she should take to protect herself.
The Facebook and Equifax breaches are somewhat intertwined in P018’s mind. She
remembers changing her password and checking her privacy settings on Facebook, but
otherwise most of her revised guardianship behaviors have to do with Equifax and
financial routines. She doesn’t know whether or not her social media data will be
protected now. She feels that Facebook only protects data when protecting that data is
financially beneficial to their bottom line. Since the Facebook breach, P018 gets on
Facebook less often. She is more reluctant to click through links on Facebook. She also
doesn’t accept friend requests as readily.
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In P018’s view, Facebook failed in their social responsibility. “I think that there are
people out there who are very vulnerable and that [Facebook has] a social obligation to
protect them as a company.”
P018 seems much more invested in the Equifax breach. Her online financial activity
includes banking, bill pay, credit cards, investments, and purchases. Her personal
guardianship behaviors have changed since the breach. Once she was notified by Equifax
that her data had been compromised, she signed up for LifeLock, froze her credit,
stopped accessing financial sites anywhere but at home, stopped accessing investments
online at all, and began to check her credit card purchases regularly and contest any
suspicious looking charges.
The Equifax breach caused P018 to feel that sharing financial data online was riskier than
she had though. It also reduced her confidence in Equifax as a guardian. Her selfconfidence increased at the same time, because she identified specific steps that she could
take to make her financial data more secure. With Equifax, she feels a certain partnership:
“I think there is more of a partnership. Like I have a responsibility to protect my data in
partnering with them in the ways to that they can help assist me in protecting my data.”
She is not sure if Equifax is protecting her data any better today than before the breach,
but she is thinks that she is protecting it better, which seems to provide her with some
comfort or confidence.
P018 draws a distinction between Equifax and Facebook as protective entities. She feels
that it benefits Equifax to keep data secure, while people will use Facebook whether their
data is secure or now.
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P019
P019 was aware of the Facebook breach. They are a Caucasian and American
Indian/Alaskan Native, non-binary person with a disability. They are between 18-24
years of age, attended high school, and have an approximate annual household income of
less than $24,000. They have prior of experience of threats and harassment on social
media platforms, which may have affected their experience of this recent breach event.
Their face-to-face interview took place on April 4th, 2019.
P019 uses Facebook “a lot more than [they] should.” They use Instagram “quite a bit,”
which is also owned by Facebook. They use YouTube “hours a day” in the background.
They have reduced their use of Tumblr, since it was bought by Yahoo. They have a
twitter and reddit accounts, but these are not part of their regular routine. They rely on
Facebook Messenger as their primary means of communication, since they have no
phone at present. P019’s personal guardianship behaviors include setting all accounts to
private when created, physically covering their webcam, restricting what they discuss
online or on devices that can go online, and limiting content stored on such devices.
P019 began our interview by raising an issue that ran throughout our discussion. They
feel violated by the auto-sharing of their online activities; examples of this include the
Facebook recent activity sidebar or Spotify/Facebook widget that shows your friend’s
listening behavior. The streaming update of one’s activities, entertainment use, and other
behaviors to all one’s friends recurred throughout P019’s interview as evidence that
Facebook had gone beyond tracking one’s behavior and into consolidating and mapping
that behavior for the consumption of other without asking for consent. They described the
different between the former and the latter thusly: “There is a difference in my brain
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almost between I collected your shopping data that you bought orange juice last week,
and I went around and filmed you in the store.”
Lack of control over their data on the internet is very concerning to P019. They see the
data breach and the information about Facebook’s data collection that became public as a
result of the data breach as evidence that Facebook is “like this giant, monolithic, I guess
mega corp. [Prior to the breach,] I knew they had the data on me, and I knew that there
was things that they were selling to advertisers obviously….[But], it felt like we were just
commodity not being exploited and ringed out.” Prior to the breach they believed that
Facebook was “selling [data] to advertisers and people who were claiming to be
businesses, but they probably didn't just have it out there.” They viewed Facebook as
provided a forum for social interaction in exchange for the use of our data. After the
breach, their assessment changed. “Like there's the added layer now of, ‘Oh, great. I
guess Facebook isn't even doing anything,’ because before it was, ‘Oh, people are always
going to be out to get my stuff,’ and now it's, ‘People are going to be out to get my stuff
and the place where my stuff is kept is not very secure and they don't particularly care
about that.’”
P019 describes the current environment as dystopian, particularly for poor individuals
who cannot afford communication options other than Facebook. “I've always kind of had
this weird feeling of being watched, but that may have been influence from prior internet
experience and so I guess it didn't shift it that much but it more made me feel like instead
of, oh I'm being watched it is everyone is being watched. I feel more like just the
environment we live in is being weaponized against us, things that we pretty much can't
live without, and a lot of people who are in my situation use because it's the only option
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is just...Gosh. It just feels more dystopian I guess is the word. It feels like this shouldn't
be a thing, it shouldn't be allowed but it is and not really we can't do anything about it but
there's not really anything that one specific person can do and it's just like, "Oh, I don't
have a phone right now. I have to use Facebook Messenger for everything I'm going to
do."
Facebook’s lack of guardianship “just adds this other layer of worry, of I've got to be
extra vigilant now to make sure that the people who are going to hurt me don't hurt me
because they have more access.” They seem themselves as below average in their ability
to protect their data online. “Given my circumstance I'd say below average because so
many people know so many things about me from way back when I knew nothing about
protecting privacy and those things, even though I'm able to hide most information about
me know, information about me in the past can very much lead somebody in a
roundabout way to me now. I feel like my privacy is not the best protected in the first
place, and with data breaches happening and me being in that vulnerable position I feel
even more vulnerable.”
P019’s feelings of vulnerability are profound and extend beyond themselves to those
around them with whom they choose to interact in physical spaces as well. “I don't know
if I ever feel physically unsafe because I've been through a lot already and I guess I'm at a
point where I'm just like if somebody decides to do something what could they do to me?
Like there are a million horrible things that could happen to me, but those horrible things
could happen to me for no reason, so what could they do to me reasonably? It doesn't
make me feel necessarily super physically unsafe. It mostly makes me feel bad for the
people who would be around me, like friends who I would have who, like I can't take
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pictures with ever, ever because that's in my phone. They could have access to any
picture in my phone.” (As a point of clarification, when P019 says “they could have
access,” the word “they” refers to malicious people, not companies.)

192

P020
P020 was aware of the Facebook breach. She is a white woman between 35-44 years of
age, who holds a graduate or professional degree. She has worked in both the for-profit
and non-profit sectors. Her approximate annual household income is $200,000 or more.
P020’s online social media activity is limited to Facebook. Her personal guardianship
behaviors are based on limiting access to her posts through Facebook’s privacy settings.
Her profile is set to “unsearchable,” so that people cannot find her account. She has a
LinkedIn account, but it is not part of her routine. She found out about the Facebook
breach from the news and watched the testimony in Washington before Congress.
P020 has always seen social media as risky. She has assumed from the beginning that
information on social media is “not perfectly private.” She never trusted Facebook to
guard data in the way that maybe the user would like. She also “never really had
confidence in [her] own ability to protect [her] information.” She thinks that people are
generally out for themselves and that scales up to corporations also being out for
themselves. After the breach, P020 checked her privacy settings, but made no other
changes. She believes that any changes Facebook has made are likely PR motivated.
P020 explained her perception of attackers online “I also think that attackers are getting
really, really resourceful, and that in any company it is always possible that someone can
breach their data in new and inventive ways.” Because of this belief, P020 behaves as
though any data she shares might become public at any time. “I try to keep in mind, try to
behave in a way that, how do I word this, that I am conscious that anything that I am
putting out that it might get picked up by someone else.”
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P021
P021 was aware of the Facebook breach and affected by the Equifax breach. He is a
white man, between 35-44 years of age, who attended college. His approximate annual
household income is $35,000 to $49,999. His face-to-face interview regarding the
Facebook breach took place on April 18, 2019; he was not interviewed regarding the
Equifax breach.
P021’s online social media activity includes Facebook and Twitter daily and Tumblr less
frequently. His personal guardianship behaviors include strong passwords and password
locked phones. He learned of the Facebook breach from social media posts both posts
from friends and from new sites.
P021’s view of risk was not affected by the breach, because he already assumed [his]
information's free to read by nearly anyone who wanted to.” He has never considered
Facebook a meaningful data guardian. “They are a useful repository and publisher of my
data, or at least the stuff I would like to get out there. They're going to get the rest of it
along with it.”
After the breach, P021 changed passwords and increase protection for online accounts of
which he does value security, such as email accounts. He did not change his protective
behaviors on Facebook, because of his assumption that Facebook is inherently insecure.
He thinks that any effort’s Facebook is currently making to improve data security are
classic examples of closing the barn door after the horses have gone.
When it comes to P021’s own ability to protect his data, he does not see a relationship
between his guardianship and external guardians. “My ability to protect my information
is about keeping my phone out of people's hands and having decent passwords so casual
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criminals or ne'er-do-wells can't mess with me. It's a little like home security in the way
that I don't think it particularly is possible for me at my level to defend against an actual,
professional, or talented, or skilled, or resourced attack. I don't particularly think
Facebook is going to, but those are two different things.” He views himself having fairly
average self-protection abilities.
P021’s risk assessment has been consistent from his earliest days of internet access. “It's
my knowledge of those risks. I don't know how far back we go, but we go all the way
back to the BBS era, my knowledge of those risks is what informs my assumption that
there are no good data guardians. Not with the kind of data I have. From my very, very
first experience with a computer connected to another computer was people going
through and reading supposedly private purity teste results and laughing on BBS's. And
then later, I won't name names, but someone who was in charge of significant
information security in a multi-national, showing how easily publicly accessible
databases were, how you could see who had purchased what, and who was what level of
whatever, and even trace— We could even sit there on Saturday night and trace financial
malfeasance and work out who from what office it had come from, from publicly
available data. Those experiences meant I assumed there were no good data guardians.”
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P022
P022 was affected by both the Facebook and the Experian breach. She is a white female,
between 35-44 years of age, who attended some college. Her approximate annual
household income is $100,000 - $149,999. Her face-to-face interview regarding the
Facebook breach took place on April 19th, 2019; she was not interviewed regarding the
Equifax breach.
P022’s online social media activity consists primarily of Facebook and Facebook
Messenger every day, Instagram every other day, and Linked In occasionally. Her
personal guardianship behaviors include restricting who can see her posts, using
passwords and a password manager. Many of the guardianship behaviors are new.
Though she was notified that she was affected by the Facebook breach, the Equifax
breach, and at least one other breach within a fairly tight timeframe, the real trigger event
for her was an episode of the podcast Reply All that clarified in detail how compromise
of less sensitive data could lead to the compromise of more sensitive data. Once she
understood these connections, P022 changed her protective behaviors. She got a
password manager and began to consider security regularly when online.
Thinking back to before the Facebook breach, P022 says, “what Facebook is did not seem
important, what I put on it did not seem important, so how to protect it did not seem
important.” But now, her view has changed. “It seems more important knowing that
people who want our data go to the non-important places to build a profile so they can get
to the important places.”
P022 does not consider Facebook a data guardian. She equates them with a public space
for posting. “I think of them like a bulletin board in a coffee house. It's a place where I
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can put things. I can control that the people in that coffee house are the ones seeing it, but
somebody could wander in, you know?” She does not consider Facebook secure nor does
she believe that she is capable of protecting her data online. She sees herself as above
average in her ability to enact protective behaviors, but even so does not expect those
behaviors to stop motivated offenders. “I think generally it's like having a house. If
somebody really wants to step inside, they're gonna come get it.” That risk is “just part of
living in the world.”
After the Facebook data breach, P022 actually felt “vindicated,” because it confirmed her
belief that Facebook “cannot and do not and would not” protect her data. She sees
Facebook as like other companies “I assume 99% of companies are there to make a
profit. Facebook is not running Facebook because they think it would be really great if I
could keep up with my friends.... If they can sell it, they will. And if they can make a
profit off of it, they will.
P022 is somewhat comforted by how wrong Facebook sometimes is about her. “It's only
been about two years since we kinda all found out about the secret place in Facebook that
shows who they think you are. And you kinda knew they were doing that, but then to see
it, you're like, why do they care how close I live to where my parents live? You know
what I mean? ... [B]ut it also, so much of it was wrong.... while they're collecting data,
they're still making giant assumptions, because I am not a woman of color who lives
within five miles of my parents. And you know, there were multiple things that were just
completely wrong that I'm like, well, I mean, again, anybody googling me could come up
with some ideas, and they actually would probably get a little closer.”
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P022’s primary security concern relates to her daughter. She has always been “selective
about that” and “Would never post anything that I felt like could be nefarious or
whatever.” But she has recently added the step of asking for her daughter’s permission
before posting. While her daughter is young, it is important that she have a say. “We had
a discussion … I said, ‘Well then, from now on, I need your permission to post about you
or post pictures of you or stories about you.’” She is very conscious that other families
navigate this issue differently, but for her family for now this works.
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P023
P023 was affected by the Facebook breach. He is an African American man, between 25
– 34 years of age, who has attended college. His approximate annual household income is
$25,000 to $34,999. His phone interview took place on April 21, 2019.
For P023, a typical day on social media includes Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and
Patreon. He no longer uses Facebook regularly. He said, “Right now, I'm treating
Facebook like a credit card where I keep it open because I have to.” He has not deleted
his account, though. “I'm not completely closing it out. But yeah. The one good thing
about Facebook and Instagram by extension, is that you're able to disable the app.”
In terms of personal guardianship, P023 is very selective about both what he posts and
who he shares those post with. His one exception to this is political posts: these he makes
public. For him, this serves as an incentive to only post political statements he feels
strongly enough about to share with the world. He does use a unique password for
Facebook, but in general he says that he “go[es] forth in the world when it comes to
internet, knowing that [his] stuff has been breached, pretty much.”
P023 rejects the idea of risk as an aspect of Facebook use. He says “For me, it's more
about exploitation and just how much I'm willing to let people use it to use me for money
without getting anything back. Like I said, everything is out in the open there. If you
really want to hack something you can do it. If I gave a damn, personally. If I wanted to
hack somebody, I could probably figure out how to do it without much effort.” Because
he sees Facebook as fundamentally exploitative, he is more concerned with “the
monetization of people and the fact that it's done so covertly is kind of the more upsetting
factor of it.”
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Nor does P023 have any faith in his own ability to protect his data online. “My
confidence in protecting my own information online was already pretty low [before the
breach], I guess you might say. That's why my tech savviness and my usage of it is
relatively low. But, yeah. I would say ultimately [the breach] did have a negative effect
on [my confidence.]” He does believe that he could learn to protect himself more
effectively, but at present sees himself as below average in respect to self-protection
online.
P023 does not see Facebook as a data guardian. On this topic, he is emphatic. “A data
guardian? I have no faith in Facebook as a data guardian whatsoever. When a company
amasses billions of dollars in such a short amount of time, the idea of them at all having
any kind of perspective towards the best interest of the consumer is laughable, in my
opinion.” He points to the complete lack of competitors to Facebook as a contributing
factor in this. “So they're essentially a monopoly, and therefore you don't really have any
perspective ... you don't have any confidence in their ability to do right by the people.”
He also sees a lack of regulations in the tech space as a contributing factor. He does not
expect a solution to the regulatory issue to be forthcoming given the advanced age and
corruption present in today’s government.
P023 does not feel that Facebook has improved in any way since the breach. In fact he
points to recent events, as evidence that they have not solved their underlying problems.
“No. I mean, if they're doing anything at all, I think they're just doing something to make
themselves look better. Like, recently the New Zealand Park shooting, you know, it was
viewed on Facebook a bunch of times, and at first they said "Oh, they only viewed it this
small amount of time," and then like, incrementally throughout the day, they were forced
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to admit how many times it was actually viewed before it got taken down. Now that's not
necessarily saying that they weren't trying to block that, because that site is huge on
users, so maybe there is a certain... what looks to us like a large chunk, that would filter
through without them being able to get it fast enough. That's very possible, but given
their tendency to lie about it firsthand makes it seem like they're more concerned about
just covering things up instead of actually doing anything.”
The New Zealand Park example is a very public example of Facebook failing to moderate
a volatile situation, but P023 experiences difficulties with Facebook as a responsible
guardian within his own social network. “I'm actually having open communication with a
friend right now who's actually going through some issues where she got people who are
mass reporting her on stuff because they are psychotic and there’s not a real sure-fire
way… to combat that.” He would like to see Facebook help resolve social and political
issues “that Facebook largely helped create.”
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P024
P024 was aware of the Facebook breach. He is an African American man, between 55-64
years of age, who holds a bachelor’s degree. His approximate annual household income
is $50,000 - $74,999. His phone interview took place on April 22nd, 2019.
Facebook is the only social media that P024 uses. His son created an Instagram account
for him, but he has never posted. He does not consciously take any steps to protect
himself online. He does not own a computer; all his Facebook use is through his phone.
P024 heard about the Facebook breach on the news. It didn’t affect his feeling of risk
online, because he does not feel that he does enough online to be at risk. He has noticed
that Facebook has had “a problem with politics in the last couple of years” that he doesn’t
think they have fixed. He believes that “they've worked to resolve it, but they haven't
really come up with anything definite to guarantee our safety.”
P024 thinks that Facebook is huge and that that contributes to their difficulties. “I think
it's kind of gotten out of their hands, it's so big.” He perceives attackers as ubiquitous and
difficult for companies to keep ahead of. “Hackers are everywhere, no matter what you
try to come up with to stop it, they figure a way around it and then you've got to figure a
way to stop that, on and on and on it goes.” But he does feel that, because of all the
attention, Facebook is making an extra effort to keep data secure right now. He is glad
that Facebook is now “taking steps to eliminate certain sites that are deemed dangerous,
like terrorist sites and things like that, racist sites.”
Overall, Facebook breach didn’t affect P024 very much personally. He says, “I'm really a
Luddite as far as that stuff goes, I really am. I think I'm stuck in 2002, that's when I gave
up technology.” He thinks he’s below average in his ability to protect himself online, but
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he isn’t involved enough online for that to matter much to him. He communicates with
“really low amount of friends” and has “a small core group of people I talk to every day.”
One thing about the breach did have a big effect on P024, however. He remembers
“being worried that they were going to go away. "No, no, don't take my Facebook away."
He vividly recalls after the breach, “their stock dropped, they lost a bunch of money and I
was like, "Uh-oh." A lot of people wanted to boycott Facebook, boycott and I was like,
‘But that's the only thing I use.’” P024 might be a luddite with no computer, but his social
interactions on Facebook are an active and valued part of his social support.
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